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Abstract 
The objectives of the study are to assess the fiscal sustainability and development impacts 
of Ghana’s fiscal rule for allocating petroleum revenues to the annual budget against alternative 
fiscal rules - the permanent income and the bird-in-hand rules. Fiscal sustainability is measured 
by government long-term fiscal space in proportion to non-oil GDP, whilst development impacts 
are measured through a dynamic CGE model of Ghana.  
Generally, the study makes four important findings on how fiscal policy triggered by the 
inflow of new petroleum revenues could affect the long-term fiscal sustainability and growth of 
the economy. One, Ghana’s fiscal rule is neither fiscally sustainable nor provide higher impacts 
of petroleum revenues on economic development relative to the permanent income and the bird-
in-hand rules. Two, fiscal sustainability does not necessarily lead to greater development 
outcomes. The bird-in-hand rule is the most fiscally sustainable, but the permanent income rule 
provides higher development outcomes and can move Ghana’s transformation towards a full 
middle income status. Three, institutional quality in a country could lead to efficiency gains in 
government spending. Four, efficiency in government spending could improve on development 
outcomes.  
Ghana could therefore benefit from its petroleum revenues by adopting the permanent 
income rule; and with temporary petroleum revenues, the focus of the country should be on 
current investment of petroleum revenues in building the country’s asset base to support short-
term and long-term growth of the economy. However, this should be complemented with 
strengthening the quality of institutional arrangements to enhance efficiency in government 
spending.  
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1     Background 
The economy of Ghana has transformed from a low growing economy to a high growing 
one over the last three decades. The growth of the economy Ghana’s economic picked after the 
Structural Adjustment Program of the mid 1980s, following periods of low or negative growth 
from the mid 1970s.  Since 2001, the economy has grown at an average of 5% per annum 
(African Development Bank, 2011). In the last five years, Ghana’s economy has been among the 
top performing in Africa, and in 2012 was the fastest growing in the world due mostly to oil 
exports (International Monetary Fund, 2013). For instance, the country’s growth rate increased 
from 3.7% in 2000 to 8.3% in 2008 and then went down to 4.6% in 2009 (Republic of Ghana, 
2010a).  
It is fair to say that growth and FDI has increased significantly since the start of the Third 
Republic. However, there have been major challenges associated with capital shortfalls and fiscal 
mismanagement in recent times (Aryeetey, 2008). This led to declining growth in 2009 which 
was partly attributed to the Global Financial Crisis; and even then, the 4.6% growth rate was 
above the Africa and world averages in that year. Inflation also fell from 40% in 2000 to 11% in 
2006 and then went up to 23% in 2009. It stood at 9% as of November, 2011 due to fiscal 
consolidation and austerity measures (Republic of Ghana, 2010a). 
The country’s poverty levels have however reduced as a result of the many poverty 
reduction programmes largely financed by development partners. In 1999, the population below 
the poverty levels stood at 52% but now stands at 29% which puts Ghana on course to meeting 
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the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty by 2015 (Republic of Ghana, 
2009). Ghana is nevertheless far from meeting many of the other MDGs. 
Ghana’s foreign direct investments increased from US$2 billion in 2009 to US$3.2 
billion in 2011, which put Ghana as the third largest recipient of foreign direct investments in 
Africa following South Africa and Nigeria which received US$5.8 billion and US$8.9 billion 
respectively (UNCTAD, 2012).  
However, the oil wealth is yet to translate into positive development outcomes. Whether 
expected petroleum revenues from oil exploitation will be a window of development opportunity 
depends on the prudent and sustainable management of the revenues.  
In anticipation of petroleum revenues in the midst of weak institutional capacity for 
managing large amounts of capital inflows, Ghana requires appropriate fiscal rules to guide 
allocation of petroleum revenues for budget support to meet her development targets without 
compromising fiscal sustainability.  
Ghana discovered oil and gas in commercial quantities in 2007 and there are concerns 
regarding the sustainable management of revenues that emanate from the exploitation of these 
resources.  
There have been many studies on the impact of petroleum revenues in the economies of 
oil producing countries. Most of the studies on resource revenue management have concentrated 
in the use of either econometric or partial equilibrium models, which leaves out very important 
variables particularly on the behavior of government and institutions and therefore fail to 
measure the impacts of more than one policy or external shocks.  
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They also do not account for the economic interactions between the various markets in a given 
economy. Further, they ignore important inter-sectoral input-output linkages. Models that 
analyze economy-wide impact of resource revenues are General Equilibrium (GE) models.  
However, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have seen little application in 
resource revenue management (see Benjamin et al, 1989; Ghadimi, 2007; and Djiofack and 
Omgba, 2010). In Ghana two recent studies on CGE models, Briesinger et al, (2009) and the 
World Bank (2010) were focused on fiscal options for managing Ghana’s oil windfall. However 
these studies were done before Ghana chose its fiscal rule expressly articulated in the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815).  
Further, existing CGE models generally ignore the role of regulatory and institutional 
arrangements for fiscal management in what has come to be known as absorptive capacity, 
particularly in assessing the impacts of fiscal efficiency. While Ghadimi (2007) examines the 
effect of technical absorptive capacity on investments, there has not been a measure of the effect 
of institutional absorptive capacity in CGE models of resource-rich countries.  
This study examines the link between fiscal sustainability and the development impacts 
of Ghana’s fiscal rule against alternative fiscal rules. It also examines the development impact of 
institutional quality on fiscal rules in the economy. The findings hopefully will guide the 
government of Ghana on sustainable ways of allocating petroleum revenues for budget support 
and how fiscal efficiency could enhance the realization of the country’s development targets. 
1.2    Statement of the Problem 
Resource-rich countries that are benefiting from large inflows of resource revenues encounter a 
number of serious challenges. Resource revenues are subject to high and uncertain price 
volatility and are likely to destabilize the national budget and consequently lead to liquidity 
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problems (International Monetary Fund, 2007). Natural resources are depletable and the case of 
intergenerational equity is therefore another challenge. 
In addition, the inflow of large resource revenues has negative impacts on the economy 
and could lead to ‘Dutch disease’ a situation associated with real currency appreciation and the 
negative impact on non-resource tradable sector (Ibid, 2007).  
The economic performance of most resource-rich countries in the developing world has 
raised doubts regarding the usefulness of these resources (Wurthmann, 2006). Some have 
described the phenomenon as ‘resource curse’ or ‘resource-trap’ (Mikesell, 1997). Some have 
attributed this development to institutional weaknesses (Stevens, 2003; Alayli, 2005), corruption 
and lack of transparency (Wurthmann, 2006). There are many who attribute it to fiscal 
challenges (Moreno and Rodriquez, 2009). Thus the literature on resource curse shows that it is 
not the endowment of these resources that is problematic but the management of the resources 
(Corden and Neary, 1982). 
Ghana’s economy is faced with fiscal challenges which are likely to be aggravated with 
expected petroleum revenues. For some time, excessive spending has been the bane of the 
economy. Especially during election years, government has often resorted to high consumption 
spending rather than capital spending whiles capital projects are usually misguided with little 
impact on the economy. These have led to high deficits, high inflation and crowding out of the 
private sector regarded as the engine of economic growth (Osei and Donfe, 2008). This 
phenomenon has historical roots also in resource-rich countries that are currently facing serious 
developmental challenges. For example, during the 1970s oil boom, resource-rich countries 
resorted to overspending, financing of overambitious projects whiles some even went borrowing 
against oil resources (Karl, 1997). With petroleum revenues coming into the economy, the 
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temptation for Ghana to continue its excessive spending is very high since most of the factors 
that account for such spending are still a feature of the economy. 
Another challenge results from the recent global financial crisis which increased capital 
scarcity to developing countries. Several developing countries who went to the capital market 
during the pre-crisis period for development financing have returned to the International 
Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as a 
consequence of the crisis. For instance, Ghana before the financial crisis raised US$750 million 
from the capital market through its Jubilee bond. The country even weaned itself from the 
International Monetary Fund. However, it has now gone back to the IMF for development 
financing leading to a budget support programme of about US$1 billion for three years starting 
from 2009; and to the World Bank for US$300 million support in 2009. But this is at a huge cost 
to the country due to the accompanying conditionality such as public sector employment freeze 
and divestiture of national strategic assets.  
Before this development, Ghana had received significant debt reliefs of more than US$4 
billion due to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative which decreased its debt 
vulnerability and strengthened debt sustainability. With expected petroleum revenues, overseas 
development financing is likely to scale down (International Monetary Fund, 2009) whiles the 
country continues to suffer from the effect of the global financial crisis. In Section 5 of the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815), government is allowed to collateralize 
petroleum revenues. This already demonstrates Ghana’s debt vulnerability within the medium 
term when petroleum revenues begin to fall and in the long-term when the revenues are depleted 
(World Bank, 2010) and may also weaken its debt sustainability bringing it to its pre-HIPC 
status. 
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In 2011, Ghana’s parliament passed the fiscal model for managing petroleum revenues 
through Act 815. The fiscal rule requires that not more than seventy percent of the annual 
“Benchmark Revenue” from petroleum receipts should be spent through the national budget and 
the balance saved in the Ghana Petroleum Funds. “Benchmark Revenue” is defined as total 
annual petroleum revenue net of the equity financing costs of the national oil company and not 
more than 55% of the remaining carried and participating interest (both allocated to the Ghana 
National Petroleum Company). The fiscal rule was neither based on any analysis of its long-term 
sustainability nor of any empirical assessment of its development impacts.  
Apart from the lack of empirical foundation of Ghana’s fiscal rule, the country is further 
associated with the problem of low absorptive capacity due to weak institutions, non-adherence 
to budget institutions and the inability to invest large inflows of expected petroleum revenues 
efficiently, which would likely affect development outcomes (Ghana Aid Effectiveness Forum, 
2010). These institutional problems could affect the transformation of petroleum revenues to 
economic growth and development. The literature on resource curse confirms that the growth 
performance of resource-rich countries is primarily the result of how resource rents are 
distributed through institutional arrangement (Eifert et al, 2006).  
Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund estimate that Ghana would 
receive annual average revenues of US$1 billion at crude oil price of US$75 per barrel for 20 
years from the first phase of the Jubilee operations. This is expected to extend beyond the stated 
period as many discoveries have been made apart from the Jubilee fields.  
Ghana’s fiscal rule seeks to allocate new revenues from oil to the budget. Theoretically, 
an increase in government revenues from additional sources would lead to increased government 
spending. However, with expected short petroleum revenue horizon, the questions that should be 
 7 
confronted by Ghana is whether its fiscal rule can achieve fiscal sustainability, and whether it 
can have greater development outcomes on the economy.  
Also, there is concern about fiscal efficiency and whether the effect of Government 
expenditure on development could be enhanced with improved spending efficiency resulting 
from improved institutional quality. Resource-rich countries are always confronted with the 
difficulties of how much to spend of their resource revenues and the efficiency of spending; and 
its contribution to avoiding the resource “curse”, the situation Ghana is faced with at the 
moment.  
The objectives of the study are therefore threefold –  
a. To assess the fiscal sustainability of Ghana’s Fiscal rule in comparison with other 
alternative rules;  
b. To assess the development impacts of Ghana’s fiscal rule in comparison with other 
alternative rules; and 
c. To assess the development impacts of fiscal efficiency of fiscal rules. 
1.3       Research Questions 
To accomplish the objectives of the study, the study seeks to answer the following questions. 
a. To what extent is Ghana’s fiscal rule for allocating petroleum revenues to the budget 
more fiscally sustainable relative to other alternative rules? 
b. Does Ghana’s fiscal rule have higher development impacts relative to other alternative 
rules? 
c. To what extent can institutional quality affect the development impacts of fiscal rules? 
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1.4       Methodology 
To answer these questions, three levels of analyses have been conducted. The first 
analysis uses simple fiscal sustainability measures to explain the sustainability of alternative 
fiscal rules. In the second analysis, a dynamic CGE model built for Ghana is used to analyze the 
development impacts of fiscal rules.   In the third analysis, the development impacts of 
institutional quality are measured by the introduction of an institutional quality index in the CGE 
model. 
Fiscal sustainability analyses focused on comparison between Ghana’s rule against 
alternative rules – the Permanent Income (PI) rule and the Bird-in-hand (BIH) rule, by 
computing and analyzing the most sustainable fiscal balance among them.  The PI and BIH rules 
are examined because they are the most commonly used fiscal rules in resource-rich countries. 
The CGE model follows the model developed by Logfren et al, (2002) to analyze the 
economy-wide effects of policies in developing countries. The Mathematical presentation of the 
model is adopted from Briesinger et al, (2011) but has been modified to capture institutional 
quality considerations to address the objectives of the study. 
The model describes the behavior of all economic agents. On the supply side, it assumes 
constant-returns to scale technology with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation 
function between primary inputs. There are three primary factor inputs in our model; labour, 
capital and land. There are also intermediate inputs required to produce each sector’s output. For 
the substitution between primary and intermediate inputs in the production functions, we assume 
a Leontief technology. 
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For commodities that are sold domestically and for exports, a Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) function is applied, while for commodities that have both domestic and 
foreign supply, an Armington Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) is used.  
Labour is mobile across sectors but capital is fixed. An important assumption in the 
model is full-employment. In this model we further assume a diminishing marginal efficiency of 
investment due to the problem of absorptive capacity and incorporate costs of adjustment for 
capital stock and institutional quality index. The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index is used as proxy for institutional quality. The CPIA reflects a measure 
of four clusters of policy and institutional environment which varies across countries. The 
institutional quality index is introduced into the CGE model as a measure of efficiency in the 
policy and institutional environment for managing petroleum revenues, whilst the assumption of 
diminishing marginal efficiency of capital captures the effect of inefficiency on economic 
growth. 
On the demand side, household consumption is allocated across different commodities 
(market and home commodities) in line with Linear Expenditure System (LES) demand 
functions, solved from maximization of a Stone Geary utility function.  On the government side, 
a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function with endogenous taxes is assumed. Savings and 
Investments are endogenously determined. In the foreign sector, commodities are tradable but 
capital and labour are not. Another important assumption in the model is the small open 
economy assumption such that the country does not have influence on world prices of imports 
and exports. The exchange rate is flexible. 
The model is calibrated to the updated Ghana 2007 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
used in Briesinger et al, (2011). The SAM has information covering demand and production 
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structures of 70 detailed sectors, comprising of 27 agricultural subsectors, 33 industrial 
subsectors, and 10 service subsectors. There are two types of households (urban and rural); three 
factor inputs – labour, capital and land. Capital is sector specific and labour is mobile across 
industries.  
In all, 7 policy simulations have been conducted based on 2 main scenarios. The first 
scenario assesses the development impacts of Ghana’s fiscal rule against alternative rules and the 
second scenario assesses the development impacts of fiscal efficiency.  
1.5       Justification and Contributions of the Study 
Fiscal rules by themselves are not sufficient to ensure sustainable development impacts. 
They address the question of how much to spend but ignore the efficiency of spending. Fiscal 
rules must therefore be complemented with the institutional arrangements that make spending 
efficient. Ghana is however associated with weak institutions (World Bank, 2009) and whether 
its fiscal rule would increase the development impacts of petroleum revenues can be measured 
through empirical examination. 
Political and institutional arrangements are the most important determinant of how 
countries with oil perform (World Bank, 2009). The difference in the growth performance of 
resource-rich countries is primarily the result of how resource rents are distributed through 
institutional arrangement (Eifert et al, 2006) and countries that ignore the importance of these 
arrangements and have weak institutional environment will likely see their oil resources turned 
into a curse (Eifert et al, 2002). Also, Ross (1999) identified three reasons why policies have 
failed in countries confronted with development challenges and associates the phenomenon to 
the policies dictated by short-sightedness and excessive spending, the influence of interest 
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groups and lack of accountability as a result of the state not imposing taxes on people and 
depending on resource rents. 
Models of computable general equilibrium applied to fiscal rules in resource management 
excludes efficiency measures such as the quality of institutional arrangements (for example; 
Benjamin et al, 1989; Decaluwé et al, 1990; Ghadimi, 2007; Omgba and Djiofack, 2010; 
Briesinger et al, 2009; World Bank, 2009).  
This is confirmed in Söderbaum (2000) who observed that the theoretical framework of 
computable general equilibrium combines general equilibrium theory, neoclassical micro-
economic optimization behaviour of rational economic agents, as well as some macroeconomic 
features to explain economic, social and environmental policies, but they fail to account for the 
effects associated with “institutional arrangements, ethical issues and the developmental needs of 
a society within an interdisciplinary, pluralistic, holistic, and dynamic approach”.  
Also, in spite of the recent attempts at introducing dynamic features into CGE models, 
these are limited in scope and form. For instance, the models that account for capital 
accumulation as a dynamic process is very silent on regulatory and institutional changes that an 
economy needs to be on the desired path to steady state equilibrium. The lack of incorporation of 
these dynamic features narrows the economy to an “artificial perfect macroeconomic stability” 
(Ackerman, 2005), which inadequately explains the adjustment path to equilibrium.  
The limitations of CGE models in relation to the efficiency of fiscal rules is an important 
gap that need to be addressed. Further, existing CGE models on Ghana’s fiscal rule do not 
incorporate efficiency features, thus ignoring the impact of the efficiency of fiscal rules on 
economic development.  
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The study attempts to address these shortcomings by making four major contributions to the 
literature on CGE models and build on existing frameworks in Ghana.  
a. It seeks to explore the relationship between fiscal sustainability and development 
outcomes, a phenomenon that has not been established.  
b. It incorporates efficiency features associated with institutional quality in a CGE model to 
address a major weakness of CGE models in adequately accounting for the adjustment 
path in a dynamic process.     
c. It is the first empirical analysis of Ghana’s fiscal rule for managing its petroleum 
revenues. The Ghana rule is provided for in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
2011 (Act 815).  
d. It adds to the exiting literature on modeling in Ghana and increases options for policy 
analysis in the development process of the country. 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 2 deals with the current state of fiscal 
management in Ghana and future trends. Chapter 3 covers literature review whilst Chapter 4 
provides estimated petroleum revenues. Chapter 5 deals with analysis of fiscal sustainability of 
fiscal rules, comparing Ghana’s rule with alternative rules – the Permanent Income and Bird-in-
hand rules. Chapter 6 describes the CGE model for Ghana and analyzing the theoretical 
foundations of CGE models and the main features of Ghana’s SAM, the data set to which the 
model has been calibrated. Chapter 7 presents analyses of policy simulations. Chapter 8 
summarizes the findings and conclusions as well as limitations of the study and some 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CURRENT STATE OF FISCAL MANAGEMENT IN GHANA AND FUTURE 
OUTLOOK 
2.1 Introduction 
This section explores Ghana’s macroeconomic environment particularly the fiscal 
framework and its management. It also analyzes the short-term and long-term policy issues 
confronting Ghana as a result of expected petroleum revenues, and how the political economy 
could affect the fiscal policy and the effective use of petroleum revenues. Ghana is confronted 
with important policy questions as it transitions into a major oil producing country including 
issues such as crude oil price volatility, and fiscal sustainability.  
2.2  Fiscal Management with and without Petroleum Revenues 
2.2.1    Fiscal Management before the Onset of Petroleum Revenues 
Ghana’s record of fiscal management over the last two decades showed an economy 
which was vulnerable to external shocks, which destabilized the economy. As a country 
dependent on primary commodities of gold, cocoa and timber, the country’s finances have not 
been stable due to volatilities in the prices of these commodities.  
As a result of these challenges, the economy has been associated with serious fiscal 
problems including fiscal deficits, and poor trade balances. Recent reported poor fiscal 
management led Fitch Ratings to downgrade Ghana’s financial outlook from stable to negative 
in 2009. With uncertainty over petroleum policy and poor fiscal management, Standards and 
Poor’s also downgraded Ghana in 2010 from B+ to B. The rating in 2011 was not different. 
The causes of these fiscal challenges are not far- fetched. Fiscal management has been 
the major problem for the economy largely arising from excessive expenditures to meet the 
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development commitments of the country. These have been compounded by high election year 
spending as a result of the desire to retain political power by the governing party. For example, 
the election years of 2008 and 2012 recorded 14% and 12% of GDP in fiscal deficits 
respectively. 
It must be noted that government revenue over the years has been increasing steadily 
since 2000 with the revenue/GDP ratio increasing from 17.7% in 2000 to 26 percent in 2007, a 
trend mirrored by the increase in tax revenue, largely attributed to increasing efficiency, 
widening the tax net and an increase in the average indirect tax rate, but the rate and size of 
public spending have not been controlled over the years (Republic of Ghana, 2010a). Since 2007, 
the fiscal downturn resulted from increased government spending, including the spending of 
US$750 million raised from the capital market on budget support contrary to the intended use for 
the facility (Ibid, 2010a).  
It is also important to note that there are developments on the global scene with regards to 
oil imports, food and energy sector problems. High crude oil prices in 2007, high food prices, 
and energy subsidies affected economic performance although not as bad as what other 
developing countries experienced.  As a result of this, the macroeconomic gains of the period 
between 2001 and 2007 were eroded with inflation rising to 19%, foreign reserves weakened 
from US$ 2.8 billion down to US$ 1.9 billion, and interest rates increasing from 10 to 25% 
(Bank of Ghana, 2010).   
The Government of Ghana set a fiscal framework to reduce fiscal deficits from 14% in 
2008. Through inflation targeting monetary policy and fiscal adjustments with increased 
domestic revenues, the deficit was reduced to 9.4% of GDP in August 2010, but this reduction 
could not be sustained as 2012 produced a higher deficit of 12% of GDP.  
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As indicated above, the rise in fiscal deficits can largely be attributed to higher public 
expenditures over the years which reached 41% of GDP in 2008 from 37% in 2007 and 34% in 
2006, resulting from spending on increased public wages, energy subsidies, debt service and 
capital expenditures. For instance, the public sector wage bill increased from 8.5% to 11.3% of 
GDP between 2005 and 2008 (World Bank, 2010).  
Apart from the fiscal deficits, the current account deficit also widened by US$1.2 billion 
in 2008 to around 18% of GDP, which was largely due to non-oil imports which grew by US$1 
billion in 2008 from US$6 billion in 2007 (Republic of Ghana, 2010a). Between 2009 and 2011, 
the recurrent balance declined to an average of 9% of GDP due to increased exports arising from 
oil and cocoa exports. In 2011, oil production was 24,451,452 barrels rising from 1,181,088 
barrels in 2010 (Republic of Ghana, 2012). However, oil imports have also continued to 
influence the balance of trade and the budget. This led to postponement of planned increases in 
the prices of petroleum products whiles petroleum subsidies which characterized the period 
reached 2.4% of GDP in 2008. But these measures eventually exposed the weaknesses in the 
fiscal system resulting in a huge fiscal deficit of 14% of GDP by the end of 2008 with its 
negative consequences on macroeconomic stability (see Figures 2-1 and 2-2). 
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Figure 2-1: The Twin Deficit position 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Ghana Article IV Consultations, IMF Country Report, 
2009). 
Figure 2-2: Fiscal Deviations 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Ghana Article IV Consultations, IMF Country Report, 
2009). 
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The financial deficit in the public sector has serious consequences for inflation and public 
debt management, especially through budget deviations, including wiping out private savings 
and investments. The deficits absorb all the savings coming from outside the country as well as 
those mobilized domestically. This has often denied the private sector access to credit and 
therefore the ability to take advantage of economic expansion opportunities.  
The World Bank has observed that if Ghana is to maintain an average GDP growth of 6% 
per annum, then the public sector deficit must be addressed to raise aggregate investments rate 
between 2% to 4.5% (World Bank, 2010). The Government of Ghana and the Bank of Ghana are 
sponsoring a new legislation, the Fiscal Responsibility legislation, to inject fiscal discipline by 
imposing limits on the fiscal framework. Whether this legislation will solve the practical 
difficulties of fiscal deficits has not been examined in detail yet. 
Another fiscal challenge the economy has been facing is government’s management of 
public debts. Government strategy for debt management especially domestic borrowing has not 
responded to the growing development of the financial sector. The fiscal and current account 
deficits exposed the increasing demand for financing. This has been difficult since divestiture 
proceeds which have largely been used to finance deficits are no longer coming in. In fact, the 
twin deficits of 2009 and 2010 were financed from the divestiture of Ghana Telecom to 
Vodafone, the balance of the Eurobond issued in 2007, international reserves and domestic short-
term borrowing.  
The financial situation of the country has increased its debt vulnerability and debt levels 
are likely to reach unsustainable levels with its negative implications for international reserves, 
and the strength of the Ghanaian Cedi. The global financial position following the financial crisis 
and the economic downturn has further increased the debt vulnerability. Foreign Direct 
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Investments are lower, external demand for Ghana’s exports and remittances have also gone 
down due to the economic downturn in Europe and the United States. This qualifies Ghana 
among the countries that are most vulnerable (World Bank, 2009).  
Figure 2-3: Ghana’s Debt Profile (2006 – 2010) 
 
Source: Republic of Ghana (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), Budget and Policy Statements. 
Figure 2-4: Domestic Debt Financing 
 
Source: Republic of Ghana (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), Budget and Policy Statements. 
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From Figures 2-3 and 2-4, Ghana’s debt profile before the rebased GDP showed that 
domestic debts were on the high side due to delays in repayment of domestic debts, high 
domestic financing of fiscal deficits and debt reliefs. However, external debts overtook domestic 
debts following Ghana’s discovery of oil, which did not only improve debt sustainability but also 
raised the country’s credit worthiness.  
In addition to these challenges in Ghana’s fiscal management, the issue of fiscal 
efficiency has undermined the contribution of fiscal management to improving the public 
financial management system and national development for that matter. A fiscally challenged 
country must be concerned about fiscal discipline and efficiency. A country can achieve fiscal 
expansion, fiscal sustainability and intergenerational equity; and yet unable to transform its oil 
wealth into development. Fiscal efficiency is therefore an important requirement to ensuring that 
petroleum revenues do not go to wasteful public spending.  
At the core of fiscal efficiency is a sound public financial management system, which has 
equally been constrained necessitating several reforms in Ghana for enhancing efficiency, 
accountability and transparency in the financial management functions of government. This has 
focused on budget preparation, budget implementation, accounting, cash management, aid and 
debt management, revenue management, procurement and auditing. 
In spite of these reforms, public financial management has not improved. The External 
Review of Public Financial Management (World Bank, 2006) also recognizes that “budget 
information is of poor quality, information on planned expenditures diverges from actual and its 
presentation is not reader friendly to anyone other than budget experts”. Another External 
Review of Public Financial Management (World Bank, 2009) further notes that the budget 
process is highly fragmented, and only less than 45% of expenditure is covered by the Medium 
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Term Expenditure Framework; budget ceilings are less credible and are often ignored by the 
implementing agencies, the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). 
The consistent occurrence of deviations from budget targets and the widening fiscal 
deficits expose the weaknesses in the public financial management system. With petroleum 
revenues expected into the economy and largely through the budget, the challenges will get 
worse. Petroleum revenues will not bring relief to the economy if the efficiency of spending and 
transparency are not enhanced.  
2.2.2    Fiscal Outlook with Petroleum Revenues 
The period before the onset of petroleum revenues was characterized by large fiscal 
deficits, fiscal indiscipline, and high debt levels. The fiscal outlook with the inflow of petroleum 
revenues depends to a large extent on how these challenges can be addressed.  
Between 2009 and 2011, Government fiscal deficit averaged 9% of GDP and is expected 
to decline to 6% of GDP in 2015 (International Monetary Fund, 2013). This is however doubtful 
considering that the deficit level in 2013 stood at 10.8% of GDP and 11.8% in 2012 
(Government of Ghana Official Portal, “Budget Deficit of 10.8 Per cent Recorded In 2013 –Bank 
of Ghana”, 3 April, 2014). The implementation of the new Single Spine Salary Structure has 
further widened the public wage bill by 47% between 2011 and 2012 in nominal terms.  
The International Monetary Fund (2013) further predicts that the current balance could 
increase to 11.9% of GDP in 2014 notwithstanding that oil production is likely to peak during 
this period with oil exports growing. This could be due to the rising imports of consumables, an 
important feature of “Dutch” disease. Petroleum revenues are temporary and may not be able to 
support future sustainable development. Apart from this, the fiscal challenges are unlikely to 
improve due to the following reasons. 
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Debt levels are expected to increase as a result of increased borrowing against expected 
petroleum revenues. Ghana has already legalized collateralization of petroleum revenues and 
contracted a US$3 billion loan from the China Development Bank on the back of petroleum 
revenues. This is in additions to a Jubilee Bond of US$750 million whose repayment is due in 
2017. The country’s debt profile is estimated to have increased by 65% in two years starting 
2009 from US$8.1 billion in December 2008 to US$13.4 billion in May, 2011(The Statesman, 
Ghana’s Debt has Doubled, 1st July, 2011).  
The developments on the debt front is further compounded by uncertainty regarding 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). ODA is likely to scale down as a result of expected 
petroleum revenues. Ghana’s history of ODA and aid flows witnessed a rising trend from 2002 
to 2004, but declined consistently thereafter between 2005 and 2007. However, this trend holds 
for many other developing countries except a few as could be seen from the following Figure 2-
5. 
Figure 2-5: Trends in ODA and Aid as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2009) 
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The common observation in the trend of ODA inflows is the inverse relationship between 
a country’s net flow of ODA and its level of economic development. Thus, countries such as 
Ghana, Cape Verde and South Africa that have made significant progress in economic 
development have experienced a decline in development assistance. Ghana has been declared a 
lower middle income country, and with more petroleum revenues expected to flow in to the 
economy as production of oil increases, there is possibility that official development assistance 
will fall.  
Another source of development assistance to Ghana which will likely fall further is in the 
area of budget support through the Multi Donor Budget Support (MDBS), a programme 
requiring donors to pool resources together for harmonizing development support to Ghana. 
Official statistics show that the MDBS contributed more than US$2 billion in budget support 
since its inception in 2003 and has constituted about 30% of total donor inflows to the country 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2010). There however has been some volatility in 
MDBS support which has likely introduced some instability in the budget as demonstrated in the 
consistent fiscal deficits recorded over the same time. The following Figure 2-6 shows the status 
of MDBS inflows to Ghana. 
Figure 2-6: MDBS Contribution as a percentage of total aid to Ghana 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
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Low ODA inflows coupled with low Foreign Direct Investments will likely bring about a 
decline in real economic growth. Thus, production of oil in Ghana and the expected revenues 
from oil does not only provide the economy a financial relief but also threatens economic 
performance. 
Debt vulnerability is likely not to get better in spite of the petroleum revenues. A 
Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis conducted by the World Bank based on Ghana’s debt 
profile through December 2008 and the macroeconomic framework for 2009 – 2011, 
recommends that there will not be significant change in the medium-term risk of debt distress; 
and this has been confirmed by an updated debt sustainability analysis which shows a rise in debt 
distress (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Moreover, the attempt to borrow on non-
concessional terms against future oil revenue for purposes of posting fiscal consolidation would 
further worsen Ghana’s risk of debt distress. The large fiscal deficits the country records now are 
also likely to take Ghana to unsustainable debt levels.  
However, at current debt levels, the export of oil and inflow of petroleum revenues will 
improve Ghana’s debt sustainability if production levels increase beyond the peak jubilee 
volume of 120,000 barrels per day. Both the solvency and liquidity ratios show that debts in 
proportion to total revenue ratio and debts in proportion to GDP will be reduced indicating that 
Ghana could borrow more. This is complemented by the rebasing of the GDP which saw a 
significant rise in the country’s GDP. However, when pegged against the pre-rebased GDP, 
Ghana could be heading to its pre-High Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt position, spelling 
fiscal dangers for the economy.  
If Ghana is to improve on its fiscal outlook, there must be serious efforts at improving on 
tax collection and controlling public spending but this requires higher institutional quality to 
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achieve. This is also consistent with recent recommendations made by the World Bank to the 
Government, which asked the Government to raise tax collection, reduce expenditures and 
ensure that expenditure cuts do not fall disproportionately on public investments in order to 
protect wages, salaries and other important recurrent cost (World Bank External Review, 2009). 
This was to ensure that fiscal measures did not adversely affect growth substantially with its 
implications for poverty reduction. Government should also correct the country’s twin deficits 
problem if petroleum revenues will translate in to sustainable development.  
Following the global financial crises and decline in foreign resource inflows, Ghana 
needed fiscal space to meet its development targets. Fiscal space refers to the ‘availability of 
budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose without any 
prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s financial position’ (Heller, 2005). Judging by 
this, the inflow of petroleum revenues in 2011 was timely though not sufficient to provide the 
space fully at least for the year.  
Government also became overambitious with its development programme due to the 
expected petroleum revenues, which worsened its fiscal position for 2011. Government’s 
expected fiscal deficit for 2011 had been projected at 5% of GDP, but this was revised to 7% of 
GDP in the Supplementary Budget in spite of the entry of petroleum revenues in the budget. 
Also, fiscal deficit rose sharply in 2012 attributed to subsidies, low disbursement of grants and 
shortfall in petroleum receipts (Republic of Ghana, 2013). The fiscal performance of the 
Government of Ghana is presented in Figure 2-7. 
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Figure 2-7: Ghana’s Fiscal Performance (2005 – 2012) 
 
Source: Republic of Ghana (Various Budget Statements, 2006 – 2013). 
The problem associated with weak institutional infrastructure could undermine the 
development effects of efficient fiscal management. For instance, in a study by the World Bank 
(2009), investment of petroleum revenues within the current status of weak public financial 
management will not bring improvement in the living conditions of the people. As in Figure 2-8 
below, investments of petroleum revenues could lead to lower per capita incomes in the long-run 
compared to a higher per capita income in a non-oil economy. 
Figure 2-8: Real Per Capita Income in Ghana with oil Revenues 
 
Source: World Bank (2009b) Economy-wide impact of oil discovery in Ghana, Report No. 
47321-GH, November 30, 2009. PREM 4 Africa Region. 
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Important reforms are a necessary requirement for improved public financial 
management and investment efficiency for that matter. The government introduced a new legal 
framework, the Financial Administration Act, aimed at strengthening public financial 
management. Government has also enacted a Petroleum Revenue Management Act, and reduced 
the powers of the Minister of Energy under a new Petroleum Commission Act 2011 (Act 821).  
The new legal reforms have also avoided the conflict of interest in the role of the 
National Oil Company, the GNPC (which hitherto performed its commercial functions and 
regulatory functions delegated by the Minister of Energy). A new regulatory regime has been 
introduced by an Act of Parliament, the Petroleum Commission Act, setting up an independent 
regulator of petroleum operations covering upstream regulations including evaluation of 
applications for petroleum licenses. However, the implementation of the Act as well as other 
reforms has been ineffective so far because the Legislative Instruments that are required to give 
effect to the new laws are not yet in place.  
There is no doubt that the public financial management system in Ghana is faced with 
challenges. Some of the challenges are that; institutions are non-compliant with statutory 
regulations and penalties are not enforced. There are also delays in processing payments for 
contractors engaged by government for goods and services and non-timely preparation and 
submission of withdrawal applications to the World Bank for the releases of funds.  
One serious development challenge that has characterized public financial management 
in most developing countries is poor governance of resources and corruption due to low 
institutional absorptive capacity. This phenomenon is what is described as institutional causality 
of “resource curse” (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). This could increase social, economic and political 
inequalities in a country (Gupta et al, 1998), lower economic growth and undermine economic 
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development (Obayelu, 2007). Thus, there is the danger of losing the value of public investments 
and its negative spill-over due to low absorptive capacity, both technical and institutional. This 
could increase the unit cost of public investment and deprive the country of the real value of her 
resources.  
Absorptive capacity constraints could also undermine the rate of capital accumulation 
and for that matter the rate of economic growth. Whiles the causal relationship between 
institutional weaknesses and the capacity to transform natural resources into sustainable capital 
has been contested, it cannot be wished away that quality institutions are important requirements 
for the effective management of public finances. A look at some empirical evidence will be 
helpful. 
Eifert et al, (2002) for instance observe that the disparity existing in the growth 
performance among resource-rich countries is mainly due the institutional arrangement through 
which resource rents are distributed, and oil would likely lead to a curse rather than a blessing if 
these weak institutions are not reversed.  
This is supported by Mehlum et al, (2006) who drew a cross country econometric 
evidence that low growth performance is associated with resource abundant countries with poor 
institutions, while countries with high quality of institutions escape the from this effect. 
Therefore, countries that discover natural resources must work to build on the quality of their 
institutions especially public financial management institutions involved in tax collection, budget 
planning and auditing; as well as regulatory institutions such as licensing authority and 
environmental protection agencies. If there is no leap in the quality of institutions, resource 
wealth may not be able to move society to a “good equilibrium” where the wealth, quality 
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institutions and economic growth converge (Vardy, 2010). Thus, institutions could become 
weaker as a result of resource abundance. 
But there is no consensus on the relationship between growth and weak institutions. For 
example, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and Brunschweiler (2008) show that a negative 
relationship between resource abundance and the low quality of institutions may be due to a 
“convergence effect”. They argue that countries with poor institutions and low level of economic 
development between 1970 - 2000 benefited more in growth performance from resource 
abundance because “they were catching up, having started from lower development” This is 
contrary to the well known claim by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) that resource curse might 
result from weak institutions. This evidence however does not deny the importance of good 
governance in the effective management of natural resources. 
In this wise, Ross (2010) finds econometric evidence that natural resources could 
discourage domestic taxation and thereby limit citizens’ demand for greater transparency and 
accountability. He also suggests that resource wealth could increase the repressive tendencies of 
the state; and that the enclave nature of the natural resources sector may undermine modern 
changes which are relevant to democratic development (Ibid). 
In spite of the lack of consensus, it remains significant for countries with natural resource 
abundance to build minimum quality institutions because initial conditions determine the level to 
which the curse will occur. This reflects the theory of “rent cycling” which emphasizes the 
“existence of institutional quality thresholds below which natural resource discoveries harm a 
country’s development path” (Auty 1993).   
This is due to the fact that quality institutions remove the bottlenecks that slow the rate of 
capital accumulation. Thus, countries with poor institutions may face problems of project 
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feasibility, project selection, project execution, monitoring and evaluation, and the link between 
projects and development impacts, which are all related to public financial management. 
Countries that face these difficulties are said to have low institutional absorptive capacity which 
has implications for transforming natural capital. Table 2-1 below provides a clear comparison in 
the rate of capital accumulation among oil producing countries with different levels of absorptive 
capacity. 
Table 2-1: Effects of Absorptive Capacity on Capital Accumulation – 2000 
Country Natural Capital ($ 
per capita) 
Produced Capital ($ 
per capita) 
Intangible Capital ($ 
per capita) 
Norway 54,828 119,650 299,230 
United Kingdom 7,167 55,239 346,347 
Brazil 6,752 9,643 70,528 
Trinidad and Tobago 30,977 14,485 12,086 
Iran 14,105 3,336 6,581 
Cameroon 4,733 1,749 4,271 
Congo, Republic of 9,330 6,343 -12,158 
Nigeria 4,040 667 -1,959 
Source: World Bank (2006a) “Where is the Wealth of Nations? – Measuring Capital for the 21st 
Century”, Washington DC. 
 
Table 2-1 shows that countries with higher absorptive capacity are able to increase their 
capital stocks than those with low absorptive capacity. For instance, Norway, United Kingdom 
and Brazil have increased their capital stock over the years. On the contrary, the rate of capital 
accumulation in Iran, Cameroon, Congo and Nigeria has been very slow. In fact, Nigeria and 
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Congo further made negative gains in institutional capital, thus, their oil resources have 
weakened state institutions.  
There is a significant relationship between capital accumulation from natural resources 
and welfare maximization and development sustainability. Development is sustainable when 
utility does not fall at any period along the development path (Pezzey, 1989) or where the 
present value of utility along the development path does not fall (Dasgupta, 2001). Thus, the 
fiscal rule of a country should be guided by its level of absorptive capacity. In response to the 
need to take absorptive capacity into consideration, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 
2011 (Act 815) of Ghana provides that allocation of petroleum revenues to the budget should 
take into consideration the level of absorptive capacity. However, how absorptive capacity is 
incorporated into revenue allocation decision has not been addressed by the law. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that Ghana’s economy has been associated with serious fiscal problems 
ranging from high fiscal deficits, high trade balance, and high debt levels. Fiscal deficit by end 
2011 stood at 9% of GDP and is expected to decline to 6% of GDP in 2015. But this is 
dependent on serious fiscal adjustments which are unlikely with the onset of petroleum revenues. 
Trade balance averaged 9% of GDP between 2009 and 2011 and is expected to increase to 
11.9% by 2014 on account of increased oil imports from US$3,165 million in 2011 to US$3,500 
million in 2013. This will further expand government expenditure and introduce another fiscal 
challenge. Debts levels are rising with total net Government debt expected to increase from 
39.9% of GDP in 2011 to 50.5% of GDP in 2015, due to improvement in debt sustainability as a 
result of petroleum revenues. This could take the country’s debts to unsustainable levels and 
crowding out the capacity of the country to service the debts.  
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The fiscal outlook with the onset of petroleum revenues is therefore unlikely to show 
improvement as oil has the potential to fuel more spending, increase debt levels and weaken 
institutions responsible for fiscal management. The economy is also associated with poor public 
financial management systems due to fiscal indiscipline and inefficiency. This demonstrates the 
economy’s low institutional absorptive capacity which has the tendency of undermining the 
impact of petroleum revenues on development.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW OF GHANA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR, FISCAL RULES AND 
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews the literature on the state of Ghana’s oil and gas industry focusing 
on the early history of hydrocarbon development and recent developments leading to commercial 
oil production. The section also provides the theoretical and empirical foundation of fiscal rules 
and fiscal sustainability. It further provides the empirical basis for Computable General 
Equilibrium Models in the analysis of the development impacts of fiscal rules as well as 
measurement options for institutional quality.  
3.2 Brief Overview of Ghana’s Petroleum Sector 
3.2.1 Hydrocarbon Development 
Ghana recently found commercial quantities of oil and gas reserves. Oil exploration in 
reality is not new to the country. Exploration for oil and gas resources started in the 19
th
 Century 
in the Western basin of the country by two companies - Societe Francaise de Petrole of France, 
and the African and Eastern Trade Corporation, which was a subsidiary of the then United Africa 
Company (UAC). These companies drilled wells in onshore Tano areas in the western regions of 
the country.  
Ghana has always wished to find oil in commercial quantities since independence but it 
was not until the 1970s that commercial levels of offshore oil reserves were discovered.  The 
discovery made in the Saltpond basin was operated by Agripetco.  
In 1983, the Government set up the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to 
promote exploration and production. The GNPC signed a number of Agreements in 1989 that led 
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to the entry in Ghana’s offshore oil industry of three companies, two American and one Dutch, 
who spent US$30 million drilling wells in the Tano basin.  
In 1990 production begun even though it was insignificant to make the country an oil 
producing nation and on June 21, 1992, an offshore Tano basin well produced about 6,900 
barrels of crude oil daily. The GNPC then entered into several agreements with oil exploration 
companies including Amoco of the United States, Petro Canada International and Diamond 
Shamrock among others to prospect for oil in offshore blocks between Ada, Tano Basins and the 
Keta Basins respectively.  
In the early 1990s, the GNPC reviewed all earlier oil and gas discoveries to determine 
whether a predominantly local operation might make exploitation more commercially viable. 
The GNPC wanted to set up a floating system for production, storage, off-loading, processing, 
and gas-turbine electricity generation, hoping to produce 22 MMSCF per day, from which 135 
megawatts of power could be generated and fed into the national and regional grid.  
The discovery of oil and gas in 2007 at the Mahogany-1 exploration well was struck by 
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation on the deepwater Kosmos Energy’s West Cape Three Points 
Block, while Ireland’s Tullow Oil announced the findings of its nearby Hyedua-1 well in the 
adjacent Deepwater Tano license. This deepwater find estimated between 800 million and 1.8 
billion barrels of recoverable oil showed that there still exist huge potentials in Ghana’s oil story. 
The new discovery perhaps opened the gate to Ghana’s future prospects as a major oil and gas 
producing nation. 
Since the discovery in the Jubilee Fields, there have been 23 other discoveries in the 
Deep water Tano and West Cape Three Points areas, a significant number of which have been 
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proven to be commercially viable (Daily Graphic, “Commercial production, export of oil yields 
US$1.4 billion revenue for Ghana”, 11th September, 2013). 
There are several active other explorations going on in Ghana’s waters and a reasonable 
activity level onshore in the keta basin. The following map shows Ghana’s hydrocarbon 
exploration space.  
Figure 3-1: Ghana’s Hydrocarbons Exploration Space 
 
Source: Africa Energy 
Following the commercial discovery by Tullow Oil Ghana and Kosmos Energy Ghana, 
Ghana which hitherto had been named ‘a graveyard’ has attracted lots of attention from major oil 
companies. Exxon Mobil, the largest Exploration and Production Company in the world made 
unsuccessful bids to buy a stake in the West Cape Three Points block. The Royal Shell Oil Plc is 
 35 
the latest to announce its interest in securing an exploration license to operate in Ghana. Table 3-
1 shows some offshore blocks that are actively being explored in the country.   
Table 3-1: Oil Blocks Offshore Ghana and Ownership Structure 
Block Ownership 
West Cape Three Points  Kosmos, 30.875% (operator); Anadarko, 30.875%; Tullow, 
26.396%; GNPC, 10% (carried); PetroSA, 1.854% 
Deep Water Tano Tullow, 49.95% (operator); Kosmos, 18%; Anadarko, 18%; 
GNPC, 10% (carried); PetroSA, 4.05% 
Shallow Water Tano Tullow, 31.5% (operator); InterOil Corporation, Al Thani 
Emirates Petroleum Corporation, Sabre, and GNPC, 10 
percent (carried) 
Offshore Cape Three Points Vitol Upstream Ghana Ltd., 85%; GNPC, 15%—some 
surveying done (Heliconia Energy Ghana Ltd., subsidiary of 
Vitol), drilling due late 2008 
Cape Three Points South Hess, block owner/operator 
Cape Three Points Deepwater Vanco Energy Company (operator) holds a 28.34% interest in 
the block, with Lukoil holding a 56.66% stake. GNPC, the 
state oil company, holds a 15% carried interest. 
Saltpond oil and gas field Small production of 750 bpd by Lushann-Eternit Energy Ltd. 
- Saltpond Offshore Producing Company (Lushann-Eternit, 
60%; local interests, 40%); 
further exploration in area by Oranto Petroleum Ltd./ Stone 
Energy Ghana Ltd. 
Keta offshore Afren Energy Ghana, 68%; Mitsui, 20%; GNPC, 10%; 
Gulf Atlantic Energy, 2% 
Sources: GNPC Available at: www.gnpcghana.com. 
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3.2.2 Ghana’s First Commercial Discovery: The Jubilee Fields 
In 2007, Kosmos Energy Ghana and Tullow Oil Ghana together with other partners 
announced the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in two blocks, West Cape Three Points 
and Deep Water Tano. The drilling fields on the blocks, called the Jubilee Fields, are operated 
under a Unitization Agreement. The Other partners on the blocks include Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation and PetroSA. The Ghana National Petroleum Company has a carried interest and a 
paid interest. The composition of ownership in these blocks is stated in Table 3-1 above. 
Figure 3-2: Detail of Jubilee Fields off the Coast of Western Ghana 
 
Source: Tullow Oil Plc Available at: www.tullowoil.com. 
According to the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the Jubilee field phase 1 
development (Africa Development Bank, 2009), the Jubilee Unit Area covers part of the 
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Deepwater Tano and West Cape Three Points license areas. It lies in water depths of between 
1100 – 1700m and covers an area of approximately 110km2.  
Tullow Oil Ghana also drilled a successful exploration well, the Ebony 1 in the Shallow 
Water Tano license area. There are other active on-going drilling, development, appraisal, and at 
least three additional high-impact exploration wells which include Tweneboa, Teak, and Onyina. 
Other exploration wells have been drilled in the Keta block and the South Deepwater Tano 
block. As already stated, by December, 2012, the number of discoveries stood at 23, giving 
Ghana one of the highest exploration success rates in the world.  
The development of the Jubilee fields was preceded by the approval of a Field 
Development Plan by the Government of Ghana in line with the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Law (PNDC Law 84 of 1984) and the Model Agreement Framework. The 
development of the fields went through a fast-track approach in three years with production 
commencing in December 2010. The development phase covered field development, sub-sea 
infrastructure, and the manufacturing of the Floating Production and Offloading (FPSO) Vessel 
in Singapore. 
3.2.3 Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Policy 
Ghana’s petroleum policy is an integral part of the National Energy Policy (Government 
of Ghana, 2010a). The main goal of the policy is to “sustain and optimize the exploitation and 
utilization of Ghana’s oil and gas endowment for the overall benefit and welfare of all 
Ghanaians, present and future”.  
Several challenges confront the upstream subsector including for example how to 
increase and sustain investor interest in exploration activities, maximization of local content, 
efficient management of petroleum revenues, environmental sustainability and the security of 
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petroleum installations. In order to address these challenges, the Government further formulated 
the National Energy Strategy (Government of Ghana, 2010b), which prescribes measures for 
addressing the challenges.  
The strategy includes the enactment of appropriate laws to give effect to the policy. Some 
of the laws in Ghana that are relevant to the petroleum sector are:  
a. The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law 1983 (PNDC L 64);  
b. Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law 1984 (PNDC L 84);   
c. Petroleum Income Tax law 1987 (PNDCL 188);  
d. Internal Revenue Act 2000 (Act 592);  
e. Maritime Security Act 2004 (Act 675);  
f. Petroleum Revenue management Act 2011 (Act 815);  
g. Petroleum Commission Act 2011 (Act 821) 
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) defines the framework for 
managing oil and gas revenues accrued to the state. The Act specifies clear rules for the inflow 
and outflow of oil and gas revenues, including expenditure allocation options. The main features 
of the Act are; the fiscal framework, collateralization of petroleum revenues and a strong 
transparency framework.  
Section 3(1-2) of the Act establishes a Petroleum Holding Fund to which all petroleum 
revenues must be deposited. Apart from certain exceptional circumstances, including for 
example, refunding tax overpayment, paying management fees, paying royalties for onshore 
petroleum operations, or repairing communities adversely affected by petroleum operations, 
petroleum revenues deposited in the Petroleum Holding Fund must be transferred to the 
consolidated account for budget spending, the Stabilization Fund and the Heritage Fund.  
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The Finance Minister is required by the Act to determine the annual “Benchmark 
Revenue” for the next financial year latest by October 1st.  The Minister is then required to 
allocate 70% of “Benchmark Revenue” to the budget, 21% to the Stabilization Fund and 9% to 
the Heritage Fund. The purpose of the allocation to the budget is to meet development needs of 
the country, which is also called the “Annual Budget Funding Amount”.  
The level of the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be guided by the country’s 
medium term national development plan and the level of absorptive capacity. The Minister is 
therefore required to prioritize not more than four areas for the spending of petroleum revenues, 
which shall be reviewed every three years.  The Annual Budget Funding Amount shall be 
collateralized for a period not exceeding 10 years. The Stabilization Fund is to cushion the 
budget against crude oil price volatility, while the Heritage Fund is an endowment Fund to meet 
inter-generational equity. This is also called Future Generations Fund.  
Withdrawals from the Ghana Stabilization Fund may be done in two ways depending on 
which is lesser. On one hand, when petroleum receipts in any quarter falls below 25% of the 
Annual Budget Funding Amount, 75% of the estimated shortfall shall be withdrawn from the 
Stabilization Fund.  
On the other hand, 25% of the balance standing in the Stabilization Fund can be 
withdrawn. The Heritage Fund cannot be spent until the petroleum resources are depleted. 
However, Section 10(4) of the Act allows Parliament to review the restrictions on the Heritage 
Fund by simple majority to authorize spending of a portion of the interest accrued to the Fund 
after 10 years. When petroleum resources are depleted, the Stabilization Fund and the Heritage 
Fund shall be merged into the Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund. At this point, the Annual Budget 
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Funding Amount shall not exceed the total amount of dividends from the national oil company 
and returns on the Ghana Petroleum Wealth Fund.  
Further, the Minister of Finance is required by Section 23 of the Act to determine the 
maximum limit of the Stabilization Fund and to ensure that any excess revenues over the 
maximum limit are transferred to the ‘Contingency Fund or used for debt repayment’. 
The fiscal framework for managing Ghana’s revenues underscores the relevance of 
prudent management of resources, the need to accelerate economic development and to achieve 
inter-generational equity. While the provisions of the Act are generally positive and reflect best 
international practices, there are concerns on many aspects of the Act, which requires some 
discipline on the part of the managers of the economy.  
The provision for collateralization of future petroleum revenues may undermine fiscal 
sustainability. The danger is that petroleum revenues are not permanent even as they are volatile 
and therefore, while revenues will eventually decline during the depletion stage of the country’s 
oil fields, unpaid accumulated debts become a burden at the time petroleum revenues are 
insufficient to service these debts, particularly when the loans are not spent efficiently. Thus, 
future development is inconveniently sacrificed with serious implications for future generations.  
Also, the provision to spend a portion of the interest on the Heritage Fund by simple 
parliamentary majority is likely to negatively affect the growth of the Fund which then defeats its 
endowment objective. Fact is that the Government of Ghana has historically not controlled 
spending as demonstrated in the persistent fiscal deficits recorded in the national budget over the 
years. Such appetite for spending will likely entice the Government to use its majority in 
parliament to deplete the Heritage Fund. 
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Another important issue relates to the provision to transfer excess revenues over the 
maximum limit of the Stabilization Fund to the Contingency Fund. The Government’s 
Contingency Fund is a discretionary Fund which is spent by the Minister without recourse to the 
requirements of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act. That is, the Minister could spend it 
outside the priority areas specified in the Act. Also, there are several portions of the Act that are 
too loose and provide avenues for abuse of discretion. Thus, Ghana’s fiscal rule requires strong 
institutional frameworks to check potential abuse and ensure that petroleum revenues are 
managed in line with the country’s development objectives. 
3.3 Literature on Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Sustainability 
3.3.1 Definition of Fiscal Rules 
There is significant academic literature on why unconstrained discretion over fiscal 
policy can cause problems for public finances and create macroeconomic instability. The 
problem associated with resource-rich countries is the temptation to meet the increasing pressure 
for spending against volatile revenues. There is also the fear to raise taxes to finance public 
expenditure in what has become known as fiscal illusion and a deficit bias which also have 
implications for inflation (Obinyeluaku et al, 2008). 
Fiscal rules are statutory or constitutional restrictions that set specific limits on fiscal 
indicators such as budgetary balance, debt, government spending, or taxation (Kennedy and 
Robbins, 2001). Primarily, fiscal rules seek to disengage fiscal policy from government influence 
much like the separation of monetary policy embodied in inflation-targeting frameworks. They 
also impose greater accountability on government finances, drive expectations and enhance 
transparency of the overall budgetary framework. 
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Again as noted by Brunila (2002), such rules help tackle a country’s predisposition to 
budget deficits by pre-empting possible spending over-runs and thereby help to address the 
political and institutional tendencies to raise expenditures during economic booms. However, 
Kopits and Symansky (1998) introduced time frame for fiscal rules by defining fiscal rules as 
“…permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an indicator of overall 
fiscal performance”. This raises fundamental issues. 
Rules must have long-term horizons and therefore in natural resource-rich countries for 
example, which are faced with resource exhaustibility problem, fiscal rules could be used to 
solve macroeconomic difficulties associated with resource exhaustion. Also, rules are indicators 
for measuring fiscal performance because they are expressed in numerical terms and are usually 
without ambiguity. They define the framework for resource inflows and outflows and indicate 
the fiscal capacity of the state under alternative fiscal policy choices.  
Over the past decade and a half, fiscal rules have gained attention in a number of 
countries. New Zealand played a pioneering role in formulating a Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(FRL) to maintain and strengthen fiscal discipline. Although subsequent designs of fiscal rules 
vary across countries, they all subscribe to basic characteristics considered important for 
effective implementation (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). As at 2010, there were about 80 
countries with fiscal rules compared to about 10 by 1990. The growth in the preference for fiscal 
rules may be due to increased macroeconomic and financial instability experienced by many 
countries. Following the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, many countries adopted new fiscal 
rules to provide guidance for fiscal policy.  
Most models of resource revenue management are aimed at solving inter-temporal 
portfolio problem to measure the optimal level of government consumption and saving. They are 
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also aimed at solving the problem caused by the instability of resource prices. Resource-rich 
countries are therefore confronted with three fiscal policy dilemmas. First, there is pressure to 
spend resource revenues on current development priorities to accelerate growth and reduce 
poverty. Second, natural resources are exhaustible and impose intergenerational equity concerns 
and future fiscal sustainability when resources are depleted. Third, the prices of natural resource 
are very volatile and could destabilize revenues and development outcomes. Resource-rich 
countries are therefore always faced with the difficulty of determining the balance between 
spending and saving, as well as choosing the optimal mix of spending portfolio which has proved 
very challenging.  
The theoretical framework formulated by Milton Friedman (1957) which has both 
stabilization and intergenerational factors is the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH). This 
theory posits that governments should be forward-looking and must be able to smooth 
consumption over time which should not deviate from the annuity present value of expected 
resource rents. Thus the most viable rule that fulfils both objectives of fiscal sustainability and 
intergenerational equity is the permanent income rule.  
Permanent income is defined as the rate of return on a country’s resource wealth, which 
in turn is equal to the present discounted value of future resource revenues. The rule ensures 
intergenerational equity because the annuity value of expenditures would be constant across 
generations and would continue after the resources are completely exhausted. It also avoids 
boom-bust cycles because expenditures out of resource revenues would be stable. This is because 
changes in current prices of natural resources have insignificant effect on computations about 
long-term value of reserves as well as the revenue stream for current spending. Where prices are 
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stable, the rule can also ensure sustainability by targeting non-oil deficits to be exactly equal to 
the return on discounted resource wealth.  
Consumption smoothing and the long-run optimal level of consumption which theory 
predicts depend on some factors including intergenerational equity considerations, the expected 
reserves, the real interest rate, the growth rate of non-resource output, the rate of population 
growth, etc. Again the PIH means that a windfall is perceived as an increment to wealth, and 
consumption from the wealth is smoothed through time. This hypothesis is similar to the tax 
smoothing literature (Barro, 1979) or the optimal use of the current account (Sachs, 1981). 
The Permanent Income (PI) rule entails use of the Permanent Fund for Future 
Generations to secure intergenerational equity and guarantee a permanent flow of resources that 
will foster economic development even after oil resources have been exhausted.  
While the PI rule is advantageous in some respects including maintaining fiscal 
sustainability, it also creates social tensions because public spending would be low at the time 
resource revenues are being accumulated for future spending. Therefore, this rule does not take 
into consideration that resource revenues might be used for domestic development needs capable 
of enhancing short-term and long-term welfare beyond the rate of return on financial assets 
sterilized abroad (Heuty and Aristi, 2010). 
In addition, the rule may not be ideal for developing countries due to capital shortages 
and higher social investment returns of public investment compared to returns on financial assets 
and this justifies the need to spend oil wealth upfront on public investments to enhance 
productivity and consumption (Takizawa et al, 2004; Van der Ploeg and Venables, 2009). The 
use of Net Present Value to calculate the value of reserves relies on future oil prices, new 
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discoveries and available technology (Heuty and Aristi, 2010) and which may change the fiscal 
benchmark of the PI rule. 
In theory, there are other identifiable fiscal rules that are being applied in resource-rich 
countries. The first is the balanced-budget rule or what is commonly called ‘hand-to-mouth’ or 
‘going-on-a-binge’ rule, which implies spending all resource revenues as they accrue to the 
government. It is also called the “big-push”. It is aimed at maintaining a balance in fiscal 
position. This rule is good for countries with serious current developmental challenges.  
Takizawa et al, (2004) argue that the front-loaded spending of oil wealth, implicit in this 
rule, is justified when the country is in dire need of public investments and infrastructure that are 
essential for long-term growth and private investments. However, the rule favours current 
spending at the expense of future generations and also lends government budgets to extreme 
volatility in response to price changes.  
The second rule is the ‘bird-in-hand’ rule, which requires that only the interest income 
made on accumulated net financial assets from resource revenues be spent. It favours 
intergenerational equity. It is also good at sterilizing resource revenues and minimizing Dutch 
Disease effects. However, while this rule avoids subjecting the government budget to spending 
volatility, it does not provide to the economy the needed capital spending for growth. Also, it 
would be more appropriate for a country at a much higher level of development. 
The third rule is the medium-term price rule, under which resource revenues valued at a 
medium-term price are spent and the balance is saved. This is the rule that is largely followed by 
Chile in its Copper Stabilization Fund (Fasano, 2000; and Davis et al, 2002).  
There is also the ‘structural balance’ rule which allows for temporary deviations in the 
overall nominal deficit from its medium-term target in line with cyclical developments. This can 
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be adjusted into an ‘augmented growth-based’ rule where the deficit is allowed to be higher 
when GDP growth in the current year is below its trend level, and requires a gradual adjustment 
of the balance to the target level when the initial deficit is above target; and an ‘augmented 
structural balance’ rule which incorporates, in addition to ‘structural balance rule, an automatic 
correction mechanism to past deviations from the target. 
The basic structural balance rule works effectively by allowing automatic stabilizers to 
operate during the periods in which there is a nonzero gap in output. The rule is however not 
very successful at reducing public debt in the aftermath of the shock. The augmented structural 
balance and the augmented growth-based balance rules both provide room for countercyclical 
fiscal responses, but have also got mechanisms which cover some degree of fiscal policy 
correction in line with debt sustainability. All these rules except the PI rule, however, do not 
guarantee fiscal sustainability or optimal intergenerational consumption of resource wealth at the 
same time. 
3.3.2         Measurement of Fiscal Sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability is measured as a percentage of GDP or better still in the case of an 
oil producing country, as a percentage of non-oil GDP. Most fiscal rules target fiscal deficits or 
public debt levels, and therefore define certain constraints on revenue or expenditure levels. 
Fiscal sustainability analysis is an important segment of the overall fiscal management 
framework in developing countries. The measurement of fiscal sustainability takes into 
consideration the exhaustibility of petroleum reserves, the financial position of the government, 
and inter-temporal welfare choices expressed in Net Present Value of future petroleum revenues.  
Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2009) outlined different set of fiscal indicators, including 
the non-oil primary balance that is a key indicator in those countries.  
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The ‘overall fiscal balance’ is widely used and has proved very useful for assessing the 
public net financing requirement and fiscal vulnerability. Its shortcoming is its inability to 
measure the effect of fiscal policy on domestic demand or the government’s adjustment effort 
especially for countries with petroleum revenues whose fiscal expansion through increased 
spending may be covered under the balance.  
The ‘non-oil balance’, which excludes net oil revenue is a better indicator of the impact 
of fiscal policy on domestic demand since oil revenue mainly originates from abroad particularly 
for countries where petroleum revenues constitute more than 50% of overall revenues. These 
countries are regarded as petroleum dependent countries and survive on revenues from exports of 
oil and gas which do not reduce the resources of the domestic private sector. This fiscal measure 
is a more reasonable measure of the impact of oil revenue injection in the economy, and the level 
of fiscal effort.  
The ‘non-oil primary balance(NOPB)’ is a further improvement over non-oil fiscal 
balance by excluding from the non-oil fiscal balance both interest receipts associated with 
accrued financial savings in oil funds and payments. Interest receipts and payments are not under 
the control of the government. This fiscal measure is the most appropriate way to assess fiscal 
sustainability through comparisons against long-term fiscal benchmarks based on inter-temporal 
government wealth considerations.  
The ‘cyclically-adjusted non-oil primary balance’, is synonymous to automatic stabilizers 
because it excludes the effect of the economic cycle on non-oil revenue and expenditures. It is a 
very useful fiscal measure because it allows the identification of the portion of the fiscal position 
that would be the direct result of discretionary fiscal policy decisions.  
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Fiscal sustainability measures are based on either an annuity model or perpetuity model. 
The annuity model is usually applied to countries with limited oil reserves whose consumption 
path is in a generation. The perpetuity model applies to countries with frequent discoveries and 
reserve accumulation. The annuity model has been extensively applied in Barnett and Ossowski 
(2003) and Carcillo et al, (2007), which are aimed at ensuring a smooth non-oil primary 
spending consistent with inter-temporal solvency and intergenerational equity. The model takes 
into account the present value of future net petroleum revenues, non-oil GDP growth and interest 
rate projections, non-oil revenue and grants outlook, the initial level of serviceable public debt, 
and the speed of adjustment. 
There is considerable level of empirical work on fiscal policy in resource-rich countries. 
These empirical works have however focused more on broad fiscal policies but issues of fiscal 
rules and fiscal sustainability and the determination of fiscal benchmarks and their effects on the 
economy remain a challenge in the literature.  Most of the existing literature on fiscal 
sustainability also employed a framework focused on government wealth inclusive of oil in the 
ground (Tersmen, 1991; Liuksila, Garcia and Bassett, 1994; Chalk, 1998; Barnett and Osswoski, 
2002), and this reflects the permanent wealth model, which is the PI rule of fiscal management.  
The International Monetary Fund (2010) observes that several countries have 
implemented fiscal rules based on some fiscal indicators. For example, in India, a gradual fiscal 
consolidation is envisaged by reducing the central government fiscal deficit to 3% of GDP by 
2013/14. The planned reduction would be mainly revenue-driven, from higher growth; and from 
measures to simplify the tax code, raise voluntary compliance, and reduce exemptions.  
Also, Indonesia also has a gradual fiscal consolidation envisaged with an overall deficit 
target of 1.2% of GDP in 2014. The consolidation is revenue-based with a projected increase in 
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the revenue-to-GDP ratio of 1.6 percentage points (2009–14). This is underpinned by reforms to 
modernize tax administration and enhance tax collection as well as policies aiming to increase oil 
and gas production. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio is projected to increase gradually to support 
economic development and poverty reduction (Ibid, 2010). 
In a study on Sudan, Ali Abass et al, (2010) measured fiscal sustainability and the speed 
of fiscal adjustment based on the annuity model. The study used the standard framework of an 
inter-temporal optimization problem of a finite, natural resource economy bearing some initial 
level of public debt to determine fiscal sustainability based on the Permanently Sustainable Non-
oil Primary Balance (PSNOPB). The optimization problem for the government according to the 
study comprises an inter-temporal choice of the size of the non-oil primary fiscal balance; and an 
inter-temporal choice of expenditure and (lump-sum) taxes consistent with that balance, provided 
by the exogenously given path of oil revenue and interest rate.  
They further observe that one of the major challenges of fiscal sustainability is 
uncertainty faced by oil producing countries regarding inter-temporal welfare choices. These 
uncertainties are caused by levels of oil reserves, oil recovery rate, crude oil prices and cost of 
production. To check these uncertainties, fiscal sustainability analysis has relied on the 
Permanent Income Hypothesis, which provides a consumption smoothing path over time. 
Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2009) measured fiscal sustainability by comparing fiscal 
positions of different oil producing countries based on cyclically adjusted non-oil primary 
balance against ‘sustainable fiscal benchmarks’ as an annuity rather than perpetuity and thereby 
took care of the exhaustibility of the resource. In their paper, the standardized approach of fiscal 
sustainability assessment across countries was used. The findings are that due to exhaustibility 
particularly for countries with limited oil reserves, a sharp fiscal adjustment is required at the end 
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of the consumption horizon. They also find that most oil producing countries deteriorated in their 
fiscal sustainability positions due to huge expansions in NOPB in spite of the higher crude prices 
prevailing during the period of the study. 
The model applied in this study takes into account the present value of future net 
petroleum revenues, non-oil GDP growth and interest rate projections, non-oil revenue and 
grants outlook, the initial level of serviceable public debt, and the speed of adjustment. The 
methodology is based on the twin assumptions of consumption smoothing and inter-temporal 
solvency to measure sustainable NOPB trajectory under various public debt reliefs and speed of 
adjustment scenarios and compared this trajectory with the end-2008 NOPB-to-NOGDP ratio 
which yields a measure of the requisite medium and long-term adjustment.  
Based on the permanently sustainable NOPB approach and a general equilibrium 
neoclassical growth framework, the study finds that the required fiscal adjustment over the 
medium term is 4–10 percent of NOGDP, with the lower bound of 4% obtained under fairly 
realistic assumptions of an annual adjustment rate of 25% and a serviceable debt stock equivalent 
to 25% of the total public debts.  
In a study by Baunsgaard (2003), he designed a fiscal rule nested within the long-run 
sustainable use of petroleum revenue in Nigeria. In this study, two specific fiscal rules are 
examined – the permanent price rule which targets a balanced budget at a reference crude oil 
price and a non-oil primary deficit rule which targets a 20% deficit relative to non-oil GDP. The 
study measured the country’s stock of wealth in real terms and permanent real wealth in per 
capita terms. These could qualify as PI rule and Population Adjusted rule provided they are 
equated to the non-oil primary deficit. However, the two specific rules examined in the study had 
different targets. 
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The results of the study show that non-oil primary deficit of 15-25% of non-oil GDP 
would be required to maintain the real wealth over time under various price and production 
assumptions. The permanent price rule is however more effective in stabilizing the non-oil 
primary deficit. The findings also show that both rules are not prone to crude price volatility. But 
volatility in revenue will impact on overall fiscal balance as a change in fiscal composition while 
non-price volatility will impact on the rules differently. An important finding in this study is that 
the non-oil primary deficit rule will insulate the budget from volatility caused by changes in 
production, production costs, the fiscal regime and the impact on petroleum revenues from 
exchange rate movement.  
Obinyeluaku et al, (2008) follow the work of Baunsgaard (2003) and Basci et al, (2004), 
and conducted a study which looked at different fiscal rules in Nigeria. They refer to revenues 
under uncertainty as stochastic revenues. The paper examines the appropriate fiscal policy rules 
that can produce better performance in reducing debt accumulation and promote the necessary 
medium-term budget deficit stability in Nigeria. In this study, two alternative policy rules are 
considered, the Fixed Primary Surplus Rule and the Variable Primary Surplus Rule.  
The study draws a comparison between the fixed primary surplus rules to an alternative, 
the variable primary surplus rule, in which the primary budget surplus is defined as an increasing 
function of the debt-to-GDP ratio. It decomposes the primary surpluses into gross budgetary 
revenue and non-interest budgetary expenditure to account for both volatility in revenues and 
control for the government expenditure since government revenues in Nigeria is largely 
exogenously determined, an important departure from the literature. The simulation in the study 
follows Monte Carlo technique.  
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The study concludes that government’s ability to make credible commitments to a fiscal 
rule depends on the flexibility of fiscal expenditure. That is both the Variable Surplus rule and 
Fixed Surplus rule perform well under different conditions. The Variable Surplus rule for 
instance is found to perform better than the simple Fixed Surplus rule, by reducing debt 
accumulation and the necessary medium-term Primary Surplus whiles the Fixed Surplus rule 
works better when the real interest rate is relatively high. 
Manasse (2006) assesses the role of shocks, fiscal rules and institutions as possible 
sources of pro-cyclicality in fiscal policy. Using parametric and non-parametric techniques on a 
sample of 49 emerging and industrial countries for the period 1974-2004, he concludes that 
policy makers’ reactions to the business cycle are different depending on the state of 
development. He also suggests that fiscal rules and fiscal responsibility laws tend to reduce the 
deficit bias on the average and that strong institutions are associated with a lower deficit bias, but 
their effect on pro-cyclicality is different in good and bad times. 
Thornton (2007) analyzed the cyclicality of government revenue, spending and the fiscal 
balance in South Africa during 1972-2001.  He suggests that while government revenues were 
largely anti-cyclical, government spending appears to be largely countercyclical in line with the 
recommendation of neoclassical model. In addition, countercyclical government spending policy 
appears to have translated into a countercyclical policy stance in general, as measured by the 
overall fiscal balance. 
Resource-rich countries in Africa have not been successful with fiscal rules ranging from 
the Permanent Income rule, the bird-in-hand rule, the hand-to-mouth rule; and price based and 
expenditure growth rules. Most of these countries have suffered from fiscal indiscipline.  
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Also, countries that implemented countercyclical policies have not had any impact on the 
degree of pro-cyclicality (Arezki et al, 2011). Those that introduced permanent income elements 
in their fiscal policies such as Chad and Equatorial Guinea sometimes abandoned them when 
pressure for public investment increased. There are also other unsuccessful countries like Nigeria 
and Sudan due to weak institutional frameworks for the implementation of fiscal rules, and 
where rules have been circumvented. For some countries like Gabon and Congo Republic, it has 
also been observe that fiscal rules forced adjustments in capital spending during bust period 
which raised concerns about growth prospects (Arezki and Ismail, 2010).  
There are also other countries that faced design difficulties by failing to account for the 
revenue horizon from their natural resources. Short-term horizons where resource revenues are 
temporary, requires rules that emphasize fiscal sustainability; whilst long-term horizons need to 
emphasize fiscal stability. For example, with its long-term petroleum revenue horizon, Nigeria’s 
macroeconomic stability has been a major challenge. Not even the passing of a Fiscal 
Responsibility Law helped in improving macroeconomic performance until quite recently in 
2011 and 2012.  
With the development of fiscal rules for measuring Ghana’s petroleum revenue 
allocation, the rule must be guided by a number of factors. With a short-term oil revenue 
horizon, the fiscal rule should address the fiscal sustainability challenge. However, this does not 
necessarily guarantee the extent to which fiscal sustainability could affect development 
outcomes. It is simply a precautionary measure. There should also be strong institutional 
frameworks to implement fiscal rules. 
 
 
 
 
 54 
3.4 Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGEs) 
3.4.1 Brief History of CGEs 
Analysis of aggregate economic phenomena from a general equilibrium perspective 
started with Walras in his publication of Elements in the late nineteenth century (Walras, 1874). 
But  it was Keynes’ General Theory in which general equilibrium analysis was first developed to 
explain macroeconomic fluctuations in general and the Great Depression in particular (Keynes, 
1936).  
Computable General Equilibrium models are fairly recent dating back to early 1960s. 
CGE models have gained much attention as a standard model for analyzing traditional economic 
policies such as, fiscal policy and optimal taxation (Slemrod, 1983), trade policy (Devarajan and 
Rodrik, 1989), income distribution (Bandara, 1991), structural adjustment, trade, etc. (Gunning 
and Keyser, 1993), sector development (Robinson et al, 1993, for agriculture), and 
environmental issues (Kokoski and Smith, 1987),  social, environmental, and poverty (Conrad, 
1999; Munasinghe et al, 2005).  
CGE models are described as the modern version of Walras model of the competitive 
economy. It is important to note that the first CGE model was developed by Leif Johansen 
(1960) in his seminal work to analyze growth in the Norwegian economy. Johansen developed a 
multi sectoral model (20 sectors) and an input-output model in line with Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory based on fixed coefficients of intermediate and value added production 
function. Johansen’s model involved linear approximation of the model by taking the logarithmic 
derivatives of the non-linear CGE model, and then applied simple matrix inversion.   
Herbert Scarf (1967) was however credited for the introduction of an algorithm for the 
solution of the general equilibrium problem of Walrasian system. This built the foundation for 
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the development of applied general equilibrium models which was used to compute general 
equilibrium prices. Thus, Scarf was the first to draw direct link between theoretical work and the 
empirical CGE modeling. He also made an improvement on Johansen’s model by designing a 
fixed point algorithm for deriving solutions to numerically specified models, without a prior 
linear approximation as did Johansen (Dixon and Parmenter, 1996). 
Shoven and Whalley (1972), a student of Scarf’s, made a significant contribution to CGE 
models by introducing a fully disaggregated CGE model to study the effects of differential 
taxation on incomes from capital. This was based on data from the United States economy. 
Jorgenson (1974) also extended CGE model by introducing a calibration technique to 
estimate supply and demand; and applied the model to production and national accounting. 
However, it was the work of Dervis De Melo and Robinson (1982) which made a significant 
advance in the formulation of CGE models and applying them to measure the impact of policy 
decisions.  
Several pioneering efforts followed these earlier developments. For instance, the first to 
introduce dynamic features into the modeling of economic behavior of consumers were Ballard 
(1983); and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). Similarly, the first attempt at implementing dynamic 
features to model economic bahaviour of the producer was Bovenberg (1985) and summers 
(1985).  
The introduction of the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) was a significant 
development in the CGE modeling literature (See Brooke et al (1988)), as it contributed to a 
quicker solution of CGE analyses by its ability to deal with large number of parameters. 
CGE models can be categorized by different specifications. First, they are classified by 
literature survey and by subject category such as Shoven and Whalley (1984), De Melo (1988), 
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and Pereira and Shoven (1988), on trade policies; Bergman (1988) and Bhattacharyya (1996) on 
energy and environmental policies; Bandara (1991) on development policies in Least Developed 
Countries; Robinson (1991) on “micro-macro” CGE models that incorporate assets, products and 
factor markets, and recently Kraybill (1993) on comparison between the regional CGE approach 
to input-output analysis;  among others.  
Second, they are categorized by geographic coverage. These include CGE models that 
have been limited to country levels and those extended to regional policy studies particularly for 
studies of the German Regions (Conrad and Schroder, 1993; and Hirte, 1998); and the Italian 
Regions (D. Antonio et al, 1988). 
Third, Naqvi (1998) categorized CGE models by modeling approach. These include 
Johansen’s non-linear, multi-sectoral growth model which focuses on sectoral allocation of 
capital and labour and distribution of sectoral output, followed by Harberger-Scarf-Shoven-
Whalley linearized model focusing on welfare economics; by Jorgenson econometric estimation 
approach; and by Ginsburgh and Walbroek (1981) linear programming approach. 
General equilibrium models are also categorized according to one period against inter-
temporal analysis. These are also known as static CGE models and Dynamic CGE models. 
3.4.2 Type of CGEs 
a.     Static CGE 
Static models have two periods of adjustments – short run and long run. The key 
difference in most models is that capital is fixed (exogenous) in the short run but free to adjust in 
the long run. Most conventional CGEs used in early modeling were static CGEs such as Shoven 
and Whalley model (1972) and Dervis, De Melo and Robinson model (1982). However, there are 
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also recent models such as Robinson, Yunez-Naude, Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis and Devarajan 
(1999).  
Static models measure the effect of policy at a certain future by calibrating the model 
based on a dataset usually a Social Accounting Matrix, in which a steady-state growth has been 
established.  Thus, the model creates savings and investments as well as demand for capital 
goods. In this case, investments represent a demand category whilst capital goods are uninstalled 
in the period.  
The first generation of CGEs was static in nature. But dynamic models emerged later. 
Very recently, CGEs have moved from traditional static to very dynamic models in line with 
inter-temporal optimization (Harrison et al, 2000; Dixon and Rimmer 2002; Bell, Devarajan, and 
Gersbach, 2003). 
b.     Dynamic CGE 
These are CGEs that consider multi-period and focuses on inter-temporal effects of 
policy decisions. The inter-temporal effects of policies are often interrupted by Government 
interventions over time, which has the tendency of taking the economy into disequilibrium. Thus, 
there must be a mechanism to restore the equilibrium through the generation of effects in either a 
recursive or fully dynamic process. That is, dynamic CGEs can further be classified as 
“Recursive Dynamic’ or “fully dynamic”.  
The first treatment of dynamic general equilibrium analysis can be traced back to La 
Volpe’s (1936) and Hicks (1939), in which they explained that current behaviour is influenced 
by backward-and forward-looking expectations. These were later followed by Ballard (1983) and 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), but Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven and Whalley (1985) were the first 
to introduce dynamic features in CGE models.  
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Other pioneers in dynamic CGE models are Bovenberg (1985) and Summers (1985) who 
applied dynamic features to the behavior of producers. The introduction of dynamic features into 
CGE models was because many of the questions the models were expected to answer were 
dynamic in nature.  
i. Recursive Dynamic CGE Models 
The recursive process involves a sequence of static equilibria which are connected 
through capital accumulation or investment distribution. Other variables such as labour and 
population are updated as exogenous variables.  
Recursive Dynamic CGE models are classified into two by Dixon and Parmenter (1996), 
depending on the expectations of economic agent’s behaviour. One of these recursive processes 
is based on static expectations and the other on adaptive expectations.  In the former case of 
expectations, savings rates are treated as exogenous whilst investment is expressed in total 
savings over the period. In this case future investments depend on the expected rate of returns.  
In the latter case, the adaptive expectations assumption, the behaviour of economic agents 
depends on the past to determine the future behavior of the economy. Thus, returns on future 
investments depend on the previous year’s rate of return and cost of capital.  
ii.    The fully Dynamic CGE Models  
The models associate the behaviour of economic agents to both intra and inter-temporal 
optimization and thereby have life-cycle behaviour. Both consumers and producers face 
constraints that affect their behaviour. For instance, the consumer is faced with maximizing a 
time-invariant inter-temporal utility function; whilst the producer is faced with maximizing the 
market value of the firm.  
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The capital adjustment costs in the dynamic process influences the behaviour of 
production and investments through Tobin’s Q theory. The adjustment costs cover the 
installation cost of capital and the cost of the unlimited capital mobility across industries. 
Government behaviour as well as financial markets and international trade can also be modeled 
with dynamic features.  
The following figure 3-3 is a schematic presentation of the modeling process of CGE 
models. 
Figure 3-3: A Basic CGE Modeling Process 
 
  
    
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Adopted from Shoven & Whalley (1998), Applying General Equilibrium, p. 104. 
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3.4.3 CGE Models for Resource producing countries 
Empirical studies in the public expenditure literature have focused on the impact of 
government consumption and public investment on economic growth. Indeed, majority of studies 
find that there exist strong negative correlations between the size of government consumption on 
goods, services and wages; and economic growth for various groups of countries (Barro, 1991).  
There is however no consensus on the impact of government capital investment with 
some arguing that such investments have little impact on growth compared with private 
investment (see Barro, 1991; Calderon, 2004; and Khan and Kumar, 1997). However, in 
Aschauer (2000), if the growth equation is controlled for the effectiveness of public capital 
expenditure, the impact of such investments may be stronger. This is what the study seeks to 
prove, accounting for the impact of institutional quality or efficiency in public spending. 
There are many neoclassical growth models that allow for the impact of government 
operations on resource allocation and growth. Some of these models seek to derive the optimal 
government expenditure or taxation paths (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), whilst others 
focus on the impact of alternative fiscal rules (see Judd, 1985; Barro, 1989; and Baxter and King, 
1993). Both types of models were applied to the analysis of public expenditure in the context of 
oil-producing countries (for example, Engel and Valdés, 2000; and Takizawa, Gardner, and 
Ueda, 2004). 
The first set of CGE applications to developing countries focused on problems of optimal 
taxation and trade policies; but two decades later, applications emerged for specific countries 
including Korea (Adelman and Robinson, 1978), and Brazil (Taylor et.al., 1980).  
It must be noted however that unlike the theory of optimal taxation which was developed 
to analyze fiscal policy impact; there exists no theory of optimal expenditure policy except the 
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ideas of expenditure policy which are based on determining government expenditure to correct 
market distortions arising from externalities and market failure (Stefano, Anand, and Erwin, 
2005; Steven, 2001). 
In the 1980s, CGE applications in developing countries centered on the issues of poverty, 
income distribution and development strategies, stretching to structural adjustment and 
stabilization policies to solve the debt crisis and trade problems that confronted many developing 
countries and who were in search for strategies. 
In the 1990s, CGE applications in addition to addressing poverty and income distribution 
issues, extended to environmental and energy problems (Devarajan, 1997; Adkins and 
Garbaccio, 1999). Also emerging during this period were applications of CGE models to natural 
resource allocation or management aimed at inter-regional or inter-sectoral allocation of multi-
use natural resources such as water resources for agriculture, mining industry among others 
(Robinson and Gelhar, 1995; Mukherjee, 1996; Ianchovichina et al, 2001). 
In the 1990s and 2000s the problems associated with petroleum resource utilization 
against crude oil price volatility and exhaustibility assumptions attracted CGE applications. A 
number of CGE based studies on the economies of resource producing countries have been 
conducted such as Benjamin et al, (1989) on Cameroon’s oil boom, and Decaluwé et al, (1990) 
on Tunisia.  
However these models are static models and therefore fail to examine all relevant 
variables as well as the inter-temporal implications of policy decisions. A Dynamic CGE model 
has however been used by Ghadimi (2007) on Iran, and Omgba and Djiofack (2010) on 
Cameroon. Briesinger et al, (2009) and the World Bank (2010) conducted dynamic CGE 
modeling on Ghana’s management of petroleum revenues.  
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3.4.4 CGE Models and Fiscal Rules 
Most of the literature on resource revenue management is concentrated in partial 
equilibrium models. But these models ignore relevant variables in an economy that interact with 
each other at the same time.  They do not also cover inter-sectoral and the distributional effects 
of policy changes (Omgba and Djiofack, 2010). Analyses of the impact of fiscal rules require 
models that look at the economy-wide impact; hence, Ghadimi (2007) argues that a general 
equilibrium model is the ideal model for these analyses.  General equilibrium models include 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Overlapping Generations Model (OGM), Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) and the IMF’s Global Integrated Monetary Fiscal Model 
(GIMF).  
Robinson et al, (1999) developed a static CGE model implemented in GAMS to analyze 
the impact of capital inflow and the Dutch disease in Cameroon. They found that the Dutch 
disease had occurred in Cameroon and their results were consistent with the effect of the 
booming sector. They further found that the Dutch disease had implications for fiscal policy due 
to what they called “varying degree of tradability” and which was found to be an important 
factor in sectoral response to the boom of resources.  
One of the most comprehensive works on fiscal rules is by Jafarov and Leigh (2007) in 
which they consider long-term fiscal policy options in Norway in relation to the substantial 
expected increase in pension outlays. They draw a comparison between Norway’s current fiscal 
rules which set non-oil deficit to 4% of Government Pension Fund assets, and three alternative 
rules including the permanent income rule, growth-adjusted rule and asset-targeting rule. They 
also analyze the macroeconomic consequences of alternative fiscal rules by using the IMF’s 
Global Integrated Monetary Fiscal Model (GIMF).  
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The results of the study show that the 4-percent rule and the three alternative rules 
considered here involve trade-offs in terms of covering the expected increase in pension 
spending, long-term fiscal sustainability, short-term expansionary impulses, intergenerational 
wealth transfers, and long-term output gains. 
In terms of covering the expected pension increase in the long term, the growth-adjusted 
rule that saves more of the oil wealth than other rules come the closest to covering the pension 
increase. Moreover, this rule provides the least stimulus to the economy in the short-term and 
performs the best in terms of long-term growth.  However, this rule also involves a much larger 
transfer of oil wealth for consumption by future generations.  
Performance under the permanent income rule is close to the allocation of resources 
based on the growth-adjusted rule, but fiscal policy under this rule is very sensitive to 
assumptions of long-term oil prices, growth rate, and interest rate.  
The asset-targeting rule avoids the much larger transfers, but it performs worse than the 
growth-adjusted and permanent income rules in terms of long-term growth and covering the 
pension increase in the long term. Moreover, this rule could be pro-cyclical. The 4-percent rule is 
pro-cyclical in the short-term and performs the worst in terms of long-term growth as well as 
covering the pension increase in the long term. However, their study does not explain how they 
calibrated their model to match the economy and is not clear how they account for population 
aging. They also assume that all agents are credit constrained which is consistent with DSGE 
models (Galaasen, 2009). 
To fill in this gap, Galaasen (2009) repeated the study by Jafarov and Leigh (2007) on 
Norway, but changed some of the fiscal rules. The rules examined include the 4% Norwegian 
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rule, growth-adjusted, constant tax wealth targeting and spending models. He used an 
Overlapping Generations to account for intergenerational issues based on demographic changes. 
The study shows that the current 4% rule gives a short-to-medium term tax reduction and 
then followed by repeated tax increases into the long-term. Thus this rule is fiscally 
unsustainable because it allows intermediate tax cuts.  The growth-adjusted and the constant tax 
rules show that reforms to the fiscal policy which allow for pre-funding through significant 
accumulation of government wealth in the short-run will prevent large tax increases. The rule 
therefore is consistent with a large distribution of welfare and incomes from future generations to 
the current adults and young ones. 
The study by Galaasen (2009) has some weaknesses including the use of the Overlapping 
Generation Model which does not give true representative feature of the economy in a 
macroeconomic framework. Moreover, it excludes net immigration and focuses on mortality and 
fertility rates. The exclusion of immigration which is a feature of Ghana’s economy for example 
makes the study inappropriate for countries like Ghana since immigration is an important feature 
of most developing countries. 
Dagher et al, (2010) used a DSGE model to analyze alternative fiscal and monetary 
policy impact of oil windfalls in Ghana focusing on expenditure smoothing and expenditure 
composition for the fiscal side and on discretionary policy tightening and exchange sales 
reduction for the monetary side. The study differentiates between the short-run impact, 
associated with demand-related pressures, and the medium run impact on competitiveness and 
growth.  
The study shows that the impact on inflation and the real exchange rate could be 
moderate, especially if the fiscal authorities smooth oil-related spending or increase public 
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spending import content. However, a policy mix that results in both fiscal expansion and the 
simultaneous accumulation of the foreign currency proceeds from oil as international reserves 
would raise demand pressures and crowd-out the private sector. In the medium term, however, 
the negative impact on competitiveness as a result of ‘Dutch Disease” effects could be smaller, 
provided public spending increases the stock of productive public capital. The findings of the 
study underscore how different policies could respond to the macroeconomic impact of oil boom. 
3.4.5 CGE Models in Ghana 
Alfsen et al, (1997) use a CGE model to describe an integrated economy–soil-
productivity for Ghana, and through several simulated scenarios calculated the drag on the 
Ghanaian economy of soil mining and erosion, and illustrate the effects of different policies 
aiming at reducing these environmental issues.  The model is complemented by an integrated 
tropical soil productivity module which touched on the impact of cultivation and management on 
the productivity of soil in the agricultural sectors.  In their model the demand for agricultural 
land correspond to the production level while soil productivity is calculated to show the pressure 
on the forest reserves. The model treats activities in the Western region of Ghana, a region noted 
for significant mining, as separate sectors to particularly analyze the concern of deforestation in 
the growth process. 
The long-run impact of fertilizer use is linked to improved vegetation cover which 
reduces erosion through the protection of the soil against heavy rain, and leaves more plant 
residues for recycling in the ground. The policy implications of fertilizer use was proved 
beneficial but only at the initial stages in order not to pollute water bodies when excessively 
used. On investments, they use ‘structuralist’ elements to model the capital market. Gross capital 
formation is allocated to manufacturing sectors and services by fixed base-year coefficients and 
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that investments and sector-specific depreciation rates are important determinants of sectoral 
capital stock. 
Colatei and Round (2000) use a SAM based CGE to model the effect of Structural 
Adjustments Programme on poverty levels. They examine the possible consequences of a range 
of poverty-alleviating income and/or consumption transfers on the economy of Ghana.  
The study was done through the use of a previously-estimated SAM for Ghana, for the 
year 1993, which falls well within the reform era for the country. The study discounted earlier 
ones which used macro-meso models to analyse poverty effects of policies. In their work, they 
disaggregated income earners in Ghana into Savannah farmers, Forest farmers, Coast farmers, 
Savannah non-agricultural farmers, Forest non-agricultural farmers, Coastal non-agricultural 
farmers, Urban unskilled, Urban skilled, Accra skilled,  and Accra unskilled. This demarcation is 
particularly significant to reflect the wide income disparity in Ghana. However, the model 
exhibits the possibility of substantial spillovers (and feedback effects) in terms of the targeted 
groups.   
Arbenser (2002) analyzes the impact of foreign direct investments and policies that 
would increase these investments. The CGE model which follows Lofgren et al, (2002) provides 
that policies that increase the inflow of FDI as well as reduce tariff levels are important 
complementarities for enhancing economic growth and welfare.  
What is particularly innovative in this model is the introduction of foreign capital inflow 
into the model. This affected some of the equations and thereby enriched modelling in Ghana’s 
economy. Foreign capital redefines the balance of payment equation as well as constitutes an 
income to the economy. However, he introduced foreign capital inflow as an exogenous variable 
which undermined the dynamism associated with capital flows. This is because foreign capital 
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does not come in on its own. They are influenced by both domestic and foreign conditions which 
could ‘endogenize’ FDI inflows. There is therefore an important limitation in the model.  
In a study on another important resource in Ghana, Cocoa, Briesinger et al, (2008) used a 
CGE model to evaluate the potential role of cocoa on the way to a middle income economy by 
2015. They found that Ghana could reach a middle income status if it recorded strong growth in 
all sectors including cocoa. They estimated that cocoa production had to increase by 60,000 tons 
annually for a decade to generate the necessary growth for accelerating Ghana to a middle 
income status. They argued that value addition to cocoa in Ghana was lower than in its 
neighboring Ivory Coast, and that cocoa processing needed to be enhanced, but more 
importantly, a move towards diversification of the economy and the export structure would be 
appropriate. 
Diao (2009) developed a quantitative assessment of the economy-wide impact of Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in Ghana under different scenarios. He used a dynamic 
computable general equilibrium model for Ghana based on 2005 Social Accounting Matrix with 
a detailed production structure at both national and sub-national levels.  
The study examined the impact of lowering capital stock in chicken production and 
lowering marginal budget share for chicken consumption for the period 2009 and 2011 and 
concludes that the shock in chicken demand due to consumers’ anxieties about the flu is the 
dominant factor in causing chicken production to fall. He also states that a 40% reduction in 
chicken demand causes domestic production to fall more than 40 percent, with certain import 
substitutions. While he recognizes a fall in imports, the ratio of imports to total domestic 
consumption rises.  
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On the other hand, a 40% fall in chicken demand will reverse this. The model does not 
show any significant drop in chicken price at the new equilibrium with a much lower level of 
demand and supply. It however concludes that the economy-wide impact on GDP was 
insignificant. In reality, the effect on GDP might have been underestimated since chicken 
consumption is highly patronized in Ghana leading to the government imposing an import duty 
on it in 2010 to encourage the production and consumption of local chicken.  
Also, Briesinger et al, (2011) developed a disaggregated dynamic general equilibrium 
model and used it to assess Ghana’s growth options in economic transformation placing 
emphasis on the role of agriculture and Green Revolution–type growth. They observe that past 
governments were too ambitious and unfocused, a development which has changed now and 
which helped the country to achieve a middle income status through political, institutional and 
economic reforms that supported rapid transformation in the economy.  
They contend that economic transformation theory should be broadened to cover other 
important issues of distribution of wealth and the level of poverty, which had been ignored in the 
past. They further argue that agriculture and “homegrown” manufacturing sectors through 
private sector leadership were more likely to create and sustain job creation and poverty 
reduction. However, they also recognize the need for government involvement to be greater than 
what is required in the “Washington consensus” style of policy prescription. Government is 
required to create and promote an enabling investment environment whilst investing in 
institutional and physical infrastructure. One of the limitations of this study is that even though it 
recognizes the role of institutions in fostering economic transformation, the authors failed to 
incorporate the quality of institutional arrangements in the model.  
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The only studies so far on Ghana’s management of its petroleum revenues with CGE 
models particularly relating to issues of fiscal policy and fiscal rules are Breisinger et al, (2009) 
and the World Bank (2009). 
Breisinger (2009) for example used a recursive dynamic CGE model to analyze the 
allocation options of petroleum in Ghana. They tested four scenarios in a CGE model: where all 
the revenue is channeled into the economy; where all the revenue is saved and interest earned is 
used for public investment; where oil revenue of only 5 percent of GDP is retained to support the 
budget; and finally where petroleum revenues are smoothed in and out over time. While the 
scenario of smoothing revenue in and out of the budget had the best outcomes on inequality, the 
poorest still face challenges of significantly improving on their living conditions. The study does 
not address the problem of how much should flow into the budget and what rules should guide 
the determination of fiscal benchmarks. 
The shortcomings of this study is that it treats petroleum revenues as coming from natural 
resources fund saved abroad. This does not take into consideration the fact that in Ghana, there 
are two fiscal frameworks - spending and savings. Petroleum revenues that are not spent are 
saved. Thus, spending does not come from the natural resources fund saved abroad unless under 
two conditions, when there is a revenue shortfall and when the oil is depleted. Thus, the study is 
inconsistent with Ghana’s fiscal model. This is understandable because at the time of the study 
Ghana had not developed and passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Act in which the 
fiscal model is well defined. 
The World Bank (2009) also used a dynamic CGE to look at broad allocation options of 
petroleum revenues in Ghana. Except the World Bank, all previous studies on Ghana’s oil boom 
do not take into consideration the level of oil reserves and rate of extraction in projecting 
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petroleum revenues. They argue that the creation of an oil fund could  be used to smoothen the 
economy against global commodity price volatilities but recommends that sound macroeconomic 
management should be strengthened, whiles inefficiencies and corruption are tackled. They state 
that clear rules about spending petroleum revenues in future are required. The study also 
recommends a substantial spending of petroleum revenues currently to enhance productivity in 
rural areas and in the agricultural sector. The study also fails to address the issues of fiscal rules 
that should guide government budgetary options for maintaining fiscal sustainability.  
This study reflects the main features of Ghana’s fiscal policy for guiding the management 
of petroleum revenues – higher early spending, creation of a Petroleum Fund, spending in 
productive sectors including agriculture to accelerate development. However, due to the fact that 
the study was conducted before the passing of Act 815, it does not empirically test the effects of 
the fiscal model. Moreover, existing CGE models in the literature are limited in several ways 
both in its theoretical composition and practical application to real world phenomena. The 
following are some of the limitations. 
CGE models rely on one year’s data to explain world phenomenon, which is quite over-
simplistic and unrealistic. The base year is chosen by the researcher which ignores the rational 
behavior of human relying on past events to assess the future. Dynamic CGE models attempt to 
address this problem but always ignore the effect of pre-base year data. This makes CGE models 
very discretionary.  
CGE models have been limited by their choice of model structure, parameters, and 
functional forms for analysis (Panagariya and Duttagupta, 2001). The parameters are derived 
from calibrations based on one year data, or are sometimes borrowed from other literature. Thus 
parameters are not estimated from statistical foundations of empirical data such as time-series 
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data due to lack of sufficient and appropriate time series data especially in developing countries, 
which makes it difficult to model observed behavior of economic agents towards technological 
change, income growth and price changes among others (Barker, 2004).   
The assumption about general equilibrium inherent in CGE models is also unrealistic. 
Steady state equilibrium may never be reached, because society tends to always find new ways 
of distorting or advancing the order of society through research, technology and development 
which put it in a never-ending process of change and disequilibrium. This makes the foundation 
of CGEs unstable (Scrieciu, 2006).  
Also, the assumption that there is full employment in the economy is flawed. However, 
recent studies have tended to relax this assumption by introducing unemployment in the model. 
In this case, the factor market is cleared when the sum of all factor demand plus in addition to 
factors that are not in demand are equal to factor supply (Logfren et al, 2002). However, in 
countries like Ghana where data on unemployment is unavailable, this assumption may be 
understandably excused.  
The zero homogeneity of demand functions coupled with the linear homogeneity of 
profits in prices are not adequate to explain the effects of prices especially absolute level of 
prices on equilibrium conditions  (Shoven and Whalley, 1984). Also, the homogeneity 
assumption tends to generalize and homogenize completely different economies without taking 
account of country specific features (Scrieciu, 2006). 
The theoretical framework of CGEs combines general equilibrium theory, neoclassical 
micro-economic optimization behaviour of rational economic agents, as well as some 
macroeconomic features to explain economic, social and environmental policies. This places the 
solution to all problems on the market. However, CGE models fail to account for the effects 
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associated with fiscal efficiency and “institutional arrangements, ethical issues and the 
developmental needs of a society within an interdisciplinary, pluralistic, holistic, and dynamic 
approach” (Söderbaum, 2000).  
Also, in spite of the recent attempts at introducing dynamic features into CGE models, 
these are limited in scope and form. For instance, CGE models that account for capital 
accumulation as a dynamic process is very silent on regulatory and institutional changes that an 
economy needs to be on the desired path to steady state equilibrium. The lack of incorporation of 
these dynamic features narrows the economy to an “artificial perfect macroeconomic stability” 
(Ackerman, 2005), which inadequately explains the adjustment path to equilibrium.  
This study seeks to address the limitations of CGE models from accounting for 
institutional quality considerations in the analysis of policy decisions. This is also in recognition 
that the impact of fiscal rules must be measured from the perspective of fiscal efficiency. Fiscal 
efficiency requires that public spending optimizes the level of desired welfare outcomes. Thus it 
is important to incorporate the quality of institutional frameworks in a dynamic CGE model to 
assess the real impacts of petroleum revenues on the economy. This is particularly important 
because Ghana is associated with low absorptive capacity (World Bank, 2010). 
CGE models that have been applied to issues of resource management particularly in oil 
producing countries (for example; Benjamin et al, 1989; Decaluwé et al, 1990; Ghadimi, 2007; 
Omgba and Djiofack, 2010; Briesinger et al, 2009; World Bank, 2009) all ignored the role of the 
quality of institutional frameworks in the management of these resources particularly in 
implementing fiscal rules. But Bigsten and Levin (2000) observe that the efficiency of 
government spending is an important determinant of growth, poverty and income distribution. 
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The regulatory and institutional gaps in CGE models therefore demonstrate an important 
gap in the literature on CGE models generally and in Ghana particularly. This important 
shortcoming is being addressed in this study through the incorporation of regulatory and 
institutional arrangements in a recursive dynamic CGE model for Ghana to determine the 
efficiency of the adjustment process of government fiscal decisions towards the desired levels of 
impacts on economic development. 
3.5         Institutional Quality and Fiscal Rules 
3.5.1    Relationship between Institutions and Economic Performance 
The need for institutional quality consideration in models of economic development 
became necessary in the 1990s when the World Bank observed that the poor performance of its 
programmes in developing countries was attributed to factors other than those in conventional 
economic theory. This compelled the Bank to reconsider the efficiency of its operations in the 
developing world in what has been captured in the works of Nellis (1999). He argued that 
international organizations needed to support economic reforms through political and 
institutional mechanisms like the creation of strong administrative systems or legal structures 
capable of sustaining economic development. This in his view needed to be factored into the new 
theoretical model.  
However, the definition of what is “institutional” introduces different approaches to the 
understanding of institutions, which thereby brings out the difficulties in forging consensus on 
the causal effect between institutions and economic growth.  In spite of this, there is a general 
agreement that institutional theories provide opportunities for explaining the behavior of the 
economy at different levels and scope. This has led to the adoption of new perspectives on the 
usefulness of institutions in the theory of growth and development (Valeriani and Peluso, 2011).  
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In the early 1990s, many economists pointed out the links between institutional quality 
and economic development. Early studies of institutional quality relationship with economic 
performance focused on western societies. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) explained that the sources of exogenous 
variation in institutions based on the types of the European colonization policies in the 19
th
 
century (and earlier). Two major colonial institutional policies were identified as examples of the 
source of this variation - the extractive policies and protective ones against the government 
expropriation. This made it possible for colonial institutions to continue having a hold in their 
former colonies.  
Hall and Jones (1999) argue that institutional quality is a part of what they call “social 
infrastructure” which reflects the governance as well as the large capital level, and which shows 
the increasing productivity of workers.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) suggest that the institutional approach to attribute 
economic performance to governance is empirical, but they based their institutional effects to the 
prevailing conditions in the earlier era of colonization.  
The literature on the effects of institutional quality has been extended to explain the 
relationship between natural resource abundance and economic development. This is part of the 
broader “resource curse” literature. As already stated in Chapter One, there is significant 
evidence that low growth performance in resource-rich countries is attributed to low institutional 
quality (Eifert et al, 2002; Mehlum et al, 2006; Humphreys et al, 2007).  
The World Bank (2009) observes that political and institutional arrangements are the 
most important determinants of how countries with oil perform. The difference in the growth 
performance of resource-rich countries is primarily the result of how resource rents are 
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distributed through institutional arrangement (Eifert et al, 2006) and countries that ignore the 
importance of these arrangements and have weak institutional environment will likely see their 
oil resources turned into a curse (Eifert et al, 2002). 
Institutional quality perspectives are varied in the literature. The rent seeking theory 
suggests that in countries where there is large abundance of natural resources, there is also a high 
incidence that firms will tend to engage in rent seeking behaviour and leaving a few firms to 
engage in productive activities (Torvik, 2002). Rent seeking behaviour is often common with 
firms that operate in countries with low institutional quality (Lane and Tornell, 1996).  
The absorptive capacity theory suggests that poor investment decisions largely associated 
with low absorptive capacity affect the transformative effect of abundant natural resources 
leading to low returns from investments (McMahon, 1997). In another study, it was found that 
“unproductive investment booms were evident in many countries” (Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001). 
Similarly, Lal and Myint, (1996) attributed the poor results in investment impacts to a collapse in 
the efficiency of investment in resource-rich countries. This is particularly important for Ghana 
since most of the features of low absorptive capacity exist in the country (World Bank, 2010). 
The statist theorist associate resource management with the type of governance regime in 
resource-rich countries. There is evidence of a positive relationship between growth and the 
political system with resource-rich countries usually aligned to oligarchies rather than 
democracies (Lal, 1995). These states have been able to avoid the curse of resources and 
Botswana and Malaysia have been cited as examples in the literature.  
In contrast states that have not been able to avoid the curse are either “predatory state” or 
“factional state”. Auty (2001) argues that dependence on primary exports of resources for any 
length of time leads to “predatory” and “factional governments” both of which are identified by 
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poor management of the economy. Ghana is seen to be a grabber friendly country (World Bank, 
2009), showing a factional democracy (World Bank, 2007; Booth et al, 2005; Eifert et al, 2002; 
Nugent, 1999); and there exist political incentives that have created a “high level of clientelism” 
(World Bank, 2007); and sometimes showing features of its past history as an autocracy (Eifert 
et al, 2002).  
Most of these studies followed the methodology used in Sachs and Warner (2005) by 
applying cross-country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis which is limited in 
several ways. For instance, evidence from cross-country OLS has problems surviving the use of 
panel instrumental variable estimation techniques. Also, cross-country OLS does not take into 
account endogeneity, heterogeneity and omitted variables biases, which exist in empirical growth 
models (Islam, 1995).  
However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) solved these 
problems by using a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation method. This 
includes the regression equation in levels; and applied lagged differences of the endogenous 
variables as instruments. The results from these studies confirm that low institutional quality is 
strongly related to poor economic performance in resource-rich countries.  
There are however divergent views on the strong positive effect of institutional quality 
and management of abundant natural resources. For example, Leite and Weidmann (2002) found 
in a study from 1970 to 1990 that there is no direct effect of low institutional quality of resource 
abundant countries on growth.  
These results are confirmed by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et al, 
(2002) in their studies on the influence of natural resources on broader indicators of institutional 
quality. Nevertheless, they all agree that there exist indirect effects of low institutional quality on 
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growth. Whilst Leite and Weidmann (2002), found indirect effects of institutional quality 
through corruption, Isham et al, (2002) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found that 
resource abundance penalizes growth through institutional quality when the resources are 
“geographically concentrated”.  
In this apparent lack of consensus, this study conducts a test in this thesis on the 
development impact of resource abundance and the management of resource revenues (through 
fiscal rules) given a level of institutional quality, and using a different methodology based on a 
recursive Dynamic CGE model. Thus, the study in addition to addressing an important limitation 
of CGE models, will likely resolve the consensus problem in the literature on the effects of 
institutional quality in resource abundant countries.   
3.5.2      Measurement of Institutional Quality 
There are different measures of institutional quality in the literature. However, the 
literature on institutional quality measure is dominated by partial equilibrium models. Whilst 
most studies generate indicators and proxies to test hypotheses based on institutional quality (see, 
Knack and Keefer, 1995; Kaufman et al, 2004; Williams and Siddique, 2008), others have used 
data bases that include measures of institutional arrangements and which have stimulated 
empirical investigation of new research questions.  
La porta et al, (1998, 2003) show through historical approach involving legal origins that 
good governance is correlated with economic growth. Their theory reflects the view held by 
Hayek (1960) who argued that checks and balances of the courts in the Anglo-American 
constitutions played a significant role in the judicial independence. They further suggest that 
judicial independence was associated with economic and political freedom which contribute to 
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secure property rights, regulation (economic effects), democracy and human rights (political 
effects). 
Several measures of institutional quality have been adopted in different empirical works. 
Acemoglu et al, (2001) used three institutional indices: Voice and Accountability, Regulatory 
Quality and the Government Effectiveness drawn from the six indicators proposed by Kaufman et 
al, (2003) called “The World Bank Global Governance Indicators”. 
Klein (2005) used the series from the data set based on the International Country Risk 
Guide published by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group. The series are defined as; 
Bureaucratic Quality, Control of Corruption in Government, Risk of Expropriation, Repudiation 
of Government Contracts and Rule of Law. A higher value for any of the indicators shows a 
higher quality of an institution.   
Valeriani and Peluso (2011) used three institutional indicators - civil liberties, quality of 
government and number of veto players. The index for civil liberties was adopted from the 
Freedom House. Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization which promotes the 
expansion of freedom around the world by promoting democratic change, monitoring freedom, 
and advocating for democracy and human rights. The index of the Freedom House is designed 
such that each country and territory is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 towards a 
survey made up of 15 questions, with 1 rating representing the highest degree of freedom whilst 
7 represents the lowest level of freedom. The ratings show the extent to which a country is 
classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.  
The index for legislative checks and balances is adopted from the Political Institutions 
database of the World Bank in which countries are scored depending on the number of players 
that can veto a law. In this index, the higher the score, the more checks and balances are 
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provided by the legislative process and the stronger will the institution be. Just like Klein (2005), 
the index used to measure the quality of government is adopted by the International Country Risk 
Guide. 
All these indices and measures of institutional quality are limited and specific to selected 
factors/indicators. They therefore fail the comprehensiveness test. The index that is broad and 
comprehensive for measuring the quality of institutions is the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) Index. 
The CPIA has been used by the World Bank to influence allocation of assistance to the 
countries which are rated high (Dollar and Levin, 2004). Aid allocation is influenced by CPIA 
ratings because it involves capital inflows which cannot be managed with weak institutional 
quality.  
Similarly, as capital inflows, petroleum revenues from the export of petroleum are 
efficiently transformed into growth and development when invested in an environment of high 
institutional quality. This is consistent with the evidence that good institutions are important for 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2002).  
The CPIA has been criticized by some researchers as a measure of institutional quality, 
but such criticisms only target the form and not the theoretical foundations of the index. For 
instance, it has been criticized for heavily relying on a uniform model of what works in 
development policy (Kanbur, 2005b) and therefore does not take into consideration country 
specific institutional diversity.  
Similarly, Herman (2004) underlines the low ability of the CPIA indicators to 
discriminate among countries or over time. The index seeks to draw some comparisons between 
countries to determine allocation efficiency of aid and such analysis must be done with a 
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common framework. However, although country specificities are important, it is practically 
impossible to factor all the different specificities into one model as most of these are qualitative 
and abstract.   
Another criticism is that CPIA indicators are not outcome based. Beynon (2001), argues 
that it is difficult to monitor outcomes than policies, hence the over reliance of CPIA indicators 
on policies rather than outcomes makes it infeasible to analyze the effects of institutional quality. 
This argument is confirmed by Kanbur (2005) who states that the CPIA does not contain any 
final outcome variables like poverty, extreme poverty, etc.  
Nonetheless, these arguments are simplistic and fail to appreciate that the CPIA cannot be 
inputs and outputs at the same time.  Most of the studies which apply CPIA use it as input to 
generate outcomes, expressing the effects of policies on outcomes such as growth, development 
and poverty reduction, a methodology followed in this study.  
There is also the criticism that the CPIA measures investors’ perceptions of institutional 
quality based on a questionnaire filled out by World Bank personnel. Thus, domestic institutional 
quality is influenced by “the opinions of foreign investors about what constitutes a good 
investment climate”. It is important to note nevertheless that this criticism has been addressed by 
the World Bank’s commitment to country ownership of policies through the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP), a participatory process between debtor-country and the World Bank in 
which CPIA results serve as the main indicators on which the PRSPs are focused (Cage, 2009). 
It is further argued that even though the CPIA has some limitations like all measures of 
institutional quality, it does cover extensively issues related to institutions and human capital 
development, which are accepted in the growth and development literature as important 
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determinants of sustained growth, poverty reduction and effective use of development assistance 
(Ibid, 2009). 
Empirical literature on growth shows that growth is influenced by policies such as 
macroeconomic stability (Fischer, 1993), rule of law (Knack and Keefer, 1995) and trade 
openness (Frankel and Romer, 1999); and these factors are all captured on the CPIA index. 
There have been specific studies that applied the CPIA index and conclude that it has positive 
impact on poverty reduction and economic growth (See Collier and Dollar, 2001; Easterly, 1999; 
and Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OIL REVENUE FORECASTING 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter estimates petroleum revenues which are used in the computations and 
application of fiscal rules in chapter 5 and 7. There have been several forecasts of expected 
revenues from oil (World Bank, 2009; International Monetary Fund, 2009; Briesinger et al, 
2009). These revenues are very critical to the economic development of Ghana considering the 
historical capital shortages experienced over the years leading to high fiscal deficits. Ghana 
needs short-term and long-term forecast of petroleum revenues for purposes of development 
planning, budgeting and long-term fiscal planning. The Jubilee phase one field has been in 
production since 2010 and has now been increased by Jubilee Phase 1A. There are other 
discoveries that have been announced and are being appraised notably; Tweneboa, Enyenra, 
Ntomme (now called TEN), and a Plan of Development has been approved by the Government 
of Ghana, with first oil from these fields expected in 2016. When these fields are brought on 
stream together with Jubilee, the country could get substantial revenues.  
The forecasting of government’s entitlement is the more important as the government 
must be concerned about the limitation of its revenues by capital allowance, at least when all 
capital costs have not been fully recovered. This raises a number of complexities including for 
instance crude oil price and production volatility. Another complexity is the computation of 
petroleum income tax, provided for in the Petroleum Income Tax Law (PNDC Law 188).  
The components of petroleum income tax such as deduction of operations cost and 
amortization of capital and interest expenses as well as carry forward losses are very important 
indicators of complex forecasting due to the differences in methodological design and 
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interpretation by different stakeholders. The tax system does not provide for thin capitalization 
and there exist no regulations on transfer pricing, which are likely to underestimate the expected 
government revenues. 
4.2 Forecast inputs 
4.2.1 Production Volumes 
Forecast of oil and gas production volumes is an important first step to take in oil revenue 
forecasting. Oil production volumes are dictated by several factors. These include the 
geophysical conditions of the producing wells, government extraction policy, and the level of 
capital financing of development.  
Production volumes are also affected by the phases of production. All producing fields go 
through ramp up phase to plateau production phase and then to a decline phase and then exit. 
These factors make production volumes uncertain. Before oil production stage is reached, there 
is a discovery and if it is declared commercial based on an appraisal programme, a Plan of 
Development (PoD) is submitted to the Government for approval to allow for field development. 
The Plan of Development contains among others estimates of production volumes over the life of 
the project. The realization of these estimates may delay although upon maturity more oil could 
be recovered. There are also oil recovery enhancement programmes such as water and natural 
gas reinjection. The estimated production profile from all the proven discoveries is presented in 
Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Oil Production Profile (2010 – 2030) 
Item Jubilee TEN META Other Total 
Unit Oil Volume Oil Volume Oil Volume Oil Volume Oil Volume 
Unit Mmbbl Mmbbl mmbbl Mmbbl Mmbbl 
Total 482.52 336.02 160.68 384.91 1364.13 
2010 1.18 0 0 0 1.18 
2011 24.2 0 0 0 24.2 
2012 32.85 0 0 0 32.85 
2013 41.61 0 0 0 41.61 
2014 41.61 0 0 0 41.61 
2015 41.61 11.7 0 0 53.31 
2016 39.64 36.5 0 0 76.14 
2017 37.45 36.5 0 0 73.95 
2018 35.37 36.5 10.14 0 82.01 
2019 33.29 34.68 15.6 0 83.57 
2020 29.21 32.85 15.6 27.05 104.71 
2021 24.97 29.2 15.6 41.61 111.38 
2022 20.81 25.55 15.6 41.61 103.57 
2023 16.64 21.9 14.82 41.61 94.97 
2024 12.52 18.25 14.04 41.61 86.42 
2025 10.4 14.6 12.48 39.53 77.01 
2026 8.32 10.95 10.92 37.45 67.64 
2027 8.32 9.13 10.14 33.29 60.88 
2028 8.32 7.3 9.36 29.13 54.11 
2029 7.96 5.48 8.58 27.05 49.07 
2030 6.24 4.93 7.8 24.97 43.94 
Source: World Bank (2013) Energizing Economic Growth in Ghana: Making the Power and 
Petroleum Sectors Rise to the Challenge, Energy Group Africa Region June 2013. 
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From the Table 4-1, Jubilee ramps up to its peak in 2013 and assumes a plateau until 
2015. Planned production from TEN commences in 2016 whilst META commences in 2018.  
4.2.2 Crude Oil Prices 
Crude oil price is another important input in revenue forecasting. There is no one crude 
oil price, hence different crudes have different value (or prices) which are determined by the 
location of its production, the quality of the crude, and the demand and supply conditions 
surrounding them. Crude oil price forecast has been very challenging as a result. This 
necessitated the development of marker prices which have historically documented data series. 
Some marker prices include the Brent, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Dubai. In Africa, 
the most common marker is Bonny light of Nigeria. There are many ways of forecasting crude 
oil prices. 
a. Estimating a time series data of the price of one of the marker crudes over a defined 
period; 
b. Estimating an average price of one of the marker crude over a period; 
c. Estimating the selling price of crude oil over time; 
d. Estimating alternative price scenarios such as base price, high and low prices. 
Estimating crude oil prices presents some challenges. On one hand, the use of estimated 
time series exposes the volatility in crude oil prices over time but these prices need to be 
smoothened for revenue forecasting. On the other hand, Ghana’s jubilee oil is bench-marked to 
the Brent and since it can either sell at a premium or a discount, the use of Brent does not solve 
the uncertainty problem; and further ignores the deviations between it and the sales price which 
could translate into significant revenues.  
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The simpler way to revenue forecasting is to use alternative price scenarios, a practice 
that has been accepted in conventional forecasting for planning purposes. In the Table below, 
gross petroleum revenues are estimated based on production volumes form the oil fields and an 
average annual crude oil price of US$90. This price is based on a seven year moving average 
price of crude oil.  
Table 4-2: Gross Revenue based on Alternative Crude Oil Price Scenarios 
Year Total Oil Volume (mmbbl) Gross Revenue @$90/bbl (US$MM 
Total 1364.13 122771.7 
2010 1.18 106.2 
2011 24.2 2178 
2012 32.85 2956.5 
2013 41.61 3744.9 
2014 41.61 3744.9 
2015 53.31 4797.9 
2016 76.14 6852.6 
2017 73.95 6655.5 
2018 82.01 7380.9 
2019 83.57 7521.3 
2020 104.71 9423.9 
2021 111.38 10024.2 
2022 103.57 9321.3 
2023 94.97 8547.3 
2024 86.42 7777.8 
2025 77.01 6930.9 
2026 67.64 6087.6 
2027 60.88 5479.2 
2028 54.11 4869.9 
2029 49.07 4416.3 
2030 43.94 3954.6 
Source: Computations by Author 
4.2.3 Petroleum Costs 
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Petroleum cost refers to capital and operational costs incurred in exploration, 
development and production of oil. In Ghana the bulk of the costs are borne by investors and are 
therefore required to recover the costs. Oil revenue estimates are largely affected by cost 
recovery but the Petroleum Agreements signed between the Government and its investing 
partners specifies expenses that can be classified as petroleum costs. Capital costs reduces 
government revenue through a number of ways –  
a. Capital and operational costs are deducted for income tax purposes (they are tax 
deductable),  
b. Additional Oil Entitlements (AOE) are based on investors rate of return, hence they are 
computed after the deduction of capital and operational costs,  
c. The state is expected to pay the proportional development and operational costs in respect 
of its paid interest.  
The Petroleum Agreements provide for the forfeiting of the state’s future share of oil with 
interest if it defaults in meeting its cash calls. This therefore reduces the state revenues in both 
the short and long run. Petroleum costs could also create uncertainty in revenue forecasting. In 
the first place, there are no cost recovery limits in Ghana and this could reduce early government 
revenues. Second, there are no ring-fencing costing provisions in Ghana’s law, hence profits in 
one project could be used to finance costs in another project. Third, during the period of cost 
recovery, the state share is less, but expands beyond the full recovery of costs. In the Table that 
follows, gross capital and exploration expenditure are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88 
Table 4-3: Gross Capital and Operational Costs in Ghana’s Jubilee projects 
Year Total Gross CAPEX Gross OPEX 
 Oil Volume   
 Mmbbl US$MM US$MM 
Total 1364.13 17709.06 17460.3502 
2010 1.18 2632.49 20.6 
2011 24.2 822.07 139.5 
2012 32.85 1583.83 317.14 
2013 41.61 1270.67 325 
2014 41.61 2000 327.381 
2015 53.31 2800 590.376 
2016 76.14 2100 694.234 
2017 73.95 1200 704.965 
2018 82.01 1000 814.2845 
2019 83.57 1050 819.0415 
2020 104.71 850 916.7223 
2021 111.38 400 912.570642 
2022 103.57 0 901.9306093 
2023 94.97 0 889.5147218 
2024 86.42 0 877.4955063 
2025 77.01 0 860.9669453 
2026 67.64 0 845.8306341 
2027 60.88 0 838.1112526 
2028 54.11 0 831.3149722 
2029 49.07 0 824.5380966 
2030 43.94 0 815.5565612 
Source: Ghana National Petroleum Company 
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4.3 Ghana’s Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Terms 
The fiscal regime is defined by the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law of 1984, 
and the Petroleum Income Tax Law of 1987 (PITL), but the negotiated terms are contained in a 
Petroleum Agreement. The fiscal regime has major elements and minor elements. The major 
elements which form the basis of the revenue forecast are royalties, participating interest, 
corporate income tax and additional oil entitlement (AOE).   
a. Royalties:  Ghana’s model petroleum agreement sets royalties between 2.5 and 12.5% for 
crude oil and gas. PNDC Law 84 states Clause 20(1): 
“There shall be payable to the Republic royalty in respect of any petroleum produced in Ghana, 
except as may otherwise be provided in accordance with the terms of a petroleum agreement.” 
However, the royalty rate has been negotiated in different Petroleum Agreements, with 
Agreements following the jubilee discovery providing for higher royalties than pre-jubilee 
agreements. The following Table 4-4 shows variability in fiscal terms by different agreements.  
 
Table 4-4: Differential Fiscal Terms by Petroleum Agreement 
CONTRACT YEAR ROYALTY INITIAL 
INTEREST 
ADDITIONAL 
INTEREST 
VANCO 2002 5% 15% NIL 
KOSMOS 2004 5% 10% 2.5% 
HESS 2006 4% 10% 3% 
TULLOW 2006 5% 10% 5% 
VITOL 2008 12.5% 10% 10% 
AFREN  2009 10% 10% 15% 
CHALLENGER 2009 10% 10% 15% 
Source: Ghana Petroleum Agreements (Various) 
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For this study, the forecasting is based on the two Jubilee Agreements - the West Cape 
Three Points and Deepwater Tano blocks - in which a negotiated 5% royalty is provided.  The 
Government can decide to take royalty in kind or cash. According to the Petroleum Agreements, 
where the government decides to take in cash, the contractor shall pay to the Government the 
weighted average market price of crude oil at the given period. For the Jubilee operations, the 
Government of Ghana has elected to receive in-kind royalties which means its royalty income 
will come from the sales of the oil lifted. 
b. Participating Interest: The participating interests of parties to a petroleum license are 
defined by law or Agreement. However, while investors’ interest may vary depending on the 
number of investors, the state’s participating interests are mostly fixed by Petroleum 
Agreements. Jubilee is being developed and produced as a unitized production area on the basis 
of a 50/50 split between the Deepwater Tano and West Cape Three Points licenses. The Unit 
Operating Agreement however provides for redetermination of the original hydrocarbon in place 
which is likely to slightly change the tract participation of the partners on the two blocks. In the 
original Jubilee Unit license for instance, the net participating interest of the Government of 
Ghana, which has been used to compute the ‘government take’ in production equivalents is 
presented below. 
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Table 4-5: Ghana’s Participating Interests 
Interest/Cost Deepwater 
Tano Block 
West Cape Three 
Points Block 
Jubilee Unit 
Initial Interest 10% 10% 10% 
Additional Interest 5% 2.5% 3.75% 
GNPC Share of:    
Net Oil Production (after royalties) 15% 12.5% 13.75% 
 Operating Costs 15% 12.5% 13.75% 
 Exploration Costs 0% 0% 0% 
Development Costs 5% 2.5% 3.75% 
Source: Ghana Petroleum Agreements (Various) 
Participating interest of the Government of Ghana are two types under the current 
Petroleum Agreements – the initial interest which is free and carried through development; and 
additional paid interest which the GNPC can take upon commercial discovery, which is paid for 
but carried through exploration.  
Participating interest has been progressive in Agreement after agreement as the country 
matures as an oil producer. Even though the forecast of “Government Take” is based on the 
Jubilee Agreements, it is important to note that when oil is discovered based on Agreements with 
higher royalty rates, the state’s share of oil will increase and revenues will be more significant 
(See Table 4-4). 
The Government of Ghana through the GNPC pays its capital and operational costs in 
respect of its paid interest but operational costs particularly at the production level are paid for all 
its interest. For the purpose of this forecasting, the total participating interest of the Government 
of Ghana is 13.6% including a free carried interest of 10%. The Agreement further provide that 
where the GNPC fails to finance its paid participation, the Contractors would pre-finance and 
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recover the default amount from GNPC’s future share of oil with interest. This is often called a 
“collateralization clause”.  
c.       Petroleum Income taxes:  The Petroleum Income Tax Law (PNDC L 188) sets petroleum 
income tax at 50%. However this is negotiable. In all the Petroleum Agreements signed between 
the Government of Ghana and International Oil Companies, the petroleum income tax has been 
negotiated to 35%. The tax is a percentage of the chargeable income on any petroleum 
operations. The chargeable income is composed of gross sales revenue less royalties, operating 
costs, capital allowances, interest expenses, and losses carried forward from previous years.  The 
capital allowances are also calculated by depreciating all exploration and development costs on a 
five-year straight-line basis which begins with the year the expenditure is incurred or 
alternatively the year of the commencement of the project, whichever is later. In Section 11 of 
the Petroleum Income Tax Law (PNDC Law 188), Companies are required to file quarterly 
returns and based on the assessment by the Ghana Revenue Authority or upon self-assessment, 
the right amount due the state is assessed and paid. 
d. Additional Oil Entitlement:  The fiscal regime provides for a progressive resource rent tax, 
known as Additional Oil Entitlement (AOE), to assure that the country captures a progressively 
larger share of the profit from successful projects.  The AOE is tax on the investor’s inflation-
adjusted rate of return at certain thresholds which are defined by a Petroleum Agreement.  
4.4 Forecast Methodology 
4.4.1 Spreadsheet Modelling 
In this study, the Spreadsheet Model is used to forecast petroleum revenues. This method 
is simple and straight forward. On the spreadsheet, different inputs are modeled and their 
relationship with each other is established. The modeling can either be done in the columns or 
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rows in which revenue streams, costs, and production volumes are all displayed. It is also 
transparent as it could be interpreted by any user of spreadsheet. Models can also be developed 
for different projects or integrated into one project. In this study, all the producing and planned 
production wells are either on the West Cape Three Point Block or Deep Water Tano, having 
almost the same owners; and it is therefore convenient to integrate the model. Also, as indicated 
earlier, there is no cost ring fencing in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. The real challenge arises 
when production volumes from other blocks are factored into the estimate. In this case, different 
models must be developed for different projects and the revenues consolidated thereafter.  
4.4.2 Main Assumptions 
The forecasts are based on the following assumptions. 
a. The period of revenue projection is 2010 – 2030.  
b. Estimated total oil production annually are from all proven reserves – Jubilee, Tweneboa-
Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN), Mahogany-Teak-Akasa (META), Other (estimated from the 
satellite projects of Jubilee and TEN), in millions of barrels. This is based on production 
volume data provided by the GNPC. 
c. Estimated Gross revenues based on three price scenarios – base case scenario of $90 per 
barrel of oil, high case scenario of $110 per barrel and a low case scenario of $70 per 
barrel. This captures the effect of price volatility on revenues. Gross revenues are 
estimated as total oil production volume multiplied by crude oil price. 
d. Estimated royalty is at an average of 5% based on the Petroleum Agreements with the Oil 
Companies; which is deducted from gross revenue to obtain gross revenues after royalty. 
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e. Estimated gross capital cost and operational costs are given as provided by the GNPC. 
These are deducted from post royalty gross revenues to obtain net revenues or profit oil 
equivalent. 
f. Estimated revenue for state participation is at 13.75% of net revenues and is deducted 
from net revenues to obtain Investors Take. 
g. Corporate income tax is calculated at 35% (as indicated in the Petroleum Agreements) on 
Investors profit. For some years, corporate taxes were not due as a result of capital 
allowance and carry forward losses. Ghana does not have cost recovery limits.  
h. Government petroleum revenues are arrived at by the sum of royalties, state participation 
and corporate income taxes where applicable.   
Table 4-6 shows computations of the components of the fiscal regime at the base case 
scenario of $90 per barrel. Government petroleum revenues are the summation of Royalty, 
Government participation, and corporate income tax. This excludes other statutory taxes paid by 
the Oil Companies to the state, which are excluded from petroleum revenues by the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act 815. 
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Table 4-6: Estimation of Oil Revenue by Revenue Stream (US$MM) 
Year Royalty 
@$90/bbl
(0.05) 
Gross Rev 
minus 
Royalty 
Revenue 
after 
royalty  
GOG 
@$90/bbl
(0.1375) 
Investor  Corp Tax 
(0.35) 
Corp 
Tax Due 
GOG 
REVENUE 
(US$90/bbl) 
Total 6138.585 116633.1 81463.7 11201.259 70262.445 24591.855 24591.86 41931.7003 
2010 5.31 100.89 -2552.2 -350.9275 -2201.273 0 0 5.31 
2011 108.9 2069.1 1107.53 152.28538 955.24463 334.33562 -1866.93 261.185375 
2012 147.825 2808.675 907.705 124.8095 782.89556 274.01345 -1592.92 272.634438 
2013 187.245 3557.655 1961.985 269.77294 1692.2121 592.27422 -1000.65 457.017938 
2014 187.245 3557.655 1230.274 169.16267 1061.1113 371.38896 -629.26 356.407675 
2015 239.895 4558.005 1167.629 160.54899 1007.08 352.47800 -276.78 400.443988 
2016 342.63 6509.97 3715.736 510.9137 3204.8223 1121.6878 844.9056 1698.44926 
2017 332.775 6322.725 4417.76 607.442 3810.318 1333.6113 2178.517 3118.73386 
2018 369.045 7011.855 5197.5705 714.66594 4482.9046 1569.0166 3747.534 4831.2444 
2019 376.065 7145.235 5276.1935 725.47661 4550.7169 1592.7509 5340.284 6441.82597 
2020 471.195 8952.705 7185.9827 988.07262 6197.9101 2169.2685 7509.553 8968.82052 
2021 501.21 9522.99 8210.4194 1128.9327 7081.4867 2478.5203 2478.520 4108.66301 
2022 466.065 8855.235 7953.3044 1093.5794 6859.725 2400.9038 2400.904 3960.54812 
2023 427.365 8119.935 7230.4203 994.18279 6236.2375 2182.6831 2182.683 3604.23091 
2024 388.89 7388.91 6511.4145 895.31949 5616.095 1965.6333 1965.633 3249.84274 
2025 346.545 6584.355 5723.3881 786.96586 4936.4222 1727.7478 1727.748 2861.25863 
2026 304.38 5783.22 4937.3894 678.89104 4258.4983 1490.4744 1490.474 2473.74545 
2027 273.96 5205.24 4367.1288 600.48020 3766.6485 1318.327 1318.327 2192.76719 
2028 243.495 4626.405 3795.0900 521.82488 3273.2651 1145.6428 1145.643 1910.96268 
2029 220.815 4195.485 3370.9469 463.5052 2907.4417 1017.6046 1017.605 1701.9248 
2030 197.73 3756.87 2941.3134 404.4306 2536.8828 887.90899 887.9099 1490.06959 
Source: Computations by Author 
The petroleum revenues forecasted are used only for the computation of fiscal rules. This 
provided the basis for determining the fiscal benchmarks under alternative fiscal rules – the 
 96 
permanent income, bid-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rules. The fiscal benchmarks were also used 
in the CGE model to assess the development impacts of fiscal rules. 
4.4.3 Forecast Sensitivity 
Petroleum revenues are influenced by a number of factors. These factors which introduce 
volatility in Government petroleum revenues are; petroleum costs, production volume, crude oil 
prices and petroleum fiscal terms such as royalty rates, income tax rate and participating interest. 
In this study, sensitivity of government revenues to crude oil prices has been computed. 
Government revenues are based on 7-year moving average price of Jubilee Oil according to the 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011. However, since data on jubilee does not cover 7 
years, Government revenues are based on conservative estimates of crude oil prices. For this 
purpose, Government revenues are estimated by three oil price scenarios starting with a base 
case scenario of $90 per barrel, a high price scenario of $110 per barrel and a low price scenario 
of $70 per barrel. From Table 4-7, the high price scenario reflects in higher government 
revenues, whiles the low price scenario reflects lower revenues. For instance in 2012, an increase 
in crude oil price from $90 per barrel to $110 per barrels accounts for an increase in government 
revenue by 20%. Similarly, a decrease in price from $90 per barrel to $70 per barrel sees a 
decrease in government revenue by 20%.  
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Table 4-7: Sensitivity Results of Alternative Crude Prices 
Year Oil Production US$90/bbl US$110/bbl US$70/bbl 
 
 (mmbbl) US$MM US$MM US$MM 
2010 1.18 5.31 6.372 4.248 
2011 24.2 261.185375 313.42245 208.9483 
2012 32.85 272.634438 327.16133 218.10755 
2013 41.61 457.017938 548.42153 365.61435 
2014 41.61 356.407675 427.68921 285.12614 
2015 53.31 400.443988 480.53279 320.35519 
2016 76.14 1698.44926 2038.1391 1358.759409 
2017 73.95 3118.73386 3742.4806 2494.987089 
2018 82.01 4831.2444 5797.4933 3864.995519 
2019 83.57 6441.82597 7730.1912 5153.46078 
2020 104.71 8968.82052 10762.585 7175.056414 
2021 111.38 4108.66301 4930.3956 3286.930404 
2022 103.57 3960.54812 4752.6577 3168.438493 
2023 94.97 3604.23091 4325.0771 2883.384728 
2024 86.42 3249.84274 3899.8113 2599.874195 
2025 77.01 2861.25863 3433.5104 2289.006901 
2026 67.64 2473.74545 2968.4945 1978.996362 
2027 60.88 2192.76719 2631.3206 1754.213755 
2028 54.11 1910.96268 2293.1552 1528.770145 
2029 49.07 1701.9248 2042.3098 1361.539837 
2030 43.94 1490.06959 1788.0835 1192.055674 
Total 1364.13 41931.7003 50318.04 33545.36024 
Source: Computations by Author 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FISCAL RULES AND FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN GHANA 
5.1 Introduction 
Fiscal rules have become important tools for managing the allocation of resource 
revenues for development and have been used increasingly by different countries. Fiscal 
sustainability measures have also been used to determine what the fiscal constraint countries are 
faced with and to guide policy formulation aimed at sustaining consumption in future.  
The literature on ‘resource curse’ gained prominence in the 1980s following the collapse 
of the economies of resource-rich countries years after the oil boom of the 1970s. Most of the 
studies were concerned about the impact of crude oil volatility until the 2000s when issues of 
resource depletion re-emerged.  
Earlier theories of resource depletion were formulated by Hotelling (1931) and those who 
followed him such as Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1978). Hotelling for instance argues that the 
optimal path of resource extraction where the markets are competitive requires that resource 
prices net of the marginal cost of extraction grow with interest rates. For the monopolist, he 
explains that the net marginal revenue, and not the net price, will grow at the interest rate. The 
results by Hotelling were based on assumed constant marginal cost of extraction. This ignored 
the effects of cumulative production (Devarajan and Fisher, 1982). This brought about the debate 
whether to leave natural resources underground which could lead to what is called ‘scarcity rent’, 
a future gain to the resource owner (Hamilton, 2009).  
Solow (1974) was concerned about the allocation of resources to meet intergenerational 
concerns based on a per capita constant consumption. Hartwick (1978) followed Solow’s 
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argument and contends that the value of productive investments in natural resource-rich 
countries should always be equal to the value of the resource rents.  
The re-emergence of the exhaustibility theory departed from the ‘scarcity rent’ argument. 
Rather than leave resources underground, the current literature is concerned about sustainable 
management of resource benefits along a sustainable consumption path. Thus, the PI rule has 
gained prominence in the literature.  
The literature on ‘resource curse’ gained prominence in the 1980s following the collapse 
of the economies of resource-rich countries years after the oil boom of the 1970s. Most of the 
studies were concerned about the impact of crude oil volatility until the 2000s when issues of 
resource depletion re-emerged.  
Earlier theories of resource depletion were formulated by Hotelling (1931) and those who 
followed him such as Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1978). Hotelling for instance argues that the 
optimal path of resource extraction where the markets are competitive requires that resource 
prices net of the marginal cost of extraction grow with interest rates. For the monopolist, he 
explains that the net marginal revenue, and not the net price, will grow at the interest rate. The 
results by Hotelling were based on assumed constant marginal cost of extraction. This ignored 
the effects of cumulative production (Devarajan and Fisher, 1982). This brought about the debate 
whether to leave natural resources underground which could lead to what is called ‘scarcity rent’, 
a future gain to the resource owner (Hamilton, 2009).  
Solow (1974) was concerned about the allocation of resources to meet intergenerational 
concerns based on a per capita constant consumption. Hartwick (1978) followed Solow’s 
argument and contends that the value of productive investments in natural resource-rich 
countries should always be equal to the value of the resource rents.  
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The measurement of fiscal rules in resource-rich countries has often targeted a design and 
application of rules that prevent these countries from the phenomenon of “resource curse”, in 
which natural resource wealth translates into poor economic performance.  
The re-emergence of the exhaustibility theory departed from the ‘scarcity rent’ argument. 
Rather than leave resources underground, the current literature is concerned about sustainable 
management of resource benefits along a sustainable consumption path. Thus, the PI rule has 
gained prominence in the literature.  
In this study, Ghana’s fiscal rule for allocating petroleum revenues to the budget is 
compared with the permanent income rule and the bird-in-hand rule to assess fiscal sustainability 
in Ghana’s emerging oil economy in which it is faced with the sustainable use of its oil wealth 
for development. 
5.2 Defining Alternative Fiscal Rules 
5.2.1 The Permanent Income Rule 
The Permanent Income rule requires that a permanent proportion of oil wealth is spent 
annually to sustain consumption by maintaining a constant real expenditure path beyond the 
lifetime period of oil reserves.  
Ossowski and Barnett (2002) provided a good mathematical foundation for the 
permanent income consumption. They show that PI ensures long term fiscal sustainability in 
resource producing countries. They analyze welfare maximization as the primary objective of 
government consumption decision and assume that fiscal policy decisions are independent of 
other macroeconomic factors that are exogenous. They define the government consumption 
decision as: 
tttt ZGRBB  1         (1) 
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Where Bt  is government debt at the end of the period; R is the interest rate (assumed constant); 
Gt is primary government expenditure; and Zt is petroleum revenues. They also assume certainty 
in the flow of petroleum revenues; hence petroleum revenues are constant over the field life. 
With constant government expenditure (Ḡ) and non-oil revenue (Tt) they define the PI as the 
returns on the present discounted value of resource wealth presented as: 

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Where N is the oil field life and t is current period.  
Leigh and Olters (2006), extend this theory by introducing habit formation. They argue 
that the adjustment in consumption decision reflects the habits of planning authority which then 
determines the budget constraints. Their formula for PI is expressed in ratio to non-oil GDP as 
follows: 
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where g
*
 is the ratio of spending to non-oil GDP; R = 1+r; r is long run interest rate assumed 
constant;  is ratio of non-oil revenue to non-oil GDP; z is ratio of oil revenue to non-oil GDP;   
is habit strength;  is non-oil growth rate, bt-1 is ratio of previous period debt levels to non-oil 
GDP. The introduction of habits is influenced by the notion that consumption behaviour depends 
on previous behaviour. Thus, consumption is addictive and therefore the level of spending in the 
previous year is equal to the stock of habit in the current year (Leigh and Olters, 2006). In this 
case the reaction of policy makers to adverse shocks over time is to spread the policy adjustment 
over a number of years (Velculescu, 2004). They also assume a constant non-oil GDP growth 
which is assumed further to be lower than interest rate if the question of sustainability is to be 
achieved.   
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However, Maliszewski (2009) argues that such a policy would mean transferring positive 
non-oil income growth in per capita terms from future generations to the current generation since 
the present value of future non-oil revenue flows is usually higher than that of current petroleum 
revenues and therefore the rule has limited practical relevance. 
The role of uncertainty in government consumption was accounted for by Engel and 
Valdes (2000) and applied by Maliszewski (2007). They show that due to large volatilities in 
crude oil prices, petroleum revenues are faced with great uncertainties. Hence previous models 
that ignored uncertainty are only applicable to non-stochastic cases. They introduced uncertainty 
mainly because of large fluctuations in prices. The above optimizing rules are derived for a non-
stochastic environment, and need to be adjusted to take this uncertainty into account. They argue 
that if oil production remains constant, and prices follow the following process: 
ttt vPP   )(loglog 1        (4) 
where vt is a normally distributed shock with variance  
2
v and Price P0 has mean  p,0 and 
variance  2p,0 whiles the initial production has  0 =  p,0Q and variance  
2
0 =  
2
p,0Q, then 
Government maximizes consumption at: 
  )0,0(1),( 0
22
00 gg IUBUv        (5) 
where g0 (0,0) is the optimal PI level of consumption with no uncertainty whiles  BU and IU are 
functions of  20 and  
2
v. Therefore if the uncertainty emerges, it reduces government’s optimal 
consumption. There is an inverse relationship between levels of uncertainty and government 
consumption. 
This study adopts the formula for the Permanent Income model as defined in Ossowski 
and Barnett (2002). That is equation 2 above. Recall the formula for measuring the permanent 
budget constraint: 
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Ḡ = Tt + 
 
 
           
 
          
Where Gt is primary government expenditure  
Bt is government debt at the end of the period 
R is the interest rate (assumed constant) and R = 1 + r, where r is the nominal interest rate.  
Tt is non-oil revenue  
Zt is petroleum revenues 
Assuming certainty and constant government expenditures, hence petroleum revenues are 
constant over the field life; the optimal government consumption is a combination of tax 
revenues (non-oil revenues) and the present value of future petroleum revenues. Total revenues 
per year are a net of interest on debts. This formulation has been followed to define the other 
fiscal rules. 
5.2.2 The Bird-in-Hand Rule 
This rule requires the government to spend interests on financial assets from the 
investments of petroleum revenues. As explained by Bjerkholt and Niculescu (2004), in this rule, 
the government turns its oil resources into financial assets and only spends the projected returns 
on the financial assets each year.  
In this case, since petroleum revenues are invested in financial assets, the optimal 
decision will cover the present value of expected returns on expected financial assets. This can 
be expressed as follows:  
Ḡ = Tt + 1
1
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rBrFR
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r
    (6) 
Where F is expected accumulated financial assets and; 
rF = returns on Financial Assets 
But; F = PFt-1 + rPFt-1 + Zt      (7) 
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Where PFt-1 = Balance from previous years Petroleum Fund 
 rPFt-1 = returns on previous years balance in the Petroleum Fund 
 Zt = Current year petroleum revenues 
Thus beyond oil depletion, the government sustainable consumption is reduced to the 
continuous returns on the financial assets. This may not be significant during the period of oil 
production and therefore implies transferring significant current transfers to future generations 
when the financial assets would have accumulated.  
5.2.3 The Ghana Fiscal Rule 
The Ghana Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 (Act 815) provides a spending 
model which requires heavy current spending and lesser savings. The two major components of 
the model are; budget support and investments in financial assets. The rule provides that a 
maximum of 70% of annual petroleum revenues less the equity financing cost of the national oil 
company (referred to as “benchmark revenues”), shall be transferred to the budget and shall be 
known as the “Annual Budget Funding Amount”, whiles the remaining 30% shall be saved in the 
Petroleum Funds (the Stabilization Fund and the Heritage Fund). This is however applicable 
during the period of oil production. However, after oil depletion, the ABFA shall be equal to the 
real returns on financial assets of the Petroleum Fund. Thus, the Ghana rule has components of a 
‘big-push’ and the Bird-in-hand rules. Therefore, in the period of oil production, the government 
consumption decision is expressed as: 
Ḡ = 1)3.01(  ttbt rBrFZT      (8) 
But  GNPCZZ ttb  Benchmark Revenue  
GNPC is share of annual petroleum revenues, and; rF=0, because oil depletion has not been 
reached and it is therefore not spent. Also, the Stabilization Fund is spent when there is revenue 
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shortfall. However, when oil is depleted, the Annual Budget Funding Amount shall not exceed 
the real returns on financial assets of the Petroleum Fund. Thus, the Government consumption 
will be: 
Ḡ = 1 tt rBrFT        (9) 
In the oil revenue projections, it is assumed that oil reserves will not be completely 
depleted by 2030. Also, the GNPC, the National Oil Company, is allocated part of the revenue 
through the budgetary process to pay its equity costs and make new investments. In the past two 
years, the average allocation to the GNPC is about 47% of total revenues. This will likely reduce 
to about 20% when the development costs are retired by 2021. The balance which is left for 
spending and savings is referred to as the Benchmark Revenue. Thus, the fiscal rule used in this 
analysis is expressed in equation 8 above. The following sections show the results of the analyses 
of fiscal rules and fiscal sustainability.  
The equations above were used to measure fiscal rules based on the following 
assumption: 
a. Estimation of Government non-oil revenues (T). This data was sourced from the Ghana 
Statistical Service. 
b. Estimation of petroleum revenues (Z) computed by Author from data sourced from the 
GNPC (See Chapter three for oil revenue forecasting). 
c. Government Debt levels (B) sourced from the Bank of Ghana 
d. Discount rate (r) for discounting the value of petroleum wealth over estimated field life 
cycle was assumed to be 3%. 
e. GDP data was sourced from the Ghana Statistical Service 
f. It was also assumed that the Government spent (G) all its non-oil revenues. 
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Therefore the difference between government expenditure (G) without petroleum 
revenues and that with petroleum revenues was determined by the type of fiscal rule applied. The 
estimated Government Expenditure with petroleum revenues based on the Permanent Income 
rule is presented in the following Table 5-1 (See Appendices 1-B and 1-C for computations of 
the Bird-in-hand rule and the Ghana rule). 
Table 5-1: Computation of Permanent Income Value (Scenario 1 - $110/bbl; r = 0.03) 
YEAR Oil  Rev 
(US$MM) 
Non-Oil Rev 
(US$MM) 
PI (Expenditure  
With petroleum 
Revenues) (US$MM) 
Petroleum 
Rev (PI) 
(US$MM) 
PI(%GDP) 
2010 6.372 4946.501329 5523.012236 576.5109064 0.141861 
2011 313.4225 8278.185221 8278.195221 576.5109064 0.147232 
2012 327.1613 9677.650933 10254.16184 576.5109064 0.168386 
2013 548.4215 11979.26312 12555.77403 576.5109064 0.176592 
2014 427.6892 14060.78125 14637.29216 576.5109064 0.175271 
2015 480.5328 16395.31293 16971.82384 576.5109064 0.17411 
2016 2038.139 18545.54383 19122.05474 576.5109064 0.174091 
2017 3742.481 20996.91551 21573.42641 576.5109064 0.174449 
2018 5797.493 23726.13517 24302.64608 576.5109064 0.17457 
2019 7730.191 26578.53192 27155.04283 576.5109064 0.17473 
2020 10762.58 29788.38292 30364.89383 576.5109064 0.174779 
2021 4930.396 33434.3816 34010.8925 576.5109064 0.174627 
2022 4752.658 37618.51889 38195.02979 576.5109064 0.17447 
2023 4325.077 42370.30209 42946.813 576.5109064 0.174249 
2024 3899.811 47772.54313 48349.05404 576.5109064 0.173982 
2025 3433.51 53920.95203 54497.46294 576.5109064 0.173735 
2026 2968.495 60926.2596 61502.77051 576.5109064 0.173513 
2027 2631.321 68916.70509 69493.216 576.5109064 0.173317 
2028 2293.155 78040.95376 78617.46466 576.5109064 0.173086 
2029 2042.31 88615.85512 89192.36602 576.5109064 0.172882 
2030 1788.084 100686.5208 101263.0317 576.5109064 0.172662 
Source: Computations by Author 
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5.3 Measurement of Fiscal Sustainability in Ghana 
Fiscal sustainability is interchangeably used with sustainable consumption in some of the 
literature. Fiscal sustainability is derived from the potential destabilizing impact of resources on 
the short and long-term perspectives of the economy. Also, fiscal sustainability focuses on 
availability of revenues beyond resource depletion point whilst sustainable consumption is 
concerned about what to spend the revenues on to increase social welfare. 
Resource revenues introduce substantial volatilities in the budget while the value of 
resource wealth is subject to interest rates which are also volatile. More so, resource revenues 
could be temporary and may not contribute to welfare volatility. The management of resource 
revenues must take into consideration current fiscal policy and future fiscal targets. Resource 
revenues must be managed with the long-term fiscal objectives. They can either harm long-term 
fiscal impacts or sustain the critical fiscal space for appropriate fiscal adjustments. It is therefore 
important to consider alternative options of fiscal rules that can sustain fiscal policy without 
sacrificing social welfare. 
Fiscal rules are used to measure fiscal sustainability benchmarks on which the 
Government determines its short to long-term fiscal policy direction. This can be compared with 
the non-oil primary fiscal balance to determine alternative fiscal policy choices towards 
achieving fiscal sustainability.  The analysis of fiscal sustainability is seen from two 
perspectives. The first is Government budget including petroleum revenues and the second is 
petroleum revenues as additional budget sources. 
5.3.1 Fiscal Sustainability – the case of Government Budget with Petroleum Revenues 
The main question that continues to confront resource-rich countries is by how much to 
increase consumption such that consumption can be sustained beyond the production profile. 
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Sustainable consumption is interlinked with fiscal sustainability. Thus, the fiscal rule that 
provides revenue allocation for relatively higher levels of spending over a longer-term is defined 
as the most fiscally sustainable.  
The indicators for determining fiscal sustainability are varied. In this study, the ‘non-oil 
primary fiscal balance (NOPB)’ is adopted. It is an important guide to the long-term fiscal 
sustainability of fiscal policy. It includes non-oil revenues and non-oil expenditure. Invariably, it 
excludes all petroleum revenues, oil related expenditure and net interest payments. Interest 
receipts and payments are not under the control of the government but are dictated by capital 
market movement. This measure of fiscal sustainability is the most appropriate because of its 
comparison against long-term fiscal benchmarks based on inter-temporal government wealth. All 
the fiscal benchmarks are expressed in percent of non-oil GDP.  
The Government budget at any given time consists of non-oil revenues and petroleum 
revenues. The petroleum revenues allocated to the budget depend on the type of fiscal rule. 
Given non-oil revenues, the additional fiscal space provided by petroleum revenues provides 
room for increasing government consumption. The major question confronting resource-rich 
countries is the political economy issue of spending all their resource revenues or part of it.  
The danger in consuming all petroleum revenues is that it raises the consumption level 
during the period of oil production and lead to early enhancement of welfare. However, there 
cannot be sustained welfare since the petroleum revenues deplete beyond a certain level. This 
could raise social tensions especially if citizens begin to see a decline in social services as a 
result of depleted petroleum revenues.  
There are several fiscal policy choices the Government must make if it is to avoid the 
dangers associated with managing a post oil economy. First, if the Government wishes to 
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smoothen consumption and sustain welfare levels, it may have to resort to borrowing and create 
more fiscal deficits which then impose more burdens on the economy.  
Second, Government must ensure that petroleum revenues do not go to pure consumption 
but are be invested in the productive sectors to create growth and improve on welfare levels. This 
is more sustainable since the growth of the productive sectors could continue to fuel the 
economy beyond oil depletion.  
Third, Government must adopt a combination of fiscal rules and investment options such 
that a proportion of petroleum revenues are consumed or invested in so far as they do not 
sacrifice future liquidity requirement in a post oil economy. These fiscal rules could ensure 
sustained welfare and avoid the negative impacts on the economy of crude oil price volatility and 
exhaustibility of oil and gas resources. The Government of Ghana’s preference for a rule reflects 
the last observation, but whether this rule could sustain consumption over a long-term horizon 
needs to be examined.  
The long-term perspective must be borne in mind in the design of fiscal rules for developing 
countries. Thus, the fiscal rules explored in this study have all taken into consideration the long-
term horizon of the consumption path. Solow (1974) states, “Someone… must always be taking 
the long view. They (sic) must somehow notice in advance that the resource economy is moving 
along a long path that is bound to end in disequilibrium of some extreme kind. If they do notice 
it, and take defensive actions, they will help steer the economy from the wrong path toward the 
right one”. 
In terms of fiscal sustainability, the total government consumption including oil induced 
consumption as a proportion of GDP shows that consumption could be sustained at different 
levels. For instance the bird in hand rule promises relative sustainability because it offers the 
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highest government consumption levels proportional to GDP after oil depletion period compared 
to the permanent income rule and Ghana’s fiscal rule. The permanent income rule offers higher 
early consumption whilst Ghana’s rule provides higher consumption during peak oil production. 
Figure 5-1: Sustainability of Government Consumption with petroleum Revenues (%non-
oil GDP) 
 
Source: Computations by Author 
From Figure 5-1, Ghana’s fiscal rule appears less sustainable in government consumption 
from petroleum revenues, as less revenues are relatively available to meet consumption needs in 
the long-run. 
Naturally, most developing nations prefer to spend and invest their resource revenues to 
develop the country faster. Many of these countries are faced with capital shortages and high 
infrastructure financing gaps; and it makes no sense to save substantial revenues while living on 
the income from financial assets. It is recommended therefore that for those countries, investing 
in human capital and physical assets through a front-loaded approach could ensure high current 
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benefits without sacrificing inter-temporal benefits as well (Takizawa, 2004; Solow, 1986; 
Hartwick, 1977). This is the popular Hartwick rule.  
According to Hartwick, sustainability of consumption rests on investing resource rents 
such that the value of investment does not deviate from the value of resource rents at each point 
in time (Hartwick 1977; Solow 1986). Thus, genuine savings should be kept at zero at each point 
in time. Also, Van der Ploeg and Venables (2008) advocate an increase in current consumption 
which will raise income levels but also building on the capital stock for accelerating economic 
growth. 
There are problems with the Hartwick rule however. One way this could affect the 
economy adversely is the significant fall in standards of living in future. In addition, the 
contributions of petroleum revenues to the GDP falls so much that it slows down growth.  Both 
the permanent income and Ghana’s rules are faced with low absorptive capacity of the economy 
which makes it difficult to efficiently spend heavily in the early years of production. However, if 
petroleum revenues are invested efficiently in the productive sectors rather than on recurrent 
consumption, the growth of the economy could sustain standards of living in future. Therefore, 
the Hardwick rule is plausible as a rule for sustainable development unless there is a mechanism 
to build on the institutional capacity to invest resources efficiently.  
5.3.2 Fiscal Sustainability – the Case of only petroleum Revenues as additional Budget 
Sources 
The analysis is a comparison of the long-term fiscal sustainability of the permanent 
income, bird-in-hand and Ghana’s rules. From the following graph, a comparison of the fiscal 
rules show that spending of petroleum revenues based on Ghana’s rule picks up slowly as oil 
production remains low, and ramps up to higher level of spending during peak production. Thus, 
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as production and revenues increase, more revenues are allocated for spending. This however 
declines significantly in line with declining production.  
Figure 5-2: Oil Revenue Allocation based on alternative Fiscal Rules 
 
Source: Computed by Author 
Both the bird-in-hand and permanent income rules show that during the declining 
production phase and after oil depletion, relatively higher spending can be afforded from 
petroleum revenues but the bird-in-hand rule offers higher spending.  The sustainability of these 
rules nevertheless depends on a number of factors including the size of the GDP. 
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Figure 5-3: Sustainable Fiscal Balance (%non-oil GDP) 
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Source: Computation by Author 
In Figure 5-3, both the Ghana rule and Permanent Income rule can finance relatively 
higher non-oil fiscal deficits in the short-to-medium term than their counterpart Bird-in-hand 
rule. However, in the long-term and especially after oil depletion, the Bird-in-hand can allow for 
higher fiscal adjustments. The adoption of Ghana’s rule does not only reduce the ability of 
petroleum revenues to finance higher deficits in the long-run, but also narrows the future fiscal 
space in the economy with serious implications for financing sustainable consumption.  
5.3.3 Can petroleum Revenues Finance Planned Government Fiscal Balance? 
In this section, the medium term fiscal policy of the Government which defines the target 
fiscal balance for the period 2011 – 2015 compares with alternative fiscal balances based on 
Ghana’s fiscal rules, the Permanent Income and Bird-in-hand rules.  
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Figure 5-4: Government Medium Term Fiscal Target Versus Fiscal Rules (%non-oil GDP) 
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Source: Computation by Author. For the policy fiscal deficit target (See IMF Article IV 
Consultations on Ghana (2011)) 
Petroleum revenues are expected to support fiscal sustainability but the current level of 
spending under Ghana’s fiscal rule cannot fully absorb the deficit of 12% of GDP for the year, 
2012. The permanent income ruler comes closer in the medium term. However, the variance 
between the medium term target and the permanent fiscal constraint shows that Government 
must reduce its spending to sustainable levels as determined by the new petroleum revenues. 
Contrary to this, Government will resort to debt financing of the deficit which undermines long-
term fiscal sustainability. 
Historically, fiscal deficits have been financed by a mix of financing options. In 2012 for 
example, net foreign financing was about 11% of total deficit and 0.5% of GDP, whilst net 
domestic financing was 49.5% of total deficit and 2.4% of GDP. Thus, Ghana’s deficit financing 
puts more pressure on domestic sources, which could therefore crowd out the private sector and 
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undermine production and economic growth. Hence, the need for petroleum revenues to provide 
fiscal relief that reflects sustainable deficits cannot be understated. 
5.4       Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the robustness of the computations. In a 
sensitivity analysis, the study shows that fiscal policy reflects changing economic conditions, 
domestic and global. The analysis covered changes in crude oil prices and the discount rate. 
Changes in crude oil prices affect Government’s revenues from the export of oil which leads to 
changes in the amount of revenues a country receives from oil exports. The higher the price the 
more revenues received assuming production volumes do not fall, and the reverse is true. The 
practical manifestation of this has been demonstrated in the Government of Ghana 2011 
Supplementary Budget in which expected revenues for the year was revised from the original 
budget. At $70 per barrel of oil in the original budget, annual petroleum revenues were estimated 
at GHS580 million which was revised to GHS1,250 million in the supplementary budget based 
on a crude oil price of $100 per barrel. However, actual revenues received in the year was 
GHS660 million.  
One of the major problems facing resource-rich countries is the volatility of crude oil 
prices and petroleum revenues. Applying the Permanent Income rule and assuming a baseline 
crude oil price of US$90 per barrel of crude oil, a rise in oil price from US$90/bbls to 
US$100/bbls increases petroleum revenues, hence fiscal sustainability of the permanent income 
rule is improved. The permanent income line as percentage of non-oil GDP shifts to the right 
side of the baseline.  
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Figure 5-5: Sensitivity Analysis of Change in Crude Oil Prices – Permanent Income Rule 
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Source: Computations by Author 
On the other hand, a fall in crude oil price to US$70/bbls reduces the fiscal sustainability 
of the permanent income rule. Thus, it has been established that changes in crude oil prices could 
support or undermine the fiscal efforts of Government. In this case, fiscal sustainability is 
improved or worsened depending on the direction of price movement. Further, where oil prices 
fall, the Government would have to resort to other financing options to reduce its fiscal deficit. 
This is done usually through borrowing from domestic and foreign financial institutions or the 
Government Treasury Bills, which in turn increases the debt profile, weakening the sustainability 
of fiscal rules in the process.  
When crude oil prices recover, the temptation is usually to spend heavily as a result of the 
fiscal space created for the Government to operate within. Governments have the appetite for 
heavy spending where there is fiscal indiscipline and where there are no binding fiscal 
constraints because there is fiscal space created to reduce future deficits.  
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Oil rich countries that have managed their economies well have relied on countercyclical 
fiscal policy to accommodate the effects of price volatility. The fiscal instruments that have been 
used with varying impacts include the establishment of stabilization Funds, introduction of 
automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy, Fiscal Responsibility legislations and hedging, among 
others. In Ghana, the fiscal rule provides for a percentage of petroleum revenues to be transferred 
to the Stabilization and Heritage Funds to cushion against revenue shortfalls and for future 
generations respectively. The demonstration of counter cyclicality is borne out of the percentage 
allocation to the two Petroleum Funds in which 70% of the savings are transferred to the 
Stabilization Fund and the remaining 30% to the Heritage Fund.  
Figure 5-6: Sensitivity Analysis of Change in the Discount rate – Permanent Income rule 
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Source: Computations by Author 
Real interest rate is an important measure of petroleum wealth because returns on 
financial assets could determine fiscal sustainability based on fiscal rules. The fiscal rules that 
are particularly affected are the Permanent income and the Bird-in-hand rules which involve 
savings of petroleum revenues. Thus the impact of returns on investments depends largely on the 
type of fiscal rule. As can be seen from Figure 5-7, based on the permanent income rule, a higher 
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return on investments (r = 6%) is associated with improved fiscal sustainability by increasing the 
sustainable non-oil deficit.   If returns on investments is reduced to 3%, the sustainable non-oil 
balance line shifts to the left, indicating lower levels of fiscal sustainability.  
One major problem facing developing countries such as Ghana is the lower returns on 
investments facing them in the domestic economy. Practically, most resource-rich countries that 
operate petroleum funds invest in foreign economies especially in the developed and emerging 
economies. Thus, the baseline analysis in this study was based on real interest rate of 3%, quite 
close to the realized returns on Ghana’s Petroleum Funds.  
Interestingly, in the last 2 years (2011 and 2012), Ghana had to move the investments of 
its petroleum funds from US treasury to Euro clear bonds due lower returns on US bonds arising 
from the global financial crises which has affected US markets greatly. In the first half of 2012 
for instance, returns on the Alaska Permanent Fund stood at 0.2% whilst returns on the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds for the same period was 2.3%. Thus, resource-rich countries consider 
movements in the real interest rate on their investments an essential requirement for determining 
the sustainability of resource revenue induced fiscal rules. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter show that oil revenue horizon from the existing discoveries is 
not longer than twenty (20) years, hence temporary. Therefore fiscal rules in this situation must 
be designed to meet fiscal sustainability objectives. Among the three fiscal rules examined – the 
Permanent income rule, the bird-in-hand rule and the Ghana rule, the most fiscally sustainable is 
the bird-in-hand rule. Thus, the Ghana fiscal rule is not fiscally sustainable relative to the 
alternative rules. However, Ghana’s short to medium term fiscal objective cannot be financed by 
any of the rules. The rule that comes closer is permanent income. Thus, the Government must cut 
 119 
down on spending to sustainable levels in order to prevent serious fiscal shortages in the long-
term.  
Further, Government would have to take a number of fiscal policy decisions to address 
the short, medium and long term fiscal issues that have the tendency of weakening the economy.  
First, fiscal discipline and prudence for the effective management of financial assets 
especially if rules based fiscal policy is implemented. The growth of financial assets faces 
uncertainty as a result of the volatility in capital markets. Savings are adversely affected by 
financial crises, social disorders and unpredictable natural disasters (World Bank, 2006). 
Financial crises could particularly plunder returns on financial assets and slow down the growth 
of the petroleum funds which puts fiscal sustainability in danger. It is therefore important to 
institute a convenient combination of savings and investment rules that allow for investment of 
revenues in productive infrastructure while saving some of the revenue in low risk assets. 
Second, social welfare volatilities associated with rising and falling consumption pattern 
are likely to increase social disaffection (Karl, 2007a). While the permanent income and Ghana 
rule may be preferable in the short to medium term because of its high level of consumption, 
their long-term sustainability is quite limited. In this case, where an early “big-push” fiscal 
policy is adopted with the possibility to generate long-term growth and additional non-oil 
revenues, it would be important to “gradually adjust the sustainable non-oil deficit benchmark as 
the impact of investment on non-oil growth becomes clearer” (Medas and Zakharova, 2009). 
Third, the solution to the problems of social disaffections associated with fiscal 
sustainability policy rests with the political economy of managing natural resources (Ross, 2010; 
Karl, 2007b). Good governance, transparency and accountability are very critical. These 
principles ensure that citizens have reliable information about petroleum revenues, they 
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participate in the spending or consumption decision and there is increased public accountability 
for the decisions collectively made. Price fluctuations may not necessarily bring about policy 
failure but lack of information on projected resource revenues and past expenditure pattern even 
more makes policies fail (Karl, 2007b). The Government must therefore involve the people and 
ensure greater understanding among them of the implications of heavy current consumption 
versus future consumption or vice versa. This could limit social disaffections for the Government 
and the burden it puts on the economy.  
One way to reduce fiscal deficits and restore fiscal sustainability is to reduce the 
country’s wage bill which has increased substantially following the implementation of the Single 
Spine Salary Structure, aimed at reducing income distortions and disparities in the formal sector. 
Another way is to reduce the level of subsidies in the utilities by allowing the petroleum 
deregulation policy and the Automatic Adjustment Pricing of public utilities to work without 
government interferences. The country’s high election year spending must also be reviewed to 
avoid volatility in the adjustment to fiscal sustainability.  
Finally, there is the tendency to rely on fiscal sustainability without addressing the 
structural causes of inefficiency and wasteful public spending. Government must control 
spending and improve on the efficiency of public spending by instituting far reaching public 
sector reforms. In order words, fiscal sustainability should not compromise the development 
objectives of spending oil and gas revenues. It is therefore important for the Government to 
adopt a fiscal rule that is not only fiscally sustainable but also provides greater development 
outcomes. The next two chapters present the estimation and analysis of the development impacts 
of fiscal rules and to establish if there is any relationship between the two. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR GHANA 
6.1 Introduction 
To assess the impact of fiscal rules on the economy, a Recursive Dynamic Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model is developed. This follows previous models used to study the 
impact of petroleum revenues on the economy of Ghana. However, the model has been modified 
to adequately provide empirical answers to the research questions. 
6.2 Description of the Model Structure 
The Recursive Dynamic CGE is developed along the neoclassical models developed in 
Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) and also follows the model developed by Logfren et.al 
(2002) to analyze the economy-wide effects of policies in developing countries. The 
Mathematical presentation of the model is adopted from Briesinger et al, (2011) but modified to 
capture elements suitable for the study.  
The model analyzes the economic behavior of four institutional sectors: firms, 
households, the government sector and the foreign sector. All economic agents are assumed to 
adopt an optimizing behavior conditions under relevant budget constraints.  The model is a 
multi-sectoral one which solves for variables such as commodity and factor prices at the same 
time and through endogenous process. The model also shows economic activities on demand and 
supply sides. 
On the supply side, it assumes constant-returns to scale technology with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation function between primary inputs. There are three 
primary factor inputs in the model; labour, capital and land. Apart from labour and capital, 
intermediate inputs are also required to produce each sector’s output. These make the 
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formulation a two level production where at each level, capital and labour produce the real value 
added, which, in the next level are combined with intermediate inputs to produce output 
according to fixed input-output coefficients.  
For the substitution between primary and intermediate inputs in the production functions, 
a Leontief technology is assumed. For commodities that are sold domestically and for exports, a 
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function is applied, while for commodities that 
have both domestic and foreign supply, an Armington Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
is used.  
Labour is mobile across sectors but capital is fixed and sector specific. Another important 
assumption is the diminishing marginal efficiency of investment or public spending. There is 
also assumed full-employment in the economy; hence labour supplied is equal to labour demand. 
In this model we further assume a diminishing marginal efficiency of investment due to the 
problem of absorptive capacity and incorporate costs of adjustment for capital stock and 
institutional quality index. 
On the demand side, household consumption is allocated across different commodities 
(market and home commodities) in line with Linear Expenditure System (LES) demand 
functions, solved from maximization of a Stone Geary utility function with a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function specification.  
In this case, the marginal budget share of each good consumed is different from its 
respective average budget share (Briesinger et al, 2009). Income generated from the primary 
factors employed in the production process is the dominating income source for household 
consumers. Incomes from abroad through remittances or the government in direct transfers are 
also considered in the model. 
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On the government side, the model assumes a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function with 
endogenous taxes. Savings and Investments are endogenously determined. 
In the foreign sector, commodities are tradable but capital and labour are not. We assume 
a small open economy such that the country does not have influence on world prices of imports 
and exports. The exchange rate is flexible. 
In this model, there are notational conventions. Subscripts and superscripts i and j denote 
sectors and are in lower case. Scalars, parameters, time and data are also in lower case, variables 
and their initial levels and equation names are in capital letters, equation names begin with EQ, 
and initial values of variables and parameters are indicated with Z added to their names. The 
mathematical explanations of the equations are presented as follows. 
6.3 Model Equations 
There are different notational issues. Endogenous variables are Upper-case Latin letters 
without a bar. Exogenous variables are Upper-case Latin letters with a bar. Parameters are 
Lower-case Latin letters (with or without a bar) or lower-case Greek letters (with or without 
superscripts). Set indices are Lower-case Latin letters as subscripts to variables and parameters. 
The equations are presented as follows. However, the definitions of the variables and parameters 
are presented in Appendices 2-B and 2-C. 
a. Price Block 
The price block covers equations with endogenous model prices linked to other prices 
(endogenous or exogenous) as well as non-price model variables. Prices include import prices, 
export prices, demand price of domestic non-traded commodities, activity price, aggregate 
intermediate input price and consumer price. 
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Import Price 
             . (1 +                                    (C1) 
The import price is in a local-currency unit and is defined as the price paid by domestic 
consumers for imported commodities. This includes the world price of imports, adjusted to 
foreign exchange rate and import tariffs plus transaction costs.  
For all commodities therefore, the market price which domestic commodity demanders pay is the 
composite price, PQ; which applies only to payments for trade inputs. In the model, there is one 
equation for every imported commodity.  
In the import price, both the exchange rate and the domestic import price are flexible, but 
tariff rate and the world import price are fixed due to the small-country assumption. 
Export Price 
                                        (C2) 
The export price is in local currency units and is the price domestic producers receive for 
the sale of their output in export markets. The export price is the world export price adjusted to 
exchange rate plus transaction costs. The difference between the export and import prices is that 
in the export price domestic consumers of the export commodities are not affected by the tariffs 
and transaction costs. The absence of tariffs and costs of trading reduces the price domestic 
consumers pay for the commodities.  
Activity Price 
                              (C3) 
This is the gross revenue per activity unit and is defined as the return from selling the 
output or outputs of the activity. Where there are several activity commodities, the activity price 
becomes the sum of each activity price multiplied by the activity output. 
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Aggregate Intermediate Input Price 
                             (C4) 
This input price (        shows the cost of disaggregated intermediate inputs per unit 
of aggregate intermediate input, and depends on composite commodity prices,      as well as 
intermediate input co-efficient      ).  
Activity Revenue and Costs 
                                                     (C5) 
In this equation, each activity requires that total revenue net of taxes are fully used for 
payments for value-added inputs (    ) and intermediate inputs (      ). In Ghana, oil 
activity is aggregated into mining and quarrying as part of overall industry activity. Revenues 
from oil activity are used for the payment of inputs in the development of oil fields and 
operational expenses. Taxes from oil activity including royalty are treated as Government 
revenues used to finance development infrastructure.  
Consumer Price Index 
                             (C6) 
 The CPI is fixed and functions as the numéraire in the basic model version. This is 
required because the model is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, hence if the value of the 
numéraire is doubled, all prices would also double but quantities remain the same.  
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b. Production and Trade Block 
This consists of four categories:  
a. Domestic production and input use;  
b. The allocation of domestic output to home consumption, the domestic market, and 
exports;  
c. The aggregation of supply to the domestic market (from imports and domestic output 
sold domestically); and  
d. The definition of the demand for trade inputs that is generated by the distribution process. 
In line with the competitive market assumption, activities are assumed to maximize 
profits subject to their technology, given prices (for their outputs, intermediate inputs, and 
factors). The CGE model includes the first-order conditions for profit-maximization by 
producers. Thus, in the technology nest, the activity level is either a CES or a Leontief function 
of the quantities of value-added and aggregate intermediate input use. A CES function is a 
generic function, but if the elasticity of substitution becomes zero, the function becomes a 
Leontief function. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution of a CES function is 1, the 
function becomes a Cob- Douglas function. In this model, the preference is the CES.  
Apart from factor inputs, intermediate inputs are also required to produce each sector’s 
output. This makes the formulation a two level production where at each level, capital and labour 
produce the real value added which, in the next level are combined with intermediate inputs to 
produce output according to fixed input-output coefficients. 
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The optimal mix of intermediate inputs and value-added constitute a function of the relative 
prices of value-added and the aggregate intermediate input. The level of activity determines the 
quantity of outputs produced by each activity. The exponent in the activity equation is a 
transformation of the elasticity of substitution between value added and the aggregate 
intermediate input.  
Value-Added and Factor Demands 
        
         
          
           
   
  
    -1/  
       (C7) 
In this equation, the quantity of value-added is a CES function of disaggregated factor 
quantities for each activity. Each activity demands factor inputs (    ) at the point where the 
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue or that the value of marginal product of each factor 
input is equal to its price. In this case, the zero profit condition is achieved. Put differently, 
where the marginal cost is total cost, it is equal to total revenue.  
Factor Demand 
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            (C8) 
In the demand for factor equation, the exponent   
   is a transformation of the elasticity 
of factor substitution. If this elasticity is higher, then the optimal change in the ratios of different 
factor quantities becomes larger in its response to relative factor prices. In this model, the 
average price of factors (   ) is endogenous, whilst wage distortion factor (        ) is 
exogenous. 
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Also, for each activity, the demand for disaggregated intermediate inputs is measured by 
the standard Leontief formulation. This is referred to as the level of aggregate intermediate input 
use (      ) times a fixed intermediate input coefficient (     ) as expressed in the following 
equation.  
                              (C9) 
Commodity Production and Allocation 
                         (C10) 
In the above equation, production quantities, which are disaggregated by activity, are 
considered as output yields (   ) times activity levels (   ). This is shown on the right hand 
side of the equation. On the left-hand side, the quantities are allocated between market sales and 
home use. This makes it possible for any commodity to be produced by one or a combination of 
more activities; and also, any activity able to produce one or more commodities. 
Output Aggregation Function 
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      (C11) 
Aggregate marketed production of any commodity is a CES aggregate of the marketed 
output levels of the different activities producing the commodity as indicated in the above 
equation. This can further be expanded to include marketed output for export and domestic use 
as follows. 
       
          
        
  
 
          
          
  
 
     
 
      (C12) 
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The optimal quantity of the commodity from each activity source is however indirectly 
related to the activity-specific price. In this case, output is QX which is sold at PX, produced with 
the inputs and purchased at PXAC.  
The two equations above are the first-order conditions for maximizing profits from the 
sale of the aggregate output, QX, at price, PX, and subject to the aggregation function and the 
disaggregated commodity prices, PXAC. A fall in PXAC, of one activity relative to others would 
result in a shift in demand in its favour but this will not completely eliminate demand for other, 
higher-price sources. The degree of substitutability between different producers is dictated by the 
transformation of the elasticity of substitution. In terms of production economics, this is the same 
as a diminishing technical rate of substitution. 
                       
           
                
           
   
    
   (C13) 
It is important to state that in the case where there is one producer of a given commodity, 
the value of the share parameter, would be 1, hence, QXAC = QX and PXAC = PX, 
notwithstanding the values for the elasticity and the exponent. 
Output Transformation (CET) Function 
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    (C14) 
The above equation represents output transformation function. Composite output (   ) is 
a combination of imported output (  ) and domestically produced output (   . Also, 
domestically produced output can be transformed between exports and domestic use. This 
follows the assumption of imperfect transformability between domestic sales and exports of 
marketed domestic output. Except the case of negative elasticities of substitution, the CET 
function applicable to commodities that are both exported and sold domestically, is identical to a 
CES function.  
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The following equation replaces the CET function for domestically produced 
commodities that do not have both exports and domestic sales. It allocates the entire output 
volume to one of the two destinations – domestic sales and exports. 
                         (C15) 
Composite Supply (Armington) Function 
The equation below shows the Armington formulation. There is imperfect substitutability 
between imports and domestic output sold domestically. This is also a CES aggregation function 
in which the composite commodity that is supplied domestically is produced by domestic and 
imported commodities entering this function as inputs.  
                         (C16) 
An Armington function is formulated when the domain of the function is limited to 
commodities that are both imported and produced domestically. In the Armington formulation, 
the producer produces a composite commodity using the domestically produced commodity sold 
to the domestic market and imports 
c. Institutions Block 
Factor Income and Institutional Factor Incomes 
                                     (C17) 
The above equation shows the total income of each factor paid to factor owners. It is the 
sum of average factor prices of each factor adjusted to a fixed wage distortion factor multiplied 
by factor demand.  The income is shared among domestic institutions in fixed shares after direct 
factor taxes are paid and rest of the World transfers are made. Transfers to the rest of the World 
are fixed in foreign currency but are transformed into local currency by multiplying by the 
exchange rate.  
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However, the equation that follows defines factor incomes paid to institutions and 
distributed among them at fixed shares. The institutions referenced here are the domestic 
institutions – households, enterprises and the government, who receive a share each of the total 
factor income after rest of the world transfers and factor taxes have been paid.  
                             (C18) 
Income of domestic Nongovernment Institutions 
                                                                         (C19) 
Domestic nongovernment institutions form a subset of the set of domestic institutions. 
The total income of any domestic nongovernment institution is the sum of factor incomes 
(         ), transfers from other domestic nongovernment institutions (       ), transfers from 
the government (                 ) indexed to the cpi, and transfers from the rest of the world 
indexed to the exchange rate (EXR). 
Intra-Institutional Transfers 
                                                        (C20) 
In this equation, transfers between domestic nongovernment institutions (       ) are paid 
as fixed shares of the total institutional incomes net of direct taxes (                  ) and 
savings (              ). The mps and tins are the marginal propensity to save and rate of 
direct taxes respectively.  
Household Consumption Expenditures 
                                                          (C21) 
For household consumption expenditure expressed in the equation above, the total value 
is equivalent to the income after deducting direct taxes, savings and transfers made to domestic 
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nongovernment institutions. This is also called household disposable income which is spent on 
commodities.   
Household Consumption Spending on Marketed Commodities and Home Commodities 
In this model, it is assumed that each household maximizes a Stone Geary utility function 
subject to a consumption expenditure constraint in which the resulting first-order conditions are 
defined as linear expenditure system (LES).  
                      
      
                         
      (C22) 
In this equation,    
  is the minimum required quantity a consumer purchases first of one 
commodity. The consumer then has an option to add to the consumption from the remaining 
income called “supernumerary income” which is allocated to commodities in fixed shares called 
the marginal consumption share (or marginal budget shares). The marginal consumption share in 
the equation is    
 .   
It is important to note that when the minimum required quantity a consumer purchases 
first (   
 ), for all commodities, is zero, the household utility function changes from LES to Cob-
Douglas. Therefore the LES is a generic function, hence the preference for it over other 
functions. In this case, the income elasticity of demand cannot be equal to 1 unless the    
  for all 
commodities is equal to 0, that is, there is no preference for any commodity even when income 
changes.  
The household consumes composite goods and are therefore subject to composite price 
(   ). Therefore, two equations are required to explain household consumption – consumption 
of marketed commodities; and consumption of home production. The demand functions can be 
derived by diving both sides of the two equations by the appropriate price. 
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Investment Demand 
In the investment demand equation below, fixed investment demand is the product of the 
base-year quantity (     ) and an investment adjustment factor (     ). The adjustment factor 
and the investment quantity are both exogenous. Inventory Investment, which is included in the 
model, is also exogenous.  
                            (C23) 
Government Revenue 
Total government revenue is the sum of revenues from taxes, factors of production, and 
transfers from the rest of the world. The taxes are household income taxes, import taxes and 
excise taxes. Import taxes are adjusted to the Exchange rate. On the transfers side, it includes, 
factor incomes and transfers from the rest of the world. Since Ghana exports all its oil, revenues 
from oil are considered part of transfers from the rest of the world. 
                 
        
              
      
                 
                    +                                  (C24) 
Government Expenditure 
                                                    (C25) 
Total government spending is the sum of government consumption (              ) and 
the sum of transfers (                          ) to different institutions 
includingnongovernmental institutions and rest of the world. Government expenditure on 
consumption and transfers are financed by petroleum revenues and non-oil revenues. The 
transfers of petroleum revenues is additional source of financing investments and socioeconomic 
development projects particularly through the budget; and constitute three folds – transfers to 
GNPC, transfers to petroleum funds and transfers to the budget. Transfers to the budget are 
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influenced by type of fiscal rules. Thus EG adjusts to the amount of petroleum revenues flowing 
into the budget. In this model, the quantity of Government consumption is fixed, and its 
adjustment factor (   ) is exogenous. Thus, government consumption is the base year quantity 
times the adjustment factor. 
d. System Constraint Block 
There are different closures in this model. These closures are expressed for the labour 
markets, international trade, investments-savings and government-revenue balances. 
Factor Markets 
                       (C26) 
The above equation shows an equilibrium condition in the factor market where total 
quantity of factors demanded and total quantity supplied for each factor are equal. In the basic 
model version, all factor demand variables are flexible but the factor supply variable is fixed. 
The fixing of factor supply means that all factor supplied is used.  
The average factor price (   ) is the equilibrating variable that ensures that the market 
clearing condition in the factor markets are achieved. There is an indirect relationship between 
the factor price paid by each activity and the quantities of factor demand. This condition is based 
on the assumption that there is full employment in the economy. As a developing country, Ghana 
cannot have full-employment in the economy, but since unemployment data is not available, the 
assumption of full employment is adopted in this model.  
Composite Commodity Markets 
                                            (C27) 
This equation equates quantities supplied and demanded of the composite commodity. On 
the demand side, there are endogenous terms and a new exogenous term for stock change. Of the 
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endogenous terms, QG and QINV are fixed in the basic model version. The composite 
commodity supply, QQ, drives demands for domestic marketed output, QD, and imports, QM. 
The equilibrating variables are the quantities of import supply, for the import side, and the two 
interrelated domestic prices, PDD and PDS, for domestic market output. 
Current-Account Balance for the Rest of the World 
          
       
                
       
       
                                  (C28) 
The equation shows the current-account balance (expressed in foreign currency). This 
equates the spending by a country and its earning of foreign exchange.  
In the basic model, foreign savings is fixed; whilst the market clearing variable in the 
current account balance is real exchange rate. Since all items with the exception of imports and 
exports are fixed, therefore, in effect, the trade balance is fixed. Alternatively, the foreign 
exchange market closure choices are also possible, such that the exchange rate can be fixed 
whilst foreign savings is flexible and can therefore adjust to equilibrium.  
Government Balance 
                    (C29) 
The government balance equates current government revenue and the sum of current 
government expenditure and savings. This excludes investments. Savings may be negative. 
Savings–Investment Balance 
            
        
                                        
   
      
                                                               (C30) 
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The equation shows that total savings and total investment must be equal. Total savings is 
defined as the sum of savings from domestic nongovernment institutions, the government, and 
the rest of the world adjusted to local currency. Foreign savings are fixed exogenously and 
thereby make this model a “savings-driven” model such that total investments become the 
endogenous sum of the savings components. Total investment is the sum of the values of fixed 
investment (gross fixed capital formation) and stock changes. This is often referred to as the 
“neoclassical closure” in the literature. 
At this point, the model is supposed to be a square in which the number of variables is 
equal to the number of equations. But the model as presented so far is not square. However, it 
satisfies Walras law because one equation which is functionally dependent on the others can be 
dropped. In this case, either the Savings-Investment balance or the current-account balance is 
commonly dropped. Once one equation is dropped, the model becomes square, and a unique 
solution exists. Alternatively, one variable can be added to the macroeconomic balance equations 
with a solution value equal to zero rather than drop one equation.  For instance, it is possible to 
add one variable to the macroeconomic balance equations. In the GAMS version of the model, 
no equation is dropped. Rather, a variable called, WALRAS is added to the Savings – Investment 
balance to complete the model. 
6.4 The Dynamic CGE Model 
6.4.1 Introducing Dynamic Features in the Model 
Several changes occur among some exogenous and endogenous variables over time 
which explains the growth process. These changes establish a counterfactual growth path for the 
economy. The inter-period adjustments which demonstrate dynamic features in the model are 
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population growth, labour force growth, factor productivity and capital accumulation among 
others.  
In the dynamic process, certain parameters are updated as the population grows. Since 
population growth enters the model through private consumption, the level of additional 
consumption demand adjusts to changes in income.  
In the updating process, the level of each household’s consumption adjusts to 
accommodate higher consumption demand as population grows. Thus, the quantity of income-
independent demand increases at the rate of population growth,  
In the factor market, the dynamic updating process for parameters to reflect changes in 
factor supply is determined by the market clearing condition in the factor market. In this model, 
full employment of land and labour is assumed and therefore the supply of land and labour is 
fixed. This implies that total land and labour supply adjust each year to reflect exogenously 
determined measure of land and labour force growth. In the case of total capital supply, they are 
endogenous in the dynamic model. It is also assumed that at any given time, total available 
capital is determined by the previous period’s capital stock and investment expenditure, but the 
most important issue that remains unresolved is the determination of how the new capital from 
previous investments expenditure will be allocated across sectors. In this model, the new capital 
is allocated according to the proportion of each sectors share in total capital income and profits. 
The proportions are adjusted by the ratio of each sector’s profit rate to the average profit rate of 
the economy. The capital updating process is expressed in the following equations.  
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          (C36) 
The first equation (equation a) shows the average economy-wide rental rate of capital 
(     
 ). Equation b shows that each sector’s share of new capital (    
 ) is determined through a 
comparison of its rental rate to the economy-wide average rate. In this equation, the second term 
on the right hand side is multiplied by the existing share of capital stock to determine a sectoral 
distribution of new capital. Equation c shows that the quantity of new capital is determined as the 
value of gross fixed capital formation over the price of capital, which is then multiplied by each 
sector’s share of new capital to determine a final quantity allocated to each sector (     
 ). 
Equation d describes how the unit capital price (    ) is calculated. In equations e and f, the new 
aggregate quantity of capital (        ) and the sectoral quantities of capital (       ) are 
adjusted from their previous period levels to include new additions to the capital stock. These are 
adjusted to capital depreciation (  ).  
6.4.2    Model Extension: Introducing Institutional Quality 
One of the major limitations of CGE models is the lack of incorporation of the quality of 
institutional arrangements. They fail to account for institutional settings, ethical issues and their 
policy concerns for societies (Söderbaum, 2000). Also, in spite of the progress in dynamic CGE 
models, the capital accumulation process in the models also fail to account for the impact 
institutional and regulatory changes on policies.; and therefore reduces the economy  to an 
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“artificial perfect macroeconomic stability” (Ackerman, 2005), which does not adequately 
explain the adjustment path to equilibrium.  
In most econometric analyses, institutional quality has been modeled to influence the 
capital accumulation process in which an institutional quality proxy is related to a conventional 
growth model in what has become known as “institutions-augmented” growth models (see 
Clague et al, 1999; and Prados de la Escosura & Sanz , 2006 and 2009; Fleitas, 2011).  
This study follows the idea of modeling institutional quality as part of the capital 
accumulation process. However, in this study, the process is modeled in a general equilibrium 
setting unlike the conventional “institutions-augmented” growth models that are modeled in 
partial equilibrium settings. In this case, investment must be defined to go beyond the 
accumulation of tangible assets to cover other factors such as investments in human capital and 
institutional processes that facilitate the efficiency of investment (Gylfason, 2001). This defines 
the role of the private sector and that of the government. Whereas the private sector is concerned 
about institutional processes that support their operations, government is concerned about 
processes that inhibit government and elite capture, with the view to ensuring that the growth 
prospects of both private and public investments are sustained in the economy.   
Modeling institutional quality in a CGE model recognizes that as part of the dynamic 
process, the effectiveness of the adjustment path resulting from new investments can be 
determined by the quality of regulatory and institutional arrangements in the economy. The 
traditional IFPRI model has therefore been modified by the incorporation of an institutional 
quality index (INSTQ) denoting the quality of institutions in the economy, hence a measure of 
efficiency. This is particularly important for resource-rich countries that are faced with 
institutional challenges for the efficient management of resource revenues (Eifert et al, 2006).  
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To capture institutional quality index in the model, the new investments or new capital in 
the capital stock equation is adjusted to the index as follows:  
                                  
    
 
     
   (37) 
Where, 1 ≤ INSTQ ≤ 6 
Put differently, the capital stock equation is presented as: 
                               
  
     
 
     
 
Where INSTQ denotes an index of institutional quality, and represented by the CPIA index. 
In the CGE model, the capital accumulation process is adjusted to the quality of 
regulatory and institutional arrangements. This means that low level of institutional quality could 
be a drain on the performance of the economy by limiting the efficiency of investments including 
investments from petroleum revenues. If the institutional quality index is low, it implies that 
institutions are weak, and the effect on fiscal rules will translate into low capital accumulation 
with adverse results on development impacts. On the other hand, if the index is high, it denotes 
strong institution, with positive implications for the development impacts of fiscal rules. 
The capital equation has a dynamic structure in which every solution runs tracks the 
economy over the study period (2010 to 2030) covering the production profile of the Jubilee 
field and other fields that are coming on stream. Capital accumulation is influenced by savings 
(particularly for private capital accumulation) and government decisions on allocation of public 
funds.  
Investment and capital accumulation for that matter is also influenced by foreign inflow 
of capital or foreign savings, in which new investments in the oil and gas sector as well as new 
petroleum revenues become important variables for the simulations. Distribution of increased 
capital across sectors is determined relatively by the returns to capital, which are endogenous in a 
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general equilibrium model. The dynamism is based on the assumption that future capital 
accumulation is a function of the efficiency of current investments. This makes the quality of 
institutions very relevant as it demonstrates the efficiency of investments (Collier and Venables, 
2008). 
The CPIA Index measures how enabling the policy and institutional framework is in 
fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of development assistance. 
It therefore measures the standards for resource allocation to IDA countries. It is also used to 
measure a country’s fiscal sustainability analysis, and therefore determines ‘the grant-to-loan 
ratio in each country’s allocation of assistance’ (Alexander, 2010).  
The CPIA which is published by the World Bank has four (4) clusters presented in 
sixteen (16) dimensions as follows: 
Table 6.1: Clusters of CPIA 
CLUSTER A: ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
Monetary and Exchange rate policy 
Fiscal policy 
Debt policy 
CLUSTER B: STRUCTURAL POLCIIES 
Trade 
Financial sector 
Business regulatory environment 
CLUSTER C: POLICIES FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION AND EQUITY 
Gender equality 
Equity of public resource use 
Building human resources 
Social protection and labour 
Policies and institutions for environment sustainability 
CLUSTER D: PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONS 
Property right and rule-based governance 
Quality of budgetary and financial management 
Efficiency of revenue mobilization 
Quality of public administration 
Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector 
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Scoring for the CPIA follows a pattern from “1” = Very weak for 2 years or more, “2” = 
weak, “3" = moderately weak, “4” = moderately strong, “5” = strong and “6” =very strong for 3 
years or more. Thus, countries with higher scores are said to have strong policy and institutional 
arrangements for managing public resources. The following figure 6-1 presents Ghana’s 2012 
CPIA performance: 
Figure 6-1: Ghana CPIA Performance in 2012 
 
Source: World Bank, CPIA Africa, Assessing Africa’s Policies and Institutions (June, 2013)  
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The institutional weaknesses in the country’s public administration, budgetary and 
financial management; and fiscal policy constitute serious barriers that could prevent the 
transformation of petroleum revenues into positive development outcomes in the economy. 
From Figure 6-1, Ghana performed poorly in Economic Management (3.5) comprising 
Fiscal Policy, Monetary and Exchange rate Policy, and Debt policy and Public Sector 
Management and Institutions (3.7) consisting of Transparency and Accountability and 
Corruption in Public Sector, Quality of public administration, Efficiency of revenue 
mobilization, Quality of budgetary and financial management; and Property right and rule-based 
governance. Thus, the country is moderately weak in these very important clusters which provide 
the enabling environment for efficiently managing new revenues coming from oil.  
However, the country’s performance in Structural Policies and Policies for Social 
Inclusion and Equity (4.0) was moderately strong. These sectors are nevertheless likely to be 
weakened if the institutional management arrangements in the country remain weak.  
At the micro-level, Ghana’s worse performance is in fiscal policy (3.0) on account of 
deteriorating fiscal balance arising from lower than expected revenues and higher current 
expenditure. Ghana’s performance in the areas of Quality of public administration, Quality of 
budgetary and financial management; and Property rights, rule-based governance, exchange rate 
management and financial sector management are moderately weak (3.5).  
It is also important to state that although Ghana scored high in some cluster areas than 
others, overall, the country’s performance from 2007 to 2012 shows a declining trend as 
presented below in Figure 6-2. For instance, Ghana’s CPIA declined from an average score of 4 
in 2007 to 3.8 in 2012. Ghana therefore needs to improve on its policy and institutional reforms 
to provide the environment for efficient resource management including petroleum resources. 
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Figure 6-2: Ghana’s CPIA Trend over time (2007-2012) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, CPIA Africa, Assessing Africa’s Policies and Institutions (June, 2013)  
6.5 The Ghana Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The model is calibrated to the updated Ghana 2007 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
used Briesinger et al, (2011). Data on national accounts was provided by Ghana Statistical 
Services (GSS), and other data such as balance of payments provided by the Bank of Ghana, and 
government budget data provided by the Ministry of Finance. The updated Ghana SAM gives 
information covering demand and production structures of 70 detailed sectors, comprising of 27 
agricultural subsectors, 33 industrial subsectors, and 10 service subsectors. This makes it 
possible to examine sector and sub-sector specific effects on the economy. The sectors and 
commodities used in the CGE model are presented in the following Table. 
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Table 6-2: Sectors/Commodities in Ghana CGE Model 
Agriculture Industry   Industry Services 
Cereal crops Mining Electrical machinery Private 
Maize, rice, sorghum/millet Gold Televisions Trade services 
Other cereals Other mining Medical appliances Export services 
Root crops Food processing Vehicles Transport 
services 
Cassava, yams, cocoyam Formal food processing Other technical 
equipment   
Communication 
Other staple crops Vehicle parts Other equipment 
manufacturing         
Banking and 
business 
Cowpeas, soybeans Informal food 
processing 
Other industry Real estate 
Groundnuts Cocoa processing Construction Public and 
community 
Fruits (domestic) Sugar processing Water Community, 
other services 
Vegetables (domestic) Dairy product 
processing 
Electricity Public 
administration 
Plantains, other crops Meat and fish 
processing 
 Education 
Export crops Other manufacturing  Health 
Palm oil, other nuts Textiles   
Other nuts, fruits (export) Clothing   
Vegetables (export) Leather and footwear   
Cocoa beans Wood products   
Industrial crops Paper, publishing and 
printing 
  
Livestock Crude and other oils   
Chickens (broilers) Petroleum   
Eggs and layers Diesel fuel   
Beef Other fuels   
Sheep and goat meat Fertilizers   
Other meats Chemicals   
Forestry Rubber products   
Fishery Other nonmetal products   
 Machinery   
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The dynamic CGE model used in this study is an economy-wide, multi-sectoral model 
and solves for equilibrium quantities and prices of economic variables simultaneously and 
endogenously. For supply and demand decisions, behaviour is captured by nonlinear, first-order 
optimality conditions. This implies that supply and demand decisions are driven by the 
maximization of profits and utility, respectively.  On the supply side, the model defines specific 
production functions for each economic activity. The activities include agriculture and non-
agriculture which also covers industry and services. Profits are maximized subject to a 
production technology. In this model, we assume constant returns to scale and two service sub-
sectors (private and public). 
The Ghana SAM is a data framework which contains information about national income 
and product accounts and the input-output table, including the monetary flows between 
institutions. In this data framework, total income equates total expenditures for each of the 
component accounts. The reconciliation of incomes and expenditures follows a double entry 
system in which data on rows are equal to data on columns. The reliability of the various data 
sources is first assessed on the basis of observed inequalities between row and column accounts. 
The SAM is then balanced using cross-entropy econometrics. A “macro” version of the SAM is 
first prepared before it is disaggregated across sectors, factors and households to derive a more 
detailed ‘micro’ version (See Ghana Macro SAM below). 
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Table 6-3: Ghana Macro SAM 
Sum of Value Column 
              Row Act Com Trc Lab Cap land hhd Gov dtax Stax Mtax Etax s-i row Grand Total 
Act 
 
170,770 
            
170,770 
Com 82,176 
 
2,836 
   
85,093 15,473 
    
28,207 35,097 248,884 
Trc 
 
2,836 
            
2,836 
Lab 48,600 
             
48,600 
Cap 22,318 
             
22,318 
Land 18,071 
             
18,071 
Hhd 
   
48,600 22,318 18,071 
 
3,701 
     
2,007 94,697 
Gov 
        
6,235 10,304 3,524 1,089 
 
5,714 26,866 
Dtax 
      
6,235 
       
6,235 
Stax 
 
10,304 
            
10,304 
Mtax 
 
3,524 
            
3,524 
Etax -395 1,484 
            
1,089 
s-i 
      
3,369 6,776 
     
18,062 28,207 
Row 
 
59,966 
     
915 
      
60,881 
Grand Total 170,770 248,884 2,836 48,600 22,318 18,071 94,697 26,866 6,235 10,304 3,524 1,089 28,207 60,881 743,280 
Source: IFPRI (2009)  
The SAM distinguishes between ‘activities’ (the entities that carry out production) and 
“commodities” (representing markets for goods and non-factor services). SAM flows are valued 
at producers’ prices in the activity accounts and at market prices (including indirect commodity 
taxes and transactions costs) in the commodity accounts. The commodities are activity outputs, 
either exported or sold domestically, and imports. In the activity columns, payments are made to 
commodities (intermediate demand), and factors of production (value-added comprising of 
operating surplus and compensation of employees). In the commodity columns, payments are 
made to domestic activities, the rest of the world, and various tax accounts (for domestic and 
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import taxes). This treatment provides the data needed to model imports as perfect or imperfect 
substitutes vis-à-vis domestic production. 
a. Government Income and Payments 
The government is disaggregated into a core government account and different tax 
collection accounts, one for each tax type. This disaggregation is necessary since otherwise the 
economic interpretation of some payments is often ambiguous. In the SAM, direct payments 
between the government and other domestic institutions are reserved for transfers. Finally, 
payments from the government to factors (for the labour services provided by public sector 
employees) are captured in the government services activity. Government consumption demand 
is a purchase of the output from the government services activity, which in turn, pays labour. 
b. Domestic Non-Government Institutions 
The domestic non-government institutions consist of households and enterprises. The 
enterprises earn factor incomes (a reflection of ownership of capital and/or land) and may also 
receive transfers from other institutions. Their incomes are used for corporate taxes, enterprise 
savings, and transfers to other institutions. Unlike households, enterprises do not demand 
commodities. It is possible to disaggregate the enterprise sector in a manner that captures 
differences across enterprises in terms of tax rates, savings rates, and the shares of retained 
earnings that are received by different household types. 
c. Home and Final Household Consumption 
The SAM distinguishes between home (own) consumption of activities and marketed 
consumption of commodities by households. Home consumption, which appears in the SAM as 
payments from household accounts to activity accounts, is valued at producer prices, i.e., without 
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marketing margins and sales taxes that may be levied on marketed commodities. Final household 
consumption of marketed commodities appears as payments from household accounts to 
commodity accounts, valued at consumer prices including marketing margins and taxes. 
6.6. Calibrations of the Model - Elasticities and Parameters 
A dynamic CGE model requires several elasticities in addition to the SAM being the 
major source of data used to calibrate some parameters. The most important elasticities are: 
a. The elasticity of substitution between primary inputs in the value-added production 
function,  
b. The elasticity of transformation between domestically produced and consumed goods 
and exported or imported goods,  
c. The income elasticity in the demand functions.  
Some of the elasticities are calibrated from the SAM, but others are borrowed from the literature. 
The elasticities that are calibrated directly from the SAM as well as those borrowed from 
literature include: 
i. The parameters or coefficients in the production functions of the model are derived from 
the Ghana SAM. 
ii. In the case of intermediate inputs in the production function, a set of fixed input–output 
coefficients are derived from the Ghana SAM based on the assumption of Leontief 
technology.  
iii. Marginal budget shares which are the parameters used in the demand system, were 
derived from the Ghana SAM, given income elasticities of demand. 
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iv. The income elasticities of demand were estimated by Briesinger et al, (2011) from a 
semi-log inverse function suggested by King and Byerlee (1978) and based on the data of 
Ghana Living Standard Survey 5 (2005–06) (GSS 2007).  
v. CES elasticity in the production function is drawn from the CGE literature on other 
African countries.  
vi. A CET function applied to commodities sold both domestically and abroad, whilst a CES 
(or Armington) function applied to commodities that are produced domestically and from 
abroad. The elasticities of these functions were adopted from Hertel et al, (2007).  
The following Table shows the Trade and production elasticities adopted for the study. 
Table 6-4: Elasticities 
Trade Elasticities (TRADELAS) Production Elasticities (PRODELAS) 
Subsectors 
  
Armington Transformation 
Subsectors 
  
Factor substitution 
SIGMAQ SIGMAT  PRODELAS PRODELAS2  
Cocoa Beans 6.5 4.0 
All 
sectors/subsec
tors 0.75 1.20 
Forestry 5.0 4.0 
   Fishing 2.5 4.0 
   Mining 6.0 4.0 
   Petroleum 10.4 4.0 
   Construction 6.0 4.0 
   Water 6.0 4.0 
   Electricity 6.0 4.0 
   Trade 4.0 4.0 
   Communication 4.0 4.0 
   administration 4.0 4.0 
   Education 4.0 4.0 
   Health 4.0 4.0 
   Source: Hertel et al, (2007) 
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6.7 Conclusions 
The Ghana CGE model illustrates the economy-wide effect of policy shocks. In this 
study, the impacts of fiscal rules for spending petroleum revenues on the economy have been 
examined. The fiscal rules include the permanent income, bird-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rule 
for allocating petroleum revenues to the budget. However, since fiscal rules by themselves do not 
guarantee the efficiency of public spending, the model structure was modified to incorporate an 
index of institutional quality to measure fiscal efficiency. The results and analysis of the policy 
simulations are presented in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
FISCAL RULES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
This section presents analysis of the simulation results with appropriate illustrations. The 
main objective of the CGE model is to examine the development impacts of alternative fiscal 
rules. To meet this objective, seven policy simulations were conducted in a recursive dynamic 
model. The simulations were based on fiscal benchmarks computed from the permanent income, 
bird-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rules. The simulations reflected two of the research questions 
which sought to examine (i) the development impacts of the permanent income rule, the bird-in-
hand rule and Ghana’s fiscal rule for determining the optimal limits of Government spending of 
petroleum revenues; and (ii) the development impacts of the efficiency of the alternative fiscal 
rules. The efficiency of fiscal rules was measured by the introduction into the Ghana CGE model 
an index representing the quality of institutions in Ghana adopted from the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Index of the World Bank.  
The results from the simulations show that the permanent income rule has greater impact 
on economic development than the alternative bird-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rules. These 
impacts were assessed on the macroeconomic environment, household expenditure, factor 
incomes and productive sector performance. A summary of simulation results on the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules are presented in the following Table 7-1.  
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Table 7-1: Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal rules, 2030 
Variables Initial Value Base run Permanent 
Income (PI) 
Bird in 
hand 
(BIH) 
Ghana 
rule 
(GH) 
GDP (Value-added) 103902.712 
152625 
10.140% 0.104% 1.21% 
Absorption 128818.204 
224779 
10.140% 0.104% 1.21% 
Private Consumption 85090.853 
147507 
10.920% 0.112% 1.31% 
Fixed Investment 28206.913 
51536.4 
14.820% 0.152% 1.77% 
Exports 32112.462 58653.5 
 
17.940% 0.184% 2.15% 
Imports -57027.954 -98508 10.140% 0.104% 1.21% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model  
The long-term macroeconomic environment improves with increased government 
spending based on the permanent income rule. This is followed by Ghana’s fiscal rule and then 
the bird in hand rule. For instance, the long-term growth of the economy under the permanent 
income rule is expected to be 10.1% relative to the bird-in-hand rule (0.1%) and Ghana’s fiscal 
rule (1.2%). The permanent income rule appears consistent with Ghana’s growth trajectory 
considering that the economy grew at 13% in 2011. However, if this growth is to be sustained as 
it appears under the permanent income rule, then the rule will likely overheat the economy. The 
economy’s long-term growth under the current fiscal model of Ghana will not be consistent with 
expectations for maximizing welfare. Thus, Ghana’s rule is not only fiscally un-sustainable but 
also fiscally non-optimal.  
In the analysis of fiscal sustainability, the bird in hand rule was the most fiscally sustainable but 
its impact on the development of the macroeconomic environment is relatively insignificant. 
 154 
Thus what it means is that with temporary petroleum revenues, the Government should not only 
be concerned about fiscal sustainability but also the impacts the resources could make on the 
economy when invested efficiently.  
 It is also important to note that the long-term growth in GDP will be fuelled by growth in 
private consumption (10.9%), fixed investments (14.8%) and exports (17.9%).  Imports are also 
expected to grow but this is unlikely to have decelerating effect on long-term growth as terms of 
trade are expected to improve, relying on strong export growth. The growth in exports will be 
realized based on increasing private consumption as private sector investments have overtaken 
government investments. It has been estimated that Government controls about 43 of investment 
spending whilst private consumption accounts for 53.5% and the rest, 3.1%, comes from other 
non-government-related foreign inflows such as Foreign Direct Investments (Briesinger et al, 
2011).  
Private consumption could also increase if government increases its spending through the 
permanent income model and substitute domestic borrowing with petroleum revenues. This will 
release loanable funds to the private sector and thereby increase private consumption. However, 
as it is now, Government is unlikely to substitute petroleum revenues for domestic borrowing 
under its current fiscal rule which allocates insignificant proportions of petroleum revenues to 
the budget unless during the peak oil production period. Thus, under Ghana’s fiscal rule, the only 
condition that could increase allocations of petroleum revenues to the budget is through 
substantial increase in oil production which is unlikely without new discoveries of oil and gas 
resources with proven commercial viability.  
Also, the simulation results show that Ghana could successfully go through structural 
transformation if it adopts the right fiscal policy which is export enhancing. Countries that have 
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succeeded this way, have been associated with high exports, which in most cases exceeded 
overall economic growth such as experienced in Brazil and Malaysia in the 1960s and India and 
Vietnam in the 1990s.  
On the development impacts of the fiscal efficiency of fiscal rules, the results show that 
the quality of institutions in a country enhances the benefits that can be derived from the 
management of petroleum revenues. In the following Table 7-2, Ghana’s fiscal rule could inject 
increased development impacts based on efficiency gains from the institutional arrangement for 
managing petroleum revenues. With a CPIA of 6 indicating very strong institutions, the 
efficiency gains on Government expenditure based on Ghana’s fiscal rule are higher for all the 
macroeconomic variables compared to a CPIA of 3 indicating moderately weak institutions. For 
instance, GDP in value added terms grows by an additional 1.19% with strong institutions as 
against 0.03% with weak institutions. It can be deduced that with a CPIA of 6, GDP growth 
almost doubled. This trend is the same for fixed investments and exports. 
Table 7-2: Impact of Efficiency of fiscal rules on the Economy, 2030 
Variables Base (Bil ¢) GH rule Efficiency Gains 
CPIA3 CPIA6 
Absorption 103902.712 1.21% 0.024% 0.96% 
Private Consumption 128818.204 1.21% 0.025% 0.997% 
Fixed Investment 85090.853 1.31% 0.035% 1.36% 
Exports 28206.913 1.77% 0.035% 1.56% 
Imports 32112.462 2.15% 0.02% 0.88% 
GDP (Value-added) -57027.954 1.21% 0.03% 1.19% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model 
It is therefore important to state that Ghana could achieve higher development impacts 
from its petroleum revenues if efforts are made to build strong institutional frameworks within 
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which petroleum revenues are managed. This implies building the independence of regulatory 
institutions such as revenue collecting agencies, development planning agencies, environmental 
protection agencies; and accountability agencies such as Parliament, the Judiciary and other 
quasi-judicial bodies. The analysis of the simulation results on other economic variables are 
presented in the following sections. 
7.2 Analysis of Simulation Results 
The simulations that were conducted are outlined as follows: 
Scenario 1: Development impacts of fiscal rules 
SIM1: Increase Government current expenditure by 11.7% based on the permanent income rule 
SIM2: Increase Government current expenditure by 0.12% based on the bird-in-hand rule 
SIM3: Increase Government current expenditure by 1.4% based on Ghana’s fiscal rule 
Scenario 2: Development impacts of the efficiency of fiscal rules   
SIM4: Increase Government current expenditure by 1.4% with an institutional quality index of 3 
SIM5: Increase Government current expenditure by 1.4% with an institutional quality index of 6 
SIM6: Increase Government current expenditure by 11.7% with an institutional quality index of 
3 
SIM7: Increase Government current expenditure by 11.7% with an institutional quality index of 
6 
The results from the above simulations are analyzed in the following sections: 
7.2.1 Comparison of the Impacts of the permanent income, the bird-in-hand and Ghana’s 
fiscal rules on Factor Markets 
Factor inputs are required at both the primary and intermediate levels to make production 
of commodities possible. In return, factor inputs are paid for their contribution. Capital receives 
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rent whilst labour receives various forms of wages. In this study, it is assumed that capital is 
fixed but labour is mobile across sectors and is disaggregated between sectors. Land 
characteristics differ by region and attract different prices. For instance, Southern land is much 
more expensive than Northern land. 
The simulation results show that the permanent income rule offers significant earning 
opportunities for all factor inputs with a growth in income for self-employed agricultural labour 
of 0.4% as against 0.05% and 0.004% for Ghana’s fiscal rule and the bird-in-hand rule 
respectively . This is largely attributed to the higher proportion of Government spending 
associated with the permanent income rule in the early years of oil production. However, the 
distribution of income varied by factor inputs. Of all the three main factor inputs analyzed, 
labour inputs make the most gains although marginally. For instance, unskilled non-agricultural 
labour makes the most improvement in income levels (0.7%), followed by skilled non-
agricultural labour (0.44%) and then skilled agricultural labour (0.41%).  
Table 7-3: Effects of Alternative Fiscal rule on Factor Incomes 
Factor Inputs Base PI GH BIH 
Land (North) 1.7 0.14 0.012 0.001 
Land (South) 1.9 0.27 0.033 0.003 
Land (Forest) 1.7 -0.19 -0.02 -0.002 
Land (Coast) 2.05 0.12 0.014 0.001 
Unskilled Labour (non-agric) 2.6 0.7 0.08 0.007 
Skilled labour (non-agric) 2.3 0.44 0.052 0.004 
Self-employed labour (agric) 2.1 0.41 0.05 0.004 
Capital 1.7 0.1 0.01 0.001 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model  
Theoretically, there are two main reasons for the growth of incomes of labour inputs. 
First, an increase in government spending increases aggregate demand in the economy which 
requires the supply side to respond. The need for supply to respond to the growing demand in 
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turn increases the demand for labour but since supply is assumed to be constant in the simulation 
model, higher demand for labour translates into higher factor prices and higher income levels for 
that matter. Second, higher government spending also increases private investments as a result of 
Government transfers to private institutions including debt repayments. This leads to expansion 
in the economy and more jobs are created especially for skilled manufacturing labour.  Factor 
inputs such as skilled non-agricultural labour become more competitive, hence an increase in 
factor prices in the non-agriculture labour market. 
In addition, most of the public investments in Ghana are concentrated in the capital, 
Accra, and dominated by non-agricultural labour seeking jobs in the manufacturing and services 
sectors. These include mechanics that are hired in light industrial areas and unskilled casual 
workers working in the roads and construction industries. They are therefore part of the factor 
inputs to benefit from the distributive effects of government spending.  
Also, when government investment priorities are more focused on road infrastructure 
where most of the labour inputs are temporary and casual, the beneficiaries are almost unskilled 
receiving daily wages. Since 2011, the Government prioritized road infrastructure, agricultural 
modernization, capacity building and amortization of loans for oil and gas infrastructure for the 
spending of petroleum revenues. Thus, with a higher allocation of revenues as it is under the 
permanent income simulations, the impact on the incomes of unskilled non-agricultural labour 
will be greater.  
In the case of self-employed agricultural labour, the growth in income can be attributed to 
government social programmes including fertilizer subsidies and other government transfers.  
This confirms the finding by Keuning and Thorbecke (1989) in Cameroon who state that 
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government household transfers have the greatest direct impact on incomes of agricultural 
employees. 
In the case of capital earning, the rental gain is marginal (0.1%) because most of the 
capital employed are in the capital intensive industries such as oil, gas, and mining, where 
earnings are very high but are more stable and are not likely to benefit much from increased 
government spending. Moreover, most of the capital intensive industries are controlled by the 
private sector; and the spillover from government spending may be insignificant. 
Also, land owners make marginal gains in income differentiated by the location of the 
land. For instance, with permanent income rule, southern land owners make the highest gain in 
income among the land input category (0.27%) against Northern land (0.14%) and Coastal land 
(0.12%), because most investments that require land are concentrated in the south. Southern 
lands are very expensive, and the growth of government spending will likely increase the value 
of land arising from the inflationary effects and the high demand for land for new investments. 
Earnings for forest land falls marginally (-0.24%) due to low demand for land for public 
investments.  
7.2.2 Comparison of the Impacts of the permanent income, the bird-in-hand and Ghana’s 
fiscal rules on Household Expenditure 
In this analysis, households are disaggregated into Accra (the capital city), other urban 
areas in the South, North and Coastal areas; and as well as rural parts of Ghana. The 
disaggregation has become relevant because there are differential effects of public spending on 
different categories of households. Also, household sizes differ by location. For instance, 
household sizes in Northern Ghana are larger (at an average of 8) than Southern sector 
households (an average of 5). Income levels also differ, with households in the urban areas 
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enjoying higher income levels. Differences across income groups affect their marginal 
propensities to save and the impacts of income elasticity of aggregate demand due to increased 
income levels from government transfers to households, which also depends on the distribution 
of the income across income groups (Shapiro and Slemrod 2003).   
The expenditure of households is influenced by their marginal propensity to spend which 
is higher for low income households relative to the growth in their earnings as against high 
income households.  Put differently, Friedman (1957) observes that people with high income will 
tend to save more to compensate for lower future income, and people with low income will tend 
to save less in anticipation of higher future income. In spite of their higher marginal propensity 
to spend, lower income household’s expenditure size is lower accounting for the slow growth in 
their consumption.  
Table 7-4: Effect of Ghana’s Fiscal rule on Household Consumption, 2030 (% change) 
Household Base run (Bil¢) BIH PI GH 
URBAN     
Accra  22073.8 0.19% 18.7% 2.2% 
Coast 7553.88 0.15% 14.8% 1.8% 
Forest 12006.1 0.15% 14.8% 1.8% 
South 11772.4 0.16% 15.6% 1.9% 
North 2670.94 0.18% 17.2% 2.1% 
RURAL         
Forest 6910.22 0.13% 12.5% 1.5% 
South 16245.2 -0.08% -7.8% -0.9% 
North 17673 0.06% 5.5% 0.7% 
Accra 10088.7 0.08% 7.8% 0.9% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model  
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Table 7-4 above illustrates the impact of increasing public spending on household 
purchasing power based on alternative fiscal rules. Purchasing power is the real income of 
households which is determined by subtracting income taxes from household earnings as 
providers of factor inputs in the production process.    
Households form  habits over certain narrowly defined consumption of goods (like cars, 
clothing etc.) which gives a demand function with two components - a price-elastic component 
depending on aggregate consumption demand; and a perfectly price-inelastic component (Grohe 
and Uribe, 2006). Thus, a rise in aggregate demand through public expenditure raises the share 
of the price-elastic component, which induces firms to reduce their markup price over marginal 
cost. This then raises labour demand and since labour supply is assumed constant in the model, 
the result is an increase in real wages. Thus, increased public expenditure increases the 
purchasing power of certain categories of households (urban households) which could therefore 
lead to a rise in consumption.  
The increase in household consumption expenditure is based on the fact that public 
expenditure increases household incomes much more than private expenditure because of the 
social considerations that guide public spending such as cash transfers and the greater labour 
intensity of social programmes. Increased household incomes and consumption in turn increases 
the size of government income through taxes paid to the government. This confirms the general 
view that government expenditure has the greatest potential to generate government revenue.  
This point of view has often been exploited by proponents of direct cash transfer as the 
appropriate model for distributing petroleum revenues. They argue that direct cash transfer as 
opposed to investment of petroleum revenues increases the purchasing power of households, 
increases household consumption and government income through taxes. They also argue that 
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such transfers ensure equitable distribution of resource wealth and reduce inequality with long-
term implications for increasing household welfare (Goldsmith, 2002, 2010).  
Transfers also help poor workers to invest in more productive job searches by  moving 
out of an extended household and migrating in pursuit of better jobs elsewhere (Ardington, Case 
and Hosegood, 2008); enables workers to make investment in skills, or even set up their own 
small businesses (De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Sadoulet, de Janvry and Davis, 
2001); and help the poorest in the society to forego the worst forms of labour that they would 
otherwise be compelled to do out of desperation (Wittenberg, 2002). These instances cited here 
show that direct cash transfers could contribute to productivity, labour input earnings, and 
increase government tax income. 
However, this does not apply to all cases particularly in oil producing countries that do 
not depend on tax revenues. Further, direct transfers might not necessarily increase government 
income if households engage in unproductive consumption, and could decrease labour 
participation (Bertrand, Miller and Mullainathan, 2003); and lead to negative effects on the 
future consumption of households.  
The simulation results again show that the permanent income rule has higher impact on 
household expenditure, followed by Ghana’s fiscal rule and the bird in hand rule. For instance, 
an adoption of the permanent income rule can in the long-term increase the expenditure of both 
urban and rural households relative to the alternative rules. However, under all the fiscal rules, 
urban household expenditure is relatively higher than rural household expenditure for all 
categories of households. This could be explained by different factors.  
First, the bulk of Ghana’s poor are in the rural areas of the country whose earnings are 
much lower, mostly subsistence self-employed farmers. Second, productivity levels in the rural 
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areas are much lower due to low human capital accumulation, which makes labour non-
competitive; hence rural labour does not attract higher and competitive wages.  
In Ghana, farm labour is abundant and less expensive in Rural North where farming is 
seasonal, relative to Rural Forest where farming is a year round activity. This accounts for the 
differential long-term growth in the expenditure of households from these areas (12.5%) in Rural 
Forest as against 5.5% in Rural North.  
The results also show that although permanent income based spending can increase urban 
household expenditure by all categories of households, there will continue to be some disparities 
between urban household groups. Accra Urban household expenditure grows the most at 18.7% 
followed by Urban North (17.2%), Urban South (15.6%) and Urban Coast and Forest both at 
14.8%.  
The most significant growth in household expenditure occurs in Urban North. This may 
be premised on the fact that government interventions on poverty reduction will be given a boost 
from increased public transfers. So far, some of the interventions which support the growth of 
the northern economy are the Savannah Accelerated Development Programme (SADA) and 
other transfers including fertilizer subsidies partly financed from petroleum revenues, building of 
school blocks to replace ‘schools under trees”, among others. SADA is an important intervention 
aimed at narrowing the development gap between Northern and Southern Ghana. It has a Board, 
and management team headed by a Chief Executive Officer. The programme is created by law 
under Act 805 of 2011. 
These interventions have created opportunities for the emergence of a middle income 
group resulting from increased business opportunities, Government Contracts, the opening of 
branches of financial institutions and factories. An increase in public investment in the North 
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therefore accounts for the long term growth in the expenditure of Urban North Households, with 
greater potential for bridging the development gap between the Northern and Southern parts of 
Ghana.  
7.2.3 Comparison of the Impacts of the permanent income, the bird-in-hand and Ghana’s 
fiscal rules on Productive Sectors 
Increased public spending affects the productive sectors of the economy differently. 
Public spending based on alternative fiscal rules also has different effects. As already stated 
earlier, the economy’s long-term growth varies by fiscal rule – permanent income (10.1%), bird-
in-hand (0.1%) and Ghana’s fiscal rule (1.2%). Therefore under the permanent income rule, the 
economy is expected to consolidate Ghana’s middle income status. The long-term growth is 
fueled by the growth of industry particularly electricity (37%), petroleum (25%) and construction 
(16%) subsectors. This is followed by the services sector led by trade (38%) and 
communications (30%).  
The agriculture sector contributes the least with cocoa leading the agricultural growth 
with 7%. The trend in this analysis shows that Ghana can see structural transformation over the 
long-term horizon as industry growth overtakes both services and agriculture. The summary of 
the impacts of all the fiscal rules on the productive sectors are presented in the following Table 
7-5. 
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Table 7-5: Effects of Fiscal rules on productive Sectors, 2030 
Sectors  Official 2010 Base run (Bil¢) BIH PI GH 
Cocoa Beans 4.6% 2517.798 0.31% 6.8% 0.59% 
Forestry 3.8% 59.63 0.63% 5.34% 0.53% 
Fisheries 5.0% 1695.7 0.17% 6.38% 0.51% 
Mining 11.2% 5330.61 0.04% 9.13% 0.96% 
Petroleum  402.582 0.26% 25.43% 3.04% 
Construction 7.9% 12240.6 0.17% 16.38% 1.96% 
Water 1.8% 207.219 0.40% 13.31% 1.270% 
Electricity 16.7% 3404.25 0.89% 36.50% 4.35% 
Trade 9.1% 5949.24 0.39% 37.83% 4.53% 
Communications 19.6% 2199.23 0.32% 30.07% 3.71% 
Public Admin 7.6% 14682.7 0.00% 6.23% 0.63% 
Education 7.1% 3115.33 0.00% 5.31% 0.04% 
Health 8.2% 911.317 0.03% 7.12% 0.87% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model  
7.2.3.1 Agricultural Sector Growth 
Increased government expenditure based on the permanent income rule has positive 
impact on the agriculture sector contributing to the growth of the cocoa sub-sector at 7%, 
fisheries at 6% and forestry at 5%.  Cocoa subsector continues to contribute significantly to the 
economy as it has done in the last two decades.  
Briesinger et al, (2011) observes that Cocoa is Ghana’s most important traditional export 
crop which has been contributing almost three times more than expected from its size of the 
economy. The cocoa sub-sector has also been the main driver behind land expansion in Ghana 
accounting for 60% of total cultivated land increase in 12 years.  
As a result of its contributions to the economy, Government has supported the subsector 
with policy and resources including publicly funded mass spraying of cocoa farmers, cultivation 
of improved seeds and payment of bonuses to cocoa farmers when the producer price of cocoa 
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increases. However, the long term growth in cocoa is higher than its 2010 level of 5% indicating 
that increased spending from petroleum revenues can have great impact on the economy.  
It is also important to note that the agricultural sector needs to be diversified away from 
over dependence on cocoa and efforts need to be made to invest in other crops. The Government 
has already prioritized other agricultural programmers’ for the spending of petroleum revenues 
focusing on what could accelerate poverty reduction. Therefore in 2011 and 2012, the 
Government allocated GHS13.1 million and GHS72.4 million from petroleum revenues 
respectively to agricultural programmes covering:  
a. Fertilizer Subsidy  
b. Agricultural Mechanization  
c. Tsetse Project 
d. Youth in Agriculture Project 
e. Counterpart Funds for Afram Plains Area Development Project 
f. Inland Valley Rice Development Project 
g. Root Tuber Improvement Programme  
h. Northern Rural Growth Programme 
These programmes are intended to reduce poverty among rural populations because of 
the redistributive effect of agricultural investments.  
Also, even though cocoa exports are likely to grow, increased processing of cocoa will 
likely increase the value of raw cocoa beans. In the past decade, significant efforts have been 
made at  increasing cocoa processing capacity and the capacity of the  Cocoa Processing 
Company and the West African Mills Company, have been improved whilst new capacities have 
been either set up or  planned by the two major international companies (Osei 2008). 
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Table 7-6: Impact of fiscal rules on agriculture, 2030 
Sectors  Official 2010 Base run (Bil¢) BIH PI GH 
 Cocoa Beans 4.60% 2517.8 0.31% 6.80% 0.59% 
Forestry 3.80% 59.63 0.63% 5.34% 0.53% 
Fisheries 5.00% 1695.7 0.17% 6.38% 0.56% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model 
The forestry subsector also shows strong growth in the long-term over its current levels, 
growing at 5% by 2030. Ghana’s forest cover has been depleting over the years as a result of 
deforestation and global climate change causing a drastic loss of biodiversity (Dixon et al, 1996). 
It has been estimated that almost 14% of the total permanent forest reserves in the country have 
no adequate forest cover with the most affected being the North-West and South-East sub-type of 
forest zones (Tabi, 2001). There is excessive illegal and legal logging, bushfires, surface mining 
and weak implementation of forest regulations. To achieve this expected growth in the long-
term, Government expenditure must target increasing Ghana’s forest cover. Several efforts 
including the National Plantation Programme must be reactivated to make the forestry sub-sector 
contribute to the growth of the economy.  
On the part of fisheries, the long-term growth is not much different from the level in 
2010. This requires extra attention through government intervention. It is expected that oil and 
gas activity could affect the fisheries subsector more which must be evaluated to ensure that the 
economy is not negatively affected. This is particularly serious because a significant proportion 
of the population in the coastal areas that border Ghana’s offshore oil operations depend on 
fishing for their livelihoods. 
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7.2.3.2 Industry Sector Growth 
The industrial sector growth is led by electricity, petroleum and construction sub-sectors. 
On the relative effects of the fiscal rules, the simulation results show that the permanent income 
based government spending provides greater impact on industrial growth largely on account of 
the growth potential of industrial investments. Particularly, investments in infrastructure which is 
required to support industrial activity requires substantial financing which the permanent income 
rule offers relative to the bird-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rules.  
Table 7-7: Impact of fiscal rules on Industry, 2030 
Sectors  Official 2010 Base run (Bil¢) BIH PI GH 
Mining 11.2% 5330.61 0.04% 9.13% 0.96% 
Petroleum  402.582 0.26% 25.43% 3.04% 
Construction 7.9% 12240.6 0.17% 16.38% 1.96% 
Water 1.8% 207.219 0.40% 13.31% 1.270% 
Electricity 16.7% 3404.25 0.89% 36.50% 4.35% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Additional government spending must target infrastructure in the energy sector to meet 
the growing demand for energy and the construction subsector to reduce Ghana’s housing deficit. 
Ghana is faced with a budget financing gap for infrastructure, estimated by the World Bank at 
US$1.6 billion annually as shown in the graph below. 
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Figure 7-1: Ghana Infrastructure Needs 
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.  
 
Thus additional financing from petroleum revenues are expected to provide the needed 
impetus to reduce the financing gap. The energy sub-sector which is dominated by electricity 
production is also expected to grow in the long-term. The growth can come from increasing 
demand for electricity by households whose income levels have increased as a result of increased 
government expenditure. This attracts investments to the public utilities companies and from 
independent power producers to increase electricity generation capacity to meet the increasing 
demand. Demand for electricity in Ghana grows at an annual rate of 10% and is expected to 
increase further with increasing industry-led growth. Further, Government plans to increase 
generation capacity to 5000 MW by 2016 from 2400 in 2013 and further to 10,000 MW by 2025; 
which requires substantial public and private investments to realize. 
The petroleum sub-sector records a very high long-term growth at 25%. This in part can 
be attributed to the rapid deregulation of the sector to encourage private sector investments. 
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Government expenditure has been observed to have significant impact on private consumption. 
Also, the substitution of petroleum revenues for domestic borrowing crowds in the private sector. 
Thus, increased private investment in the petroleum sector as a consequence of government’s 
spending from petroleum revenues can derive the growth of the sector.  
Another reason why increasing Government expenditure based on the permanent income 
model is that demand for petroleum increases as a result of increased income levels among 
households. The high demand for manufacturing products and transportation needs as a 
consequence of high incomes causes demand for petroleum to grow. Industries need electricity to 
produce which also depends on petroleum fired plants. The growth of the economy as a result of 
higher aggregate demand also puts pressure on the supply of petroleum. It is therefore expected 
that the long-term growth of the petroleum sector will come from increased supply of petroleum 
to meet the growing demand.  
The construction subsector has also seen a surge in road construction. Government has 
prioritized road infrastructure investments and has committed the largest share of its petroleum 
revenues in the annual budget to finance this sector. From 2011-2013, more than 63 road 
infrastructure projects are being funded partly from petroleum revenues which are likely to 
continue into the long –term. These projects listed below received a total of GHS460, 045,037 of 
Ghana’s share of petroleum revenues. 
a. Upgrading of Sefwi Bekai-Eshiem-Asankragwa Road 
b. Reconstruction of Asankragua-Enchi Road 
c. Emergency Rehabilitation works on Dansoman main road 
d. Rehabilitation of Anyinam-Konongo Road, Nkawkaw by-pass (Adden No.2) 
e. Partial Reconstruction of Bomfa Junction-Asiwa and Bekwai-Ampaha Asiwa Road 
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f. Upgrading of Tainso-Badu-Adentia Road 
g. Reconstruction of Berekum-Sampa Road (Km 32-88) 
h. Construction of Kpando-Worawara Dambai Road Phase III 
i. Emergency works on the upgrading of Ho – Adidome and Adaklu Xelekpe-Aduadi Road 
j. Construction of Twifo Praso-Dunkwa Road 
k. Construction of steel bridge over river Amunam and over River Kakum on Kwaprow-
Ankaful Road 
l. Reconstruction of Navrongo-Tumu Road 
m. Construction of Wa-Han Road 
n. Construction of Bamboi-Bole road (Bamboi-Tinga Section) 
o. Accra-Kumasi Highway Dualisation Project: Kwafokrom – Apedwa Section 
p. Reconstruction of Sunyani Road in Kumasi (Sofoline Interchange 
These projects are expected to increase income levels of contractors, construction workers, 
construction material suppliers and their households which will further increase demand for other 
construction services such as housing. The permanent income model is the most suitable to 
generate the level of growth expected in the construction subsector because of its larger share of 
expenditure relative to the alternative rules. 
The mining sub-sector growth will be limited and growing less than its 2010 growth. This 
is because the sector is private sector led and growth emanates from the investment environment 
that provides incentive for higher levels of investments. The introduction of new fiscal reforms 
including an increase in corporate taxes from 25% to 35%, introduction of a windfall tax of 10% 
and ring-fencing of costs are likely to further suppress the growth of the sector. These reforms 
are already shifting the investment location preference of mining companies. Goldfields Ghana 
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Limited threatened to abandon a US$1 billion mining projects as a result of these reforms 
(Reuters, “Goldfields reduces investments in Ghana”, 8 December 2011). If the Government 
does not change its disincentive regime largely caused by the rise of resource nationalism, there 
will be deceleration in the growth of the mining sector as is projected in this analysis. 
7.2.3.3 Services Sector Growth 
The services sub-sector post a long term impressive growth potential when public 
investment is increased from petroleum revenues. Consistent with previous analysis, the 
permanent income rule is associated with higher growth rates than the bird-in-hand and Ghana’s 
fiscal rules. The sector forms a significant large part of the economy and accounts for about a 
third of overall GDP. Services can be classified as public and private, traded and non-traded, 
high and low value; and capital intensive and labour intensive services.  
Much of the sector’s long-term growth comes from trade (38%) and communications 
(30%). The simulation shows that there can be greater economic growth from the expansion of 
the services sector as demonstrated by Ghana’s recent growth in which the services sector 
contributed more to growth than agriculture and industry. Trade services cover external and 
internal services. Ghana’s service sector has been largely associated with internal trade services 
which are dominated by the informal sector. This analysis did not include the informal sector of 
the economy in the model, but when developed through government intervention in 
infrastructure provision, it could be the driving force behind the growth of the services sector.  
Growth in trade services can be generated from the impact of increased government expenditure 
on the demand side. This is largely because the economy is more of a commercial one than a 
productive one.  
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The commercial frameworks of the economy are further supported by the growing import 
levels. Trading services such as buying and selling of domestic substitutable import commodities 
will in future negatively affect domestic production and its implications for export growth is well 
known. It must be noted that trade in Ghana cannot be divorced from its linkage with external 
trade as most commodities are imported from abroad.  
Also significant is communications service. This is also influenced by the increasing 
market for mobile phone services and internet services. The communication sub-sector has 
grown fast over the last decade with the entry into Ghana of 6 telecommunication service 
companies – Airtel, Tigo, Vodafone, Kasapa, Glo and MTN. The demand for these services 
increases with increasing income levels. Thus, the spending of petroleum revenues could provide 
the impetus for further growth of the sub-sector in the long-term. 
Table 7-8: Impact of fiscal rules on Services, 2030 
Sectors  Official 2010 Base run (Bil ¢) BIH PI GH 
Trade 9.1% 5949.24 0.39% 37.83% 4.53% 
Communications 19.6% 2199.23 0.32% 30.07% 3.71% 
Public Admin 7.6% 14682.7 0.00% 6.23% 0.63% 
Education 7.1% 3115.33 0.00% 5.31% 0.04% 
Health 8.2% 911.317 0.03% 7.12% 0.87% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Public administration, education and health services are unlikely to grow beyond their 
2010 levels. The slow growth in public administration is as a result of a freeze in public sector 
employment. There have been several efforts at improving the efficiency of the public sector 
through policy and resources from both government and development partners. Weak institutions 
and low absorptive capacity do not support the efficiency of public spending and value for 
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money consideration. Thus, irrespective of the type of fiscal rule, petroleum revenues and 
increased public investments will not generate the desired growth if the regulatory and 
institutional arrangements are not sufficiently resourced with technical and financial capacity.  
The low impact of general public spending on education and health means that unless 
these important social sectors are specifically targeted, other components of public spending are 
likely to absorb higher proportion of public expenditure at the expense of productivity and 
income distribution associated with human capital development. Fan et al, (1999) show that 
public expenditure on health and education has visible impacts on poverty. Further, expenditure 
on education has the largest impact on poverty reduction in China (Fan et.al, 2002). Thus, 
targeting of public resource allocation to primary education in particular and health could largely 
improve on the distribution of human capital and income distribution (Jose, 1998). 
Productivity enhancement is an important requirement for economic growth. Further, 
human capital development is the most equitable way of distributing the benefits of petroleum 
revenues through public spending. It is also the foundation for developing the productive factors 
to support economic growth in the long-term.  This has serious implications for Ghana’s middle 
income status. However, the growth of public investment in social services is declining in 
Ghana.  
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Figure 7-2: Public Spending on Education by the Government of Ghana (%GDP) 
 
Source: Source: CIA Fact-book 2012. 
Figure 7-2 above shows that Ghana’s public spending on education as a proportion of 
GDP has been declining to the levels below lower middle income average, indicating that Ghana 
could be spending lower than her peers in the lower middle income category (Adam et al, 2013). 
Public spending on health is also lower than lower middle income average.  
Figure 7-3: Public Spending on Health by the Government of Ghana (%GDP) 
 
Source: CIA Fact-book 2012.   
The analysis in this study reignites the debate over the long-term growth potential of 
education and health financing. For instance the simulation shows that education sector growth 
in 2030 with the permanent income model lags behind its 2010 level. The health sector long-term 
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growth follows this trend. This is possible because the marginal benefits of spending on 
education and health decreases rapidly in middle income countries (Gupta et al, 2004).  The 
simulation demonstrates that Ghana can consolidate its middle income status by 2030, which 
could have decelerating effect on the marginal growth in education and health services. 
7.3 Impacts of the Efficiency of Fiscal rules on the Economy 
This section analyzes the impact of the efficiency of fiscal rules in the economy. Fiscal 
rules by nature do not factor in efficiency parameters but only guide the level of expenditure 
distribution. However, such expenditure distribution does not guarantee sustainable development 
outcomes.  
To measure the efficiency of fiscal rules, a representative efficiency index – the 
institutional quality index - adopted from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) was introduced in the simulation model. Institutional quality is an important 
measure of the efficiency of public spending (World Bank, 2009). Dombusch (1993) argues that 
no economic principles can improve the lot except a change of culture, improved discipline, and 
transparency and do away with corruption, which are institutional benchmarks for improving on 
resource allocation. 
The index used in this analysis was applied to the permanent income rule which 
demonstrated ability to contribute significantly to the long-term growth of the economy. The 
results of the simulations on the productive sectors are shown as follows: 
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Table 7-9: Impacts of the Efficiency of Fiscal rules on Development, 2030 
Sectors  Base run (Bil¢) Permanent Income  
 
Efficiency Gains 
CPIA =3 CPIA = 6 
Cocoa Beans 2517.798 6.8% 0.28% 0.37% 
Forestry 59.63 5.34% 0.15% 0.23% 
Fisheries 1695.7 6.38% 0.10% 0.14% 
Mining 5330.61 9.13% 0.02% 0.03% 
Petroleum 402.582 25.43% 0.12% 0.19% 
Construction 12240.6 16.38% 0.09% 0.13% 
Water 207.219 13.31% 0.19% 0.29% 
Electricity 3404.25 36.50% 0.39% 0.62% 
Trade 5949.24 37.83% 0.20% 0.30% 
Communications 2199.23 30.07% 0.15% 0.24% 
Public Admin 14682.7 6.23% 0.00% 0.01% 
Education 3115.33 5.31% 0.00% 0.01% 
Health 911.317 7.12% 0.00% 0.02% 
Source: Author based on Ghana’s Computable General Equilibrium Model 
In this analysis, and as already indicated, CPIA index 3 represents moderately weak 
institutions and CPIA index 6 represents very strong institutions. The simulation shows that 
strong institutions can improve on the efficiency of fiscal rules and public spending through 
efficiency gains.  Efficiency gains associated with very strong institutions are greater than those 
of moderately weak institutions (See Table 7-9 above). For instance, the simulation shows that a 
higher CPIA could lead to higher efficiency gains for the health sector (0.02%) than a lower 
CPIA score. The simulation results in this case confirms the work by Wagstaff and Claeson 
(2004) who found that the elasticity of health outcomes to expenditure was directly related to a 
country’s CPIA score.  
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Weak institutions create opportunity for patronage as opposed to quality; vested interest 
as opposed to general interest; elite societies as opposed to welfare societies. Where natural 
resource wealth is managed with weak institutions, the wealth is used to entrench the interest of 
their owners to keep institutions weaker (Isakova et.al, 2012). They also weaken institutions such 
as media freedom (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2009), democratic institutions (Ross, 2001), and 
the business climate for medium-sized businesses in the non-resource sectors (Amin and 
Djankov, 2009).  
It must be noted that as an oil producing country, public spending objectives may be 
undermined because increasing dependence on these resources largely remove the need to raise 
revenue from growth enhancing industries such as manufacturing and agriculture, which may 
relax government discipline in terms of efficiency of public spending and quality of public 
services (Karl, 1997). Thus, the low quality of services in education and health might be matched 
against eroding discipline in public spending as a consequence of weakening institutions.  
It is also important to note that the contribution of public investments to the economy 
depends on the quality of investment projects selection, feasibility, quality of procurement and 
delivery of projects and services; which are determined by the strength and capacity of state 
institutions. If attention is not paid to these factors, public spending promotes wastefulness and 
squanders development opportunities. 
It has even been suggested that efficiency gains need to be weighed against distributive 
concerns since such gains could have greater development impacts in the long-term than short–
term distributive effects. In other words, the “benefit incidence”, those who benefit from public 
services and the “expenditure incidence”, the extent to which public spending affects private 
incomes, are important considerations for determining the development impacts of allocating 
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spending. However, most resource-rich countries are more concerned about the benefits which 
suffer from the effects of short-termism.  It is important to measure the incidence of public 
spending on desired development outcomes to ensure that the long-term impacts of spending are 
achieved (Rathin et al, 2009). An efficient allocation of resources ensures that public spending 
maximizes the desired welfare outcomes. The growth of the various sectors of production shows 
that institutional quality has a great impact on expenditure outcomes. Their contribution to the 
economy increases with a CPIA of 6, and decreases with a CPIA of 3.  
7.4 Conclusions 
This section provides analyses of simulation results conducted on Ghana’s CGE model. It 
shows that whilst fiscal rules are important in an economy, not all of them can affect economic 
development greatly.  
Of the alternative fiscal rules, the permanent income rule offers the highest development 
impact on the economy, followed by Ghana’s fiscal rule and then by the bird-in-hand rule. This 
is contrary to the fiscal sustainability analysis which finds the bird-in-hand rule most fiscally 
sustainable. This means that fiscal sustainability does not necessarily lead to higher development 
impacts. Thus, whilst the permanent income rule might not be fiscally sustainable in the long-
term relative to the bird-in-hand rule, its impact on the economy is greater because of high early 
consumption. The permanent income therefore could consolidate Ghana’s transformation 
towards a middle income status. Ghana therefore has a choice between fiscal sustainability and 
development impacts but not both. That is, whether to adopt the bird-in-hand rule or the 
permanent income rule.  
However, Ghana’s own current rule neither proves to be fiscally sustainable nor 
guarantees high development impacts relative to the alternative rules. The analyses also reveals 
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that the level of institutional quality in a country could lead to efficiency gains in government 
spending, and that such gains are necessary to improve on the development impacts of fiscal 
rules.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
The objectives of the study are to assess the fiscal sustainability of Ghana’s fiscal rule 
against alternative fiscal rules and their impacts on economic development. The study also 
examines the effects of fiscal efficiency. In response to the research questions, three levels of 
analyses have been conducted.  
In the first analysis simple fiscal sustainability tools are used to explain the sustainability 
of the permanent income, bird-in-hand and Ghana’s fiscal rules whilst in the second, a dynamic 
CGE model is applied to assess the development impacts of fiscal rules. In the third analysis, 
development impacts of the efficiency of fiscal rules have been examined.   The CGE model 
follows the model developed by Logfren et.al (2002) to analyze the economy-wide effects of 
policies in developing countries but the Mathematical presentation of the model is adopted from 
Briesinger et al, (2011) and modified to capture institutional arrangements in explaining the 
efficiency of policy tools on an economy, an element which has been ignored in the traditional 
CGE literature. The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Index is 
adopted as proxy for institutional quality and represents a measure of fiscal efficiency.  
Generally, the study makes four important findings on how fiscal policy triggered by the 
inflow of new petroleum revenues could affect the long-term fiscal sustainability and growth of 
the economy.  
a. Ghana’s fiscal rule is neither fiscally sustainable nor provide higher impacts of petroleum 
revenues on economic development relative to the permanent income and the bird-in-
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hand rules. Further, Ghana’s fiscal rule is more pro-cyclical, it increases public spending 
with increasing oil production and the reverse is true. 
b. Fiscal sustainability does not necessarily lead to greater development outcomes. The bird-
in-hand rule is the most fiscally sustainable, but the permanent income rule provides 
higher development outcomes. Thus, whilst the permanent income rule might not be 
fiscally sustainable in the long-term, its impact on the economy is greater because of high 
early consumption and has the potential to move Ghana’s transformation towards a full 
middle income status.  
c. Institutional quality in a country could lead to efficiency gains in government spending.  
d. Efficiency in government spending can lead to improvement in development outcomes.  
8.2 Fiscal Sustainability in Ghana under alternative Fiscal rules 
The study examines the extent to which each of three alternative fiscal rules – permanent 
income, bird-in-hand and Ghana’s rules are fiscally sustainable. Fiscal sustainability is explained 
in terms of the fiscal benchmarks computed from alternative fiscals measured as a proportion of 
GDP.    
The study shows that Government consumption in the country could be sustained at 
different levels depending on total government consumption and oil induced consumption.  For 
instance, the study reveals that the bird in hand rule promises relative sustainability because it 
offers the highest government consumption levels proportional to GDP after oil depletion period 
compared with the permanent income rule and Ghana’s fiscal rule. The permanent income rule 
offers higher early consumption whilst Ghana’s rule provides higher consumption during peak 
oil production. Thus, Ghana’s rule and Permanent Income can finance relatively higher non-oil 
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fiscal deficits in the short-to-medium term than their counterpart Bird-in-hand rule. However, in 
the long-term the Bird-in-hand rule can allow for higher fiscal adjustments.  
The study also concludes that the adoption of Ghana’s rule does not only reduce the 
ability of petroleum revenues to finance higher deficits in the long-run, but also narrows the 
future fiscal space in the economy with serious implications for financing sustainable 
consumption. 
The Government must take a number of fiscal policy decisions to address the short, 
medium and long term fiscal challenges that have the tendency of weakening the economy.  
a. Fiscal discipline and prudence for the effective management of financial assets especially 
if rules based fiscal policy is implemented. Financial crises could particularly plunder 
returns on financial assets and slow down the growth of the petroleum funds which puts 
fiscal sustainability in danger. It is therefore important to institute a convenient 
combination of savings and investment rules that allow for investment of revenues in 
productive infrastructure while saving some of the revenue in low risk assets. 
b. Social welfare volatilities associated with rising and falling consumption pattern are 
likely to increase social disaffection. While the permanent income and Ghana rule may be 
preferable in the short to medium term because of their relatively higher levels of 
consumption, their long-term sustainability is questionable. The solution to the problems 
of social disaffections associated with fiscal sustainability policy rests with the political 
economy of managing natural resources. The Government must therefore involve the 
people and ensure greater understanding among them of the implications of heavy current 
consumption versus future consumption or vice versa. This could limit social 
disaffections for the Government and the burden it could put on the economy.  
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c. There is the tendency to rely on fiscal sustainability without addressing the structural 
causes of inefficiency and wasteful public spending. Government must control spending 
and improve on the efficiency of public spending and domestic revenue mobilization by 
instituting far reaching public sector reforms.  
8.3 Development impact of Fiscal rules in Ghana 
The effects of an increase in government expenditure based on fiscal rules are measured 
on macroeconomic variables, factor incomes, household consumption expenditure and the 
productive sectors of the economy.   
Under all the alternative fiscal rules, GDP (value added) shows consistent growth pattern 
from the short to long- term. However, the long-term GDP growth associated with the permanent 
income rule is much higher, 10% by 2030 compared to 0.1% and 1.2% for the bird-in-hand and 
Ghana’s fiscal rules respectively. From the macroeconomic perspective, this growth is fuelled by 
growth in private consumption (10.9%), fixed investments (14.8%) and exports (17.9%). 
Another important finding from the simulations is that Ghana can experience structural 
transformation in the economy. This is because, the growth of the productive sectors of the 
economy in the long-run may be influenced more by industry led by electricity (37%), petroleum 
(25%) and construction (16%) subsectors. This is followed by services led by trade (38%) and 
communications (30%); and then by the agriculture sector led by cocoa (7%).    
The permanent income rule also offers higher returns on the long-term growth in factor 
incomes for all factor inputs. However, skilled non-agricultural labour in labour intensive sectors 
make the most gains indicating that investment focus should be on labour intensive industries.  
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Thus, whilst the permanent income rule might not be fiscally sustainable in the long-
term, its impact on the economy is greater because of high early consumption. The permanent 
income therefore could consolidate Ghana’s transformation towards a middle income status. 
One of the important findings is that household expenditure can grow in the long-term. 
The study shows that the expenditure of urban households is higher than that of the rural 
households. The implications from this finding are that development from the spending of 
petroleum revenues may not be fairly distributed between urban and rural populations; and this 
could increase the influx of rural populations to the urban areas. Also, urban North household’s 
expenditure grows faster alongside Accra households, indicating the potential for bridging the 
development gap between the Northern and Southern parts of Ghana. 
Finally, the study shows that institutional quality is an important measure of efficiency 
and is an important requirement for improving on the efficiency of government spending. 
Efficiency gains in government spending could improve on the development outcomes of 
government fiscal policy. The important implication of this finding for policy makers is that a 
country can overcome the factors that impede the translation of resource abundance into positive 
development outcomes if good institutions are built and maintained whilst systems that improve 
on the management of revenues from the exploitation of petroleum resources (or minerals) are 
put in place.  
8.4     Some Main Recommendations 
The Government of Ghana should consider the following recommendations to guide its 
spending of petroleum revenues to ensure greater development outcomes. 
a. The Government of Ghana should change its current fiscal rule for spending petroleum 
revenues and adopt the permanent income rule as it offers higher development outcomes. 
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This recommendation is however necessary but not sufficient since fiscal rules by 
themselves cannot translate petroleum revenues to positive development outcomes in a 
weak institutional environment. 
b. Government must invest in building strong and independent institutions, improve on the 
policy formulation processes and project implementation effectiveness. This enhances the 
efficiency of public spending as already demonstrated from the study. These require 
interventions including new legislative frameworks, effective implementation of existing 
legislation and enhanced transparency and accountability regime to govern the inflows 
and outflows of petroleum revenues. Some specific interventions are prescribed as 
follows: 
i. Budgetary control and fiscal discipline require strong institutional 
frameworks that provide credibility and predictability to fiscal management issues. To 
this end, the Government must initiate important legislations such as the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act and the Budget Act. The Budget Act should among others establish a 
Budget Office in Parliament to monitor compliance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act.  
ii. Problems associated with public financial management have undermined 
institutional quality and increased the vulnerability of public resources to abuse through 
corruption, mismanagement and low investment returns. Government must therefore 
spend petroleum revenues guided by a long-term national development plan. In addition, 
Government must initiate legislation on Public Investment Management to guide project 
selection, procurement and timely execution of projects. This will ensure efficiency gains 
and lead to value for money for projects funded with both oil and non-oil revenues. 
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iii. Public accountability raises public confidence in the Government’s ability 
to manage pubic resources. This however requires significant level of transparency. The 
Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2011 has already provided for extensive 
transparency including a requirement for the publication of petroleum receipts, 
distribution of petroleum revenues and the expenditure on development interventions. It 
also creates the Public Interest and Accountability Committee with responsibility to 
provide independent assessment of the uses of petroleum revenues. These measures are 
not exhaustive as the Committee is not adequately funded, and which has undermined its 
effectiveness in monitoring the uses of petroleum revenues. It is therefore important to 
complement these transparency and accountability measures with the passing into law of 
the Right to Information Bill currently pending in Parliament. This will provide public 
interest information to citizens for the purpose of demanding accountability of the 
Government. Civil society has become an important institution replacing weak public 
institutions in most cases. Civil society organizations must therefore be supported with 
technical capacity to debate national policies on the use of petroleum revenues for 
accelerated development. 
iv. Transparency and accountability mechanisms should facilitate fiscal 
expansion from petroleum resource exploitation. Thus the Government should 
incorporate transparent frameworks such as open and competitive bidding process for 
granting petroleum concessions, mandatory disclosure of petroleum agreements and other 
contracts; and the disclosure of beneficial ownership information. This ensures public 
accountability and facilitates the building of strong institutions to oversee management of 
petroleum resources and revenues generated from the resources. 
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8.5 Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research 
The study is limited in several ways. Some of the limitations are explained as follows. 
The model assumed full-employment in the economy. However, as a developing country, Ghana 
has not reached the state of full-employment. The introduction of unemployment in the model in 
future will likely improve on the results of the study.  
There are several measures of institutional quality and there is no consensus on the type 
or size of institutions that could well interpret a measure of institutionalism. It may be interesting 
to adopt a similar model with a different indicator of institutional quality such as the World 
Bank’s Global Governance Indicators to see if the results will be different. 
The Ghana CGE model focused on the real side of the economy in which only relative 
prices are important; and ignores the impact of financial markets. The adoption of financial 
models with institutional quality will also be appropriate. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1-A 
Computation of Permanent Income Value (Scenario 1 - $110/bbl; r = 0.03) 
YEAR Pet Rev Non Pet Rev PI Oil Rev (PI) 
2010 6.372 4946.501329 5523.012236 576.5109064 
2011 313.4225 8278.185221 8278.195221 576.5109064 
2012 327.1613 9677.650933 10254.16184 576.5109064 
2013 548.4215 11979.26312 12555.77403 576.5109064 
2014 427.6892 14060.78125 14637.29216 576.5109064 
2015 480.5328 16395.31293 16971.82384 576.5109064 
2016 2038.139 18545.54383 19122.05474 576.5109064 
2017 3742.481 20996.91551 21573.42641 576.5109064 
2018 5797.493 23726.13517 24302.64608 576.5109064 
2019 7730.191 26578.53192 27155.04283 576.5109064 
2020 10762.58 29788.38292 30364.89383 576.5109064 
2021 4930.396 33434.3816 34010.8925 576.5109064 
2022 4752.658 37618.51889 38195.02979 576.5109064 
2023 4325.077 42370.30209 42946.813 576.5109064 
2024 3899.811 47772.54313 48349.05404 576.5109064 
2025 3433.51 53920.95203 54497.46294 576.5109064 
2026 2968.495 60926.2596 61502.77051 576.5109064 
2027 2631.321 68916.70509 69493.216 576.5109064 
2028 2293.155 78040.95376 78617.46466 576.5109064 
2029 2042.31 88615.85512 89192.36602 576.5109064 
2030 1788.084 100686.5208 101263.0317 576.5109064 
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Appendix 1 – B 
Computation of Bird-in-Hand Value (Scenario 1 - $110/bbl; r = 0.03) 
Year Non Pet Rev Pet Rev r*Opening Bal BIH(Discounted) BIH (Undiscounted) 
2010 4946.501329 6.372 0.19116 5347.468934 4946.692489 
2011 8278.185221 313.42245 9.5995683 8679.152826 8287.784789 
2012 9677.650933 327.161325 19.7023951 10078.61854 9697.353328 
2013 11979.26312 548.421525 36.7461127 12380.23073 12016.00923 
2014 14060.78125 427.68921 50.67917238 14461.74886 14111.46043 
2015 16395.31293 480.532785 66.6155311 16796.28054 16461.92846 
2016 18545.54383 2038.139113 129.7581704 18946.51144 18675.302 
2017 20996.91551 3742.480633 245.9253345 21397.88311 21126.67368 
2018 23726.13517 5797.493279 427.2278929 24127.10278 24153.36307 
2019 26578.53192 7730.191169 671.9504648 26979.49953 27250.48239 
2020 29788.38292 10762.58462 1014.986517 30189.35053 30803.36944 
2021 33434.3816 4930.395607 1193.347981 33835.3492 34627.72958 
2022 37618.51889 4752.65774 1371.728153 38019.48649 38990.24704 
2023 42370.30209 4325.077092 1542.63231 42771.2697 43912.9344 
2024 47772.54313 3899.811292 1705.905618 48173.51074 49478.44875 
2025 53920.95203 3433.510352 1860.088097 54321.91964 55781.04013 
2026 60926.2596 2968.494543 1950.678249 61327.22721 62876.93785 
2027 68916.70509 2631.320632 2088.138215 69317.6727 71004.84331 
2028 78040.95376 2293.155217 2219.577018 78441.92136 80260.53077 
2029 88615.85512 2042.309755 2347.433621 89016.82272 90963.28874 
2030 100686.5208 1788.083511 2471.499135 101087.4884 103158.0199 
r = 
 
0.03 
   Discounted Returns = 13365.58684 
   r*Discounted returns = 400.9676053 
   BIH = r*Discounted returns + Non Pet Rev 
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Appendix 1 – C 
Computation of Ghana’s Fiscal Rule Value (Scenario 1 - $110/bbl; r = 0.03) 
Year Non Pet Rev Pet Rev GNPC Benchmark ABFA GH 
2010 4946.501 6.372 2.99484 3.37716 2.364012 4948.86534 
2011 8278.185 313.4225 147.3086 166.1138985 116.2797 8394.46495 
2012 9677.651 327.1613 153.7658 173.3955023 121.3769 9799.02778 
2013 11979.26 548.4215 257.7581 290.6634083 203.4644 12182.7275 
2014 14060.78 427.6892 201.0139 226.6752813 158.6727 14219.4539 
2015 16395.31 480.5328 225.8504 254.6823761 178.2777 16573.5906 
2016 18545.54 2038.139 957.9254 1080.21373 756.1496 19301.6934 
2017 20996.92 3742.481 1758.966 1983.514735 1388.46 22755.8814 
2018 23726.14 5797.493 2724.822 3072.671438 2150.87 25877.0052 
2019 26578.53 7730.191 3633.19 4097.00132 2867.901 29446.4328 
2020 29788.38 10762.58 5058.415 5704.169849 3992.919 33781.3018 
2021 33434.38 4930.396 986.0791 3944.316485 2761.022 36195.4031 
2022 37618.52 4752.658 950.5315 3802.126192 2661.488 40280.0072 
2023 42370.3 4325.077 865.0154 3460.061673 2422.043 44792.3453 
2024 47772.54 3899.811 779.9623 3119.849033 2183.894 49956.4375 
2025 53920.95 3433.51 686.7021 2746.808281 1922.766 55843.7178 
2026 60926.26 2968.495 593.6989 2374.795635 1662.357 62588.6165 
2027 68916.71 2631.321 526.2641 2105.056506 1473.54 70390.2446 
2028 78040.95 2293.155 458.631 1834.524174 1284.167 79325.1207 
2029 88615.86 2042.31 408.462 1633.847804 1143.693 8975955% 
2030 100686.5 1788.084 357.6167 1430.466808 1001.327 101687.848 
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Appendix 1 – D 
Sustainable Fiscal Constraint base on Overall Government Budget with petroleum 
Revenues 
YEAR PI BIH GH GDP PI(%GDP) BIH(%GDP) GH(%GDP) 
2010 6307.887 4946.692 4948.865 44465.41 0.141861 0.11124811 0.111296979 
2011 8278.215 8287.785 8394.465 56225.79 0.147232 0.14740183 0.149299181 
2012 11039.04 9697.353 9799.028 65558.1 0.168386 0.14791999 0.149470896 
2013 13340.65 12016.01 12182.73 75545 0.176592 0.15905764 0.161264516 
2014 15422.17 14111.46 14219.45 87990.53 0.175271 0.16037476 0.161602096 
2015 17756.7 16461.93 16573.59 101985.6 0.17411 0.16141427 0.162509156 
2016 19906.93 18675.3 19301.69 114347.8 0.174091 0.16332017 0.168798122 
2017 22358.3 21126.67 22755.88 128165.1 0.174449 0.16483954 0.177551325 
2018 25087.52 24153.36 25877.01 143710.7 0.17457 0.1680693 0.180063129 
2019 27939.92 27250.48 29446.43 159903.6 0.17473 0.17041817 0.184151129 
2020 31149.77 30803.37 33781.3 178223.4 0.174779 0.17283574 0.189544732 
2021 34795.77 34627.73 36195.4 199258 0.174627 0.17378338 0.181650939 
2022 38979.9 38990.25 40280.01 223419 0.17447 0.17451623 0.180289057 
2023 43731.69 43912.93 44792.35 250971.7 0.174249 0.17497167 0.17847569 
2024 49133.93 49478.45 49956.44 282408.6 0.173982 0.17520161 0.17689415 
2025 55282.34 55781.04 55843.72 318198.5 0.173735 0.17530265 0.175499624 
2026 62287.64 62876.94 62588.62 358979.2 0.173513 0.1751548 0.174351629 
2027 70278.09 71004.84 70390.24 405489.9 0.173317 0.17510879 0.173593093 
2028 79402.34 80260.53 79325.12 458744.5 0.173086 0.17495694 0.172917874 
2029 89977.24 90963.29 89759.55 520453.4 0.172882 0.17477701 0.17246414 
2030 102047.9 103158 101687.8 591027.1 0.172662 0.17454026 0.172052771 
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Appendix 1 – E 
Sustainable Fiscal Constraint based on petroleum Revenues as Additional Source of 
Expenditure 
YEAR PI  BIH GH  GDP PI (%GDP) BIH %GDP) GH (%GDP) 
2010 1361.3852 0.19116 2.364012 44465.41 0.030617 4.29907E-06 5.31652E-05 
2011 1361.3852 9.5995683 116.279729 56225.79 0.024213 0.000170732 0.002068085 
2012 1361.3852 19.7023951 121.3768516 65558.1 0.020766 0.000300533 0.001851439 
2013 1361.3852 36.7461127 203.4643858 75545 0.018021 0.000486414 0.002693287 
2014 1361.3852 50.6791724 158.6726969 87990.53 0.015472 0.000575962 0.001803293 
2015 1361.3852 66.6155311 178.2776632 101985.6 0.013349 0.000653186 0.001748067 
2016 1361.3852 129.75817 756.1496108 114347.8 0.011906 0.001134768 0.006612717 
2017 1361.3852 245.925335 1388.460315 128165.1 0.010622 0.001918817 0.010833374 
2018 1361.3852 427.227893 2150.870006 143710.7 0.009473 0.002972832 0.014966662 
2019 1361.3852 671.950465 2867.900924 159903.6 0.008514 0.004202222 0.017935184 
2020 1361.3852 1014.98652 3992.918894 178223.4 0.007639 0.005695025 0.022404013 
2021 1361.3852 1193.34798 2761.02154 199258 0.006832 0.005988959 0.013856515 
2022 1361.3852 1371.72815 2661.488334 223419 0.006093 0.00613971 0.011912541 
2023 1361.3852 1542.63231 2422.043171 250971.7 0.005424 0.006146639 0.009650663 
2024 1361.3852 1705.90562 2183.894323 282408.6 0.004821 0.006040557 0.0077331 
2025 1361.3852 1950.67825 1922.765797 318198.5 0.004278 0.006130382 0.006042661 
2026 1361.3852 1950.67825 1662.356944 358979.2 0.003792 0.005433958 0.004630788 
2027 1361.3852 2088.13821 1473.539554 405489.9 0.003357 0.005149668 0.003633974 
2028 1361.3852 2219.57702 1284.166922 458744.5 0.002968 0.004838373 0.002799308 
2029 1361.3852 2347.43362 1143.693463 520453.4 0.002616 0.004510363 0.002197494 
2030 1361.3852 2471.49914 1001.326766 591027.1 0.002303 0.004181702 0.001694215 
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Appendix 1 – F 
Sensitivity Analysis of a Change in Crude Oil Price 
Year PI@$110/bbl(%GDP)  PI@$90/bbl(%GDP)  PI@$70/bbl(%GDP)  
2010 0.030616727 0.025513939 0.020411151 
2011 0.024212823 0.020177353 0.016141882 
2012 0.020766087 0.017305073 0.013844058 
2013 0.018020852 0.015017376 0.012013901 
2014 0.015471951 0.012893293 0.010314634 
2015 0.013348801 0.011124001 0.008899201 
2016 0.011905653 0.009921377 0.007937102 
2017 0.010622122 0.008851768 0.007081415 
2018 0.009473093 0.007894244 0.006315395 
2019 0.008513786 0.007094821 0.005675857 
2020 0.007638646 0.006365538 0.00509243 
2021 0.006832274 0.005693561 0.004554849 
2022 0.006093416 0.005077847 0.004062278 
2023 0.005424457 0.004520381 0.003616305 
2024 0.004820622 0.004017185 0.003213748 
2025 0.004278415 0.003565346 0.002852277 
2026 0.003792379 0.003160315 0.002528252 
2027 0.003357384 0.00279782 0.002238256 
2028 0.002967633 0.002473027 0.001978422 
2029 0.002615768 0.002179806 0.001743845 
2030 0.002303423 0.001919519 0.001535615 
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Appendix 1 – G 
Sensitivity Analysis of a change in Interest Rate 
Year PI@$110/bbl; r=0.06 (%GDP)  PI@$110/bbl; r=0.03 (%GDP)  PI@$110/bbl; r=0.01 (%GDP)  
2010 0.043569396 0.030616727 0.01296538 
2011 0.034456266 0.024212823 0.010253495 
2012 0.029551359 0.020766087 0.008793893 
2013 0.025644728 0.018020852 0.007631358 
2014 0.022017493 0.015471951 0.006551965 
2015 0.018996126 0.013348801 0.005652867 
2016 0.016942442 0.011905653 0.005041732 
2017 0.015115902 0.010622122 0.00449819 
2018 0.013480766 0.009473093 0.004011606 
2019 0.012115616 0.008513786 0.003605365 
2020 0.01087024 0.007638646 0.003234766 
2021 0.009722726 0.006832274 0.002893289 
2022 0.008671288 0.006093416 0.002580402 
2023 0.00771932 0.005424457 0.002297115 
2024 0.006860027 0.004820622 0.002041407 
2025 0.006088435 0.004278415 0.001811796 
2026 0.005396777 0.003792379 0.001605973 
2027 0.004777754 0.003357384 0.001421764 
2028 0.004223115 0.002967633 0.001256715 
2029 0.003722391 0.002615768 0.001107709 
2030 0.003277905 0.002303423 0.000975439 
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Appendix 2 – A 
Mathematical Presentation of CGE Model: Model Equations 
Production and price equations 
                             
                              
        
          
           
            
   
  
    
-1/  
      
                                    
           
            
   
  
    
-
1       
            
       
  
        
   
            
                         
                           
                                                     
                          
                                                                                                    
       
      (     
               
   
  
 
 
 
  
    
      
                          
             
                  
             
   
    
  
                                          
       
          
        
  
 
          
          
  
 
     
 
     
    
   
   
    
   
    
      
 
 
  
  
     
          
                                   
                                         
             . (1 +                                                          
 197 
       
       
 
         
   
 
          
 
   .    
   
 
      
 
   
    
   
   
   
   
    
  
 
      
 
 
        
 
       
                        
                                                   
                             
Institutional incomes and domestic demand equations 
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Factor accumulation and allocation equations 
      
      
     
   
      
                                                      
     
    
     
   
      
             
                 
      
              
      
        
      
                  
     
        
               
      
     
     
        
                        
     
 
     
           
                         
      
      
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 199 
Appendix 2 – B 
Variables 
   Final demand for private 
consumption 
   Imports 
   Domestic sales of domestic output   
  Domestic price of imports 
DSTi Inventory investment by sector   
  Domestic price of exports 
DKi Investment by sector of destination    
  World price of exports 
DEPREC Total depreciation charges   
 
 Price of composite good 
   Exports   
  Domestic sales price 
EXPSUB Total export subsidies   
  Output price 
FXDINV  Fixed capital investment   
  Price of a unit of cap/sector 
FSAV Foreign savings   
  Value added price 
FDSCif  Factor demand         GDP deflator 
GDPVA Nominal GDP in market prices    Composite goods supply 
Gi Government final demand R Exchange rate 
GR  Total government revenue RGDP  Real GDP 
GOVSAV Government savings SAVING Total savings 
HHTAX Household tax revenue TARIFF Tariff revenue 
HHSAV Total household savings WFf Average factor price 
INDTAX Total indirect tax revenue    Domestic output 
INVEST Total investment   
  Factor income 
INT i Intermediate input demand   
  Household income 
IDi Final demand for investment goods   
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Appendix 2 – C 
Parameters 
    Input-output coefficients       World price of export substitutes 
  
  CES function shift parameter   
  Household income tax rate 
  
  Production function shift parameter   
  Export subsidy rates 
  
  CET function shift parameter   
  Tariff rate on imports 
alphaif Production function share 
parameter 
  
  Indirect tax rate 
    Capital composition matrix wfdistif Factor mkt distortion parameters 
dstri Inventory investment ratio     Production function exponents 
      Depreciation rate   
  Government expenditure shares 
econi Export demand shift parameter    
  Household expenditure shares 
fsf Aggregate factor supply    CES function share parameter 
      Real government consumption    Export demand price elasticity 
kshri Investment destination shares γi CET function share parameter 
     Household saving rates   
  CES function exponent 
    
  World price of imports   
  CET function exponent 
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Appendix 3-A 
Disaggregated Updated 2005 Ghana Social Accounting Matrix (Billion Cedis) 
Production Quantities 
Production levels (quantities) 
 
 
Mt ha mt / ha 
 
Prod area Yield 
amaiz1 151,892 79,762 1.9 
arice1 18,166 7,864 2.3 
asorg1 409 414 1.0 
aogrn1 0 0 0.0 
acass1 325,794 25,562 12.7 
ayams1 121,119 15,992 7.6 
acyam1 72,325 13,293 5.4 
acpea1 454 454 1.0 
asbea1 0 0 0.0 
apoil1 50,901 161,751 0.3 
agnut1 2,752 2,970 1.0 
aonut1 44,893 55,456 0.8 
afrud1 54,322 16,691 3.3 
afrue1 134,497 21,219 6.3 
avegd1 201,566 45,731 4.4 
avege1 28,439 4,187 6.8 
aplan1 348,404 22,718 15.3 
acoco1 18,889 36,872 0.5 
asugr1 0 0 0.0 
aocro1 9,604 12,451 0.8 
aoexp1 8,722 7,420 1.2 
amaiz2 488,569 334,129 1.5 
arice2 77,243 35,795 2.2 
asorg2 1,437 1,456 1.0 
aogrn2 0 0 0.0 
acass2 2,571,923 175,226 14.7 
ayams2 1,020,696 99,754 10.2 
acyam2 1,087,662 142,267 7.6 
acpea2 9,097 9,097 1.0 
asbea2 1,350 1,432 0.9 
apoil2 210,991 670,484 0.3 
 202 
agnut2 37,105 40,040 1.0 
aonut2 153,773 189,954 0.8 
afrud2 230,085 70,696 3.3 
afrue2 194,226 30,642 6.3 
avegd2 530,379 120,332 4.4 
avege2 1,497 220 6.8 
aplan2 1,914,948 192,811 9.9 
acoco2 497,285 970,710 0.5 
asugr2 0 0 0.0 
aocro2 25,429 32,966 0.8 
aoexp2 12,795 12,094 1.1 
amaiz3 600,026 278,700 2.2 
arice3 28,306 19,278 1.5 
asorg3 48,815 45,944 1.1 
aogrn3 0 0 0.0 
acass3 5,112,823 289,660 17.7 
ayams3 1,797,306 122,022 14.7 
acyam3 331,994 46,541 7.1 
acpea3 10,000 10,000 1.0 
asbea3 3,150 3,341 0.9 
apoil3 51,103 162,394 0.3 
agnut3 11,009 11,879 1.0 
aonut3 15,500 19,147 0.8 
afrud3 53,315 16,382 3.3 
afrue3 15,080 2,379 6.3 
avegd3 859,712 195,051 4.4 
avege3 0 0 0.0 
aplan3 1,108,747 116,879 9.5 
acoco3 205,642 401,418 0.5 
asugr3 0 0 
 aocro3 6,088 9,471 0.6 
aoexp3 648 787 0.8 
amaiz4 417,224 309,679 1.3 
arice4 183,284 97,014 1.9 
asorg4 439,338 481,644 0.9 
aogrn4 0 0 0.0 
acass4 1,556,459 133,229 11.7 
ayams4 1,665,545 148,965 11.2 
acyam4 47,646 6,679 7.1 
 203 
acpea4 90,449 90,449 1.0 
asbea4 40,500 42,955 0.9 
apoil4 32,750 104,072 0.3 
agnut4 261,457 282,136 1.0 
aonut4 351,835 434,619 0.8 
afrud4 45,278 13,912 3.3 
afrue4 57,197 9,024 6.3 
avegd4 568,243 128,923 4.4 
avege4 0 0 0.0 
aplan4 199,865 21,974 9.1 
acoco4 0 0 0.0 
asugr4 0 0 0.0 
aocro4 30,179 85,241 0.4 
aoexp4 21,404 28,013 0.8 
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Appendix 3 – B 
Labour Employment 
Sectoral labor employment (QFBASE) 
   Actual number of workers 
    [Activities x Factors] land1 land2 land3 land4 
Amaiz 79762.35 334128.7 278700.1 309679 
Arice 7863.942 35794.53 19278.41 97013.61 
Asorg 414.226 1455.587 45943.89 481644 
Aogrn 0 0 0 0 
Acass 25561.54 175225.5 289660.4 133228.8 
Ayams 15991.54 99754.36 122021.8 148964.8 
Acyam 13293.13 142266.7 46541.12 6679.297 
Acpea 307.0417 7092.14 9213.78 91671.24 
Asbea 0 1431.818 3340.908 42954.53 
Apoil 161751.3 670483.5 162394.2 104071.8 
Agnut 2969.854 40040 11879.42 282136.1 
Aonut 55455.62 189954.4 19147.06 434619.4 
Afrud 16690.99 70695.99 16381.6 13912.29 
Afrue 21218.82 30641.93 2379.088 9023.702 
Avegd 45731.07 120332 195050.7 128922.6 
Avege 4187.067 220.372 0 0 
Aplan 22717.75 192811 116878.7 21973.54 
Acoco 36871.65 970710 401418.4 0 
Asugr 0 0 0 0 
Aocro 12450.94 32966.02 9471.219 85240.97 
Aoexp 7419.65 12094.44 787.4984 28013.06 
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Appendix 3 – C 
Labour Wages 
Sectoral labor wages (WFBASE) 
    Unit: 1000 cedis per year 
     
       [Activities x Factors] labself1 labself2 labself3 labself4 labskll labunsk 
Amaiz 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Arice 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Asorg 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aogrn 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Acass 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Ayams 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Acyam 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Acpea 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Asbea 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Apoil 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Agnut 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aonut 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Afrud 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Afrue 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Avegd 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Avege 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aplan 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Acoco 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aocro 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aoexp 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Achik 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aeggs 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Abeef 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Agoat 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Aoliv 6835 6835 6835 6835 11099 5331 
Afore 9070 9070 9070 9070 16282 10037 
Afish 10435 10435 10435 10435 29768 15710 
Amine 
    
25385 14037 
Aforf 3598 3598 3598 3598 20434 10572 
Alocf 3598 3598 3598 3598 20434 10572 
Acopr 3598 3598 3598 3598 20434 10572 
Adair 3598 3598 3598 3598 20434 10572 
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Ameat 3598 3598 3598 3598 20434 10572 
Atext 
     
5461 
Aclth 
    
6400 4577 
Afoot 
     
8481 
Awood 
     
9122 
Apapr 
    
17142 10189 
Aoils 
     
30880 
Apetr 
     
30880 
Adies 
     
30880 
Afuel 
     
6063 
Afert 
    
15750 14184 
Achem 
    
8000 7257 
Ametl 
     
7403 
Acapt 5547 5547 5547 5547 43490 8305 
Acons 
    
19095 10243 
Awatr 
    
30071 5454 
Aelec 
    
39159 11341 
Atrad 5365 5365 5365 5365 11752 8787 
Aosrv 
    
41073 22978 
Atran 
    
32938 7435 
Acomm 
    
12190 8690 
Abusi 
    
31008 16163 
Areal 
     
10897 
Acsrv 5601 5601 5601 5601 17477 6399 
Aadmn 
    
29969 10129 
Aeduc 
    
17049 11029 
Aheal 
    
17296 10541 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
Appendix 3 – D 
Active Population (Actual Numbers) 
 Household survey 
Haccra 2,544,225 
Hcurb 956,375 
Hfurb 1,872,798 
Hssub 2,060,706 
Hsnub 683,302 
Hcrur 1,498,344 
Hfrur 3,821,583 
Hssru 4,420,457 
Hsnru 3,742,210 
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Appendix 3 – E 
Institutions Group 
 
Gov dtax Stax mtax Etax s-i row 
ccass 
      
25 
cyams 
      
103 
ccyam 
       ccpea 
       csbea 
       cpoil 
      
326 
cgnut 
      
71 
conut 
      
216 
cfrud 
       cfrue 
      
297 
cvegd 
       cvege 
      
100 
cplan 
       ccoco 
      
7,672 
cocro 
       coexp 
      
186 
cchik 
       ceggs 
       cbeef 
       cgoat 
       coliv 
       cfore 
      
5,914 
cfish 
      
956 
cmine 
      
7,400 
cforf 
       clocf 
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ccopr 
      
931 
cdair 
       cmeat 
      
773 
ctext 
      
55 
cclth 
      
14 
cfoot 
      
7 
cwood 
      
1,792 
cpapr 
      
1 
coils 
       cpetr 
       cdies 
       cfuel 
       cfert 
       cchem 
      
54 
cmetl 
     
312 
 ccapt 
     
15,004 822 
ccons 
     
12,890 
 cwatr 
       celec 
       ctrad 
       cosrv 
      
7,380 
ctran 
       ccomm 
       cbusi 
       creal 
       ccsrv 
       cadmn 12,326 
      ceduc 2,633 
      cheal 514 
      trc 
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labself1 
       labself2 
       labself3 
       labself4 
       labunsk 
       labskll 
       capa 
       capn 
       land1 
       land2 
       land3 
       land4 
       haccra 928 
     
484 
hcurb 471 
     
137 
hfurb 294 
     
827 
hssub 734 
     
133 
hsnub 49 
     
17 
hcrur 109 
     
69 
hfrur 464 
     
159 
hssru 1,673 
     
175 
hsnru 37 
     
7 
gov 
 
7,293 10,304 3,524 1,089 
 
5,714 
dtax 
       stax 
       mtax 
       etax 
       s-i 6,776 
     
18,062 
row 915 
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Appendix 3 – F 
Household Demand Elasticities - Linear Expenditure System (LES) Demand 
(Households x 
Commodities) 
hhd haccra hcurb Hfurb hssub Hsnub Hcrur hfrur hssru hsnru 
Cocoa Beans 
0.95
5733 
0.6997
67 
0.6997
665 
0.6997
67 
0.699
767 
1.2495
21 
1.2495
21 
1.249
521 
1.249
521 
1.2495
21 
Forestry 
1.39
5631 
1.0684
27 
1.0684
27 
1.0684
27 
1.068
427 
1.3956
31 
1.3956
31 
1.395
631 
1.395
631 
1.3956
31 
Fisheries 
1.39
5631 
1.0684
27 
1.0684
27 
1.0684
27 
1.068
427 
1.3956
31 
1.3956
31 
1.395
631 
1.395
631 
1.3956
31 
Mining 
1.11
6794 
1.1167
94 
1.1167
94 
1.1167
94 
1.116
794 
1.0326
3 
1.0326
3 
1.032
63 
1.032
63 
1.0326
3 
Petroleum 
2.93
1373 
3.1093
94 
3.1093
94 
3.1093
94 
3.109
394 
2.1982
08 
2.1982
08 
2.198
208 
2.198
208 
2.1982
08 
Construction 
1.84
0823 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.840
823 
1.9658
89 
1.9658
89 
1.965
889 
1.965
889 
1.9658
89 
Water 
1.84
0823 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.840
823 
1.9658
89 
1.9658
89 
1.965
889 
1.965
889 
1.9658
89 
Electricity 
1.84
0823 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.8408
23 
1.840
823 
1.9658
89 
1.9658
89 
1.965
889 
1.965
889 
1.9658
89 
Trade 
1.06
4589 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.064
589 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.064
589 
1.064
589 
1.0645
89 
Communicatio
n 
1.06
4589 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.064
589 
1.0645
89 
1.0645
89 
1.064
589 
1.064
589 
1.0645
89 
Public admin 
1.11
3446 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.115
441 
1.0009
76 
1.0009
76 
1.000
976 
1.000
976 
1.0009
76 
Education 
1.11
3446 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.115
441 
1.0009
76 
1.0009
76 
1.000
976 
1.000
976 
1.0009
76 
Health 
1.11
3446 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.1154
41 
1.115
441 
1.0009
76 
1.0009
76 
1.000
976 
1.000
976 
1.0009
76 
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Appendix 3 – G 
Trade and Production Elasticities 
Trade Elasticities (TRADELAS) Production Elasticities (PRODELAS) 
Subsectors 
  
Armington Transformation Subsectors 
  
Factor substitution 
SIGMAQ SIGMAT  PRODELAS PRODELAS2  
Cocoa Beans 6.5 4.0 
All 
sectors/subsec
tors 0.75 1.20 
Forestry 5.0 4.0 
   Fishing 2.5 4.0 
   Mining 6.0 4.0 
   Petroleum 10.4 4.0 
   Construction 6.0 4.0 
   Water 6.0 4.0 
   Electricity 6.0 4.0 
   Trade 4.0 4.0 
   Communicati
on 4.0 4.0 
   administration 4.0 4.0 
   Education 4.0 4.0 
   Health 4.0 4.0 
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Appendix 3 – H 
Set Definitions 
Activities and Commodities 
amaiz Cmaiz Maize 
arice Crice Rice 
asorg Csorg Sorghum and millet 
aogrn Cogrn Other cereals 
acass Ccass Cassava 
ayams Ayams Yams 
acyam Ccyam Cocoyams 
acpea Ccpea Cowpea 
asbea Csbea Soyabean 
apoil Cpoil Palm oil 
agnut Cgnut Groundnuts 
aonut Conut Tree nuts 
afrud Cfrud Fruit (domestic) 
afrue Cfrue Fruit (export) 
avegd Cvegd Vegetables (domestic) 
avege Cvege Vegetables (export) 
aplan Cplan Plantains 
acoco Ccoco Cocoa beans 
asugr Csugr Sugarcane 
aocro Cocro Other crops 
aoexp Coexp Export industrial crops 
achik Cchik Chicken broiler (mostly imported) 
aeggs Ceggs Eggs and layers (domestic) 
abeef Cbeef Beef 
agoat Cgoat Sheep and goat meat 
aoliv Coliv Other meats 
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afore Cfore Forestry 
afish Cfish Fishing 
agold Cgold Gold 
aomin Comin Other mining 
aforf Cforf Other formal food processing 
alocf Clocf Informal food processing 
acopr Ccopr Cocoa processing 
asupr Csupr Sugar 
adair Cdair Dairy products 
ameat Cmeat Meat and fish processing 
atext Ctext Textiles 
aclth Cclth Clothing 
afoot Cfoot Leather and footwear 
awood Cwood Wood products 
apapr Cpapr Paper products, publishing and printing 
aoils Coils Crude and other oils 
apetr Cpetr Petroleum 
adies Cdies Diesel 
afuel Cfuel Other fuels 
afert Cfert Fertilizer 
achem Cchem Other Chemicals 
arubb Crubb Rubber products? 
anmet Cnmet Non-metallic mineral products 
ametl Cmetl Metal products 
amach Cmach Non-electrical machines 
aemch Cemch Electrical machines 
atele Ctele Radio and television equipment 
amedi Cmedi Medical and optical equipment 
avehi Cvehi Motor vehicles 
avehp Cvehp Motor vehicles parts 
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atequ Ctequ Other transport equipment 
aoman Coman Other manufactured products 
acons Ccons Construction 
awatr Cwatr Water 
aelec Celec Electricity 
agasp Cgasp Gas 
atrad Ctrad Trade services 
aosrv Cosrv Repairing, hotel, and restruant 
atran Ctran Transport services 
acomm Ccomm Communication 
aban Cbusi Banking and business services 
arees Creal Real estate 
acsrv Ccsrv Community and other services 
aadmn Cadmn Public administration 
aeduc Ceduc Education 
aheal Cheal Health 
Regions 
  
   
coast Coastal zone 
forest Forest zone 
south Southern Savanah zone 
north Northern Savanah zone 
accra Greater Accra Metropolitan Area 
Factors 
 
  
labself Self-employed labor (agriculture) 
labelem Elementary labor (agriculture and non-agriculture) 
labskll Skilled labor (non-agriculture) 
labunsk Unskilled labor (non-agriculture) 
cap Capital 
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land1 Land (coast) 
land2 Land (forest) 
land3 Land (south) 
land4 Land (north) 
Other 
accounts 
 ent Enterprises 
gov Government 
dtax Direct taxes 
stax Sales taxes 
mtax Import tariffs 
etax Export taxes 
s-i Savings-investment 
row Rest of world 
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Appendix 4 – A 
GAMS Code for Base Model 
GAMS Rev 228  x86/MS Windows                                
G e n e r a l   A l g e b r a i c   M o d e l i n g   S y s t e m 
Input file: 1dmodel.gms. IFPRI Extended standard recursive dynamic CGE modeling system, 
Version 2.00 
   2    
   4  *$OFFSYMLIST OFFSYMXREF 
   6  *The dollar control option makes empty data initialization statements 
   7  *permissible (e.g. sets without elements or parameters without data) 
   8    
   9    
  10  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       11  *1. SET DECLARATIONS ----------------------------------------------------- 
  12  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        13    
      In this section, all sets are declared. They are divided into the 
      following groups: 
      a. model sets (appearing in the model equations) 
      b. calibration sets (used to initialize variables and define model 
         parameters) 
      c. report sets (used in report files) 
  22    
  23  SETS 
  24  *a. model sets 
  25   AC           global set for model accounts - aggregated microsam accounts 
  26   ACNT(AC)     all elements in AC except TOTAL 
  27   AAG(AC)      aggregate activity accounts 
  28   R(AC)        trading regions 
  29   A(AC)        activities 
  30   ACES(A)      activities with CES fn at top of technology nest 
  31   ALEO(A)      activities with Leontief fn at top of technology nest 
  32   C(AC)        commodities 
  33   CD(C)        commodities with domestic sales of output 
  34   CDN(C)       commodities without domestic sales of output 
  35   CE(C)        exported commodities 
  36   CER(C,R)     imported commodities by region 
  37   CEN(C)       non-export commodities 
  38   CM(C)        imported commodities 
  39   CMR(C,R)     imported commodities by region 
  40   CMN(C)       non-imported commodities 
  41   CX(C)        commodities with output 
  42   F(AC)        factors 
  43   FAGG(F)      aggregate factors in factor nesting 
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  44   FLAB(F)      labor 
  45   FLND(F)      land 
  46   FCAP(F)      capital 
  47   FECW(F)      economywide factor 
  48   FLOC(F)      economywide factor 
  49   FDIS(F)      disaggregate factors 
  50   FNEST(F,F)   nested structure of factors 
  51   FTREE(F,F,F) nested structure of factors 
  52   GOVF         government functions for expenditure 
  53   MFA1(F,A)    factor F (agg or disagg) is used by A at top of nest 
  54   MFA2(F,F,A)  factor FP is aggregated to factor F for activity A 
  55   INS(AC)      institutions 
  56   INSD(INS)    domestic institutions 
  57   INSDNG(INSD) domestic non-government institutions 
  58   EN(INSDNG)   enterprises 
  59   H(INSDNG)    households 
  60   HAGG(H)      aggregate households 
  61  *b. calibration sets 
  62   CINV(C)      fixed investment goods 
  63   CT(C)        transaction service commodities 
  64   CTD(AC)      domestic transactions cost account 
  65   CTE(AC)      export transactions cost account 
  66   CTM(AC)      import transactions cost account 
  67  *c. report sets 
  68   AAGR(A)      agricultural activities 
  69   AMIN(A)      mining activities 
  70   AIND(A)      industrial activities 
  71   ASER(A)      service activities 
  72   ANAGR(A)     non-agricultural activities 
  73   CAGR(C)      agricultural commodities 
  74   CMIN(C)      mining commodities 
  75   CIND(C)      industrial commodities 
  76   CSER(C)      service commodities 
  77   CNAGR(C)     non-agricultural commodities 
  78   HURB(H)      urban households 
  79   HRUR(H)      rural households 
  80   HURB2(H) 
  81   HRUR2(H) 
  82    
  83  *d. mappings 
  84   ZONE 
  85   MAPAAGA(AAG,A) aggregate activities to region-specific activities 
  86   MAPA2C(AAG,C)  direct mapping between activities and commodities 
  87   MAPAZONE(A,ZONE) 
  88  ; 
  89    
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  90  *ALIAS statement to create identical cets 
  91  ALIAS 
  92   (AC,ACP)   , (ACNT,ACNTP), (A,AP,APP), (AAG,AAGP), (ZONE,ZONEP) 
  93   (C,CP,CPP) , (CE,CEP)    , (CM,CMP) 
  94   (F,FP,FPP) , (FAGG,FAGGP), (FLAB,FLABP), (FCAP,FCAPP),  (FLND,FLNDP), (FE 
      CW,FECWP),  (FLOC,FLOCP) 
  95   (GOVF,GOVFP),(INS,INSP) ,  (INSD,INSDP), (INSDNG,INSDNGP), (H,HP), (R,RP) 
  96  ; 
  97    
  98  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        99  *2. DATABASE ------------------------------------------------------------- 
100  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
101    
 102  PARAMETER 
 103   SAM(AC,ACP)     standard SAM 
 104   NEST(F,FP)      nested structure of factors in the model 
 105   TREE(F,FP)      direct and indirect factor mapping in nested factor structure 
 106   SAMBALCHK(AC)   column minus row total for SAM 
 107  ; 
 108    
 109  *INCLUDE ONE COUNTRY DATA SET 
 110  *Remove asterisk in front of ONE (AND ONLY ONE) of the following lines 
 111  *or add a new line for new file with country data 
 112    
INCLUDE    C:\Users\camara\Desktop\2011 Desktop\CAADP model3\1MODEL.DAT 
 
GAMS Rev 228  x86/MS Windows                             
Input file: 1dmodel.dat. IFPRI Extended standard recursive dynamic CGE modeling system, 
Version 2.00 
Input file: 1dmodel.gms. IFPRI Extended standard recursive dynamic CGE modeling system, 
Version 2.00 
 115    
      Version 2.00 Release date: July 2005 
      Last update: 
 
      This file includes country-specific model data. 
      Signals to the user who is constructing his/her own data set: 
      "!!" -- read carefully; perhaps need to supply information 
 
      The file is divided into the following searchable blocks: 
      1. SET DEFINITIONS 
      2. SAM 
      3. ELASTICITIES 
      4. PHYSICAL FACTOR QUANTITIES 
      5. COMMODITY VALUE SHARES FOR HOME CONSUMPTION 
      6. INITIALIZATION OF TAX DATA 
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 133    
 134  SCALAR 
 135   AGGREGATE       aggregate households (0 for no - 1 for yes)       / 0 / 
 136   KOPTION         capital updating options (1 DDM 2 XD)             / 2 / 
 137  ; 
 138    
 139  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       140  *1. SET DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------------ 
141  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 142    
 143  *Read in set definitions from Excel file (1data.xls) -------------- 
 144    
 145  *Model data (full set of activities and households) 
GDXIN   C:\Users\camara\Desktop\2011 Desktop\CAADP model3\1model.gdx 
 148    
 149  *Load sets 
--- LOAD  AC = 1:AC 
--- LOAD  AAG = 2:AAG 
--- LOAD  A = 3:A 
--- LOAD  AAGR = 4:AAGR 
--- LOAD  AMIN = 5:AMIN 
--- LOAD  AIND = 6:AIND 
--- LOAD  ASER = 7:ASER 
--- LOAD  MAPAAGA = 31:MAPAAGA 
--- LOAD  C = 8:C 
--- LOAD  CAGR = 9:CAGR 
--- LOAD  CMIN = 10:CMIN 
--- LOAD  CIND = 11:CIND 
--- LOAD  CSER = 12:CSER 
--- LOAD  F = 13:F 
--- LOAD  FAGG = 14:FAGG 
--- LOAD  FLAB = 15:FLAB 
--- LOAD  FCAP = 16:FCAP 
--- LOAD  FLND = 17:FLND 
--- LOAD  FECW = 18:FECW 
--- LOAD  FLOC = 19:FLOC 
--- LOAD  GOVF = 33:GOVF 
--- LOAD  INS = 20:INS 
--- LOAD  INSD = 21:INSD 
--- LOAD  INSDNG = 22:INSDNG 
--- LOAD  EN = 23:EN 
--- LOAD  H = 24:H 
--- LOAD  HURB = 25:HURB 
--- LOAD  HRUR = 26:HRUR 
--- LOAD  CTD = 27:CTD 
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--- LOAD  CTE = 28:CTE 
--- LOAD  CTM = 29:CTM 
--- LOAD  R = 30:R 
--- LOAD  NEST = 51:NEST 
--- LOAD  MAPA2C = 32:MAPA2C 
--- LOAD  ZONE = 34:ZONE 
--- LOAD  MAPAZONE = 35:MAPAZONE 
 152    
 153  *Ghana with CES function at the top of the technology nest 
 154   ACES(A)                = NO; 
 155   ALEO(A)$(NOT ACES(A))  = YES; 
 156   ANAGR(A)               = NOT AAGR(A); 
 157   CNAGR(C)               = NOT CAGR(C); 
 158   HAGG('HHD')            = YES; 
 159   ACNT(AC)               = YES; 
 160   ACNT('TOTAL')          = NO; 
 161   ACNT('HID')            = NO; 
 162   ACNT('H')              = NO; 
 163   ACNT('HSIZE')          = NO; 
 164   ACNT('WEIGHT')         = NO; 
 165    
 166  *XD 2007Dec 
 167   HURB2(H)               = NO; 
 168   HURB2(H)$HURB(H)       = YES; 
 169   HURB2('hhd')           = NO; 
 170   HURB2('haccra')        = NO; 
 171   HRUR2(H)               = NO; 
 172   HRUR2(H)$HRUR(H)       = YES; 
 173    
 174  *Add additional sets used in this country's data calibration 
 175  *e.g. sets used in the mapping between factor nests 
 176    
 177    
 178    
 179  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 180  *2. SAM ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      ------------------- 
 181  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 182    
 183  PARAMETER 
 184   SAM1(AC,ACP) 
 185   SAM2(AC,ACP) 
 186   SAM3(AC,ACP) 
 187   SAM4(AC,ACP) 
 188   SAM5(AC,ACP) 
 189   GOVFSHR(C,GOVF)         government expenditure share by commodity and function 
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 190  ; 
 191    
 192  *Load Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
--- LOAD  SAM1 = 36:SAM1 
--- LOAD  SAM2 = 37:SAM2 
--- LOAD  SAM3 = 38:SAM3 
--- LOAD  SAM4 = 39:SAM4 
--- LOAD  SAM5 = 40:SAM5 
--- LOAD  GOVFSHR = 52:GOVFSHR 
 194    
 195  *Loading large SAM sections into single SAM parameter 
 196   SAM(AC,ACP) = SAM1(AC,ACP); 
 197   SAM(AC,ACP) = SAM(AC,ACP) + SAM2(AC,ACP); 
 198   SAM(AC,ACP) = SAM(AC,ACP) + SAM3(AC,ACP); 
 199   SAM(AC,ACP) = SAM(AC,ACP) + SAM4(AC,ACP); 
 200   SAM(AC,ACP) = SAM(AC,ACP) + SAM5(AC,ACP); 
 201    
 202  *Identify government spending patterns by functions 
 203   GOVFSHR(C,GOVF)$SUM(GOVFP, GOVFSHR(C,GOVFP)) = GOVFSHR(C,GOVF) / 
SUM(GOVF 
      P, GOVFSHR(C,GOVFP)); 
 204   GOVFSHR(C,GOVF)$((ORD(GOVF) EQ 1) AND (SUM(GOVFP, 
GOVFSHR(C,GOVFP)) EQ 0) 
      ) = 1; 
 205    
 206  *The following adjustments are only relevant to a specific country SAM --- 
 207    
 208  SET 
 209   REMEXP(C)       remove exports with small shares 
 210           / ccass, cclth, cfoot, cpapr, cmetl / 
 211   REMIMP(C)       remove imports with small shares 
 212           /   / 
 213   REEXPORT(C)     remove imports with re-export problem 
 214           /   / 
 215  ; 
 216    
 217  *coils, , 
 218    
 219  *XD 2007Dec 
 220  *Adjust factor income distribution such that urban households do not share 
       family labor income 
 221  Parameter 
 222  AdjSAM(INSD,F) 
 223  ; 
 224    
 225  AdjSAM('hcrur','labself1') = SAM('hcrur','labself1') + SAM('hcurb','labsel 
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      f1') ; 
 226  AdjSAM('hfrur','labself2') = SAM('hfrur','labself2') + SAM('hfurb','labsel 
      f2') ; 
 227  AdjSAM('hssru','labself3') = SAM('hssru','labself3') + SAM('hssub','labsel 
      f3') ; 
 228  AdjSAM('hsnru','labself4') = SAM('hsnru','labself4') + SAM('hsnub','labsel 
      f4') ; 
 229    
 230  AdjSAM('hcrur','labunsk') = SAM('hcrur','labunsk') - SAM('hcurb','labself1 
      ') ; 
 231  AdjSAM('hfrur','labunsk') = SAM('hfrur','labunsk') - SAM('hfurb','labself2 
      ') ; 
 232  AdjSAM('hssru','labunsk') = SAM('hssru','labunsk') - SAM('hssub','labself3 
      ') ; 
 233  AdjSAM('hsnru','labunsk') = SAM('hsnru','labunsk') - SAM('hsnub','labself4 
      ') ; 
 234    
 235  AdjSAM('hfrur','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hfrur','labunsk') + 450 ; 
 236  AdjSAM('hcrur','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hcrur','labunsk') + 300 ; 
 237    
 238  AdjSAM('hssru','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hssru','labunsk') - 500 ; 
 239  AdjSAM('hsnru','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hsnru','labunsk') - 250 ; 
 240  AdjSAM('hfrur','capn')    = SAM('hfrur','capn') - 450 ; 
 241  AdjSAM('hcrur','capn')    = SAM('hcrur','capn') - 300 ; 
 242  AdjSAM('hssru','capn')    = SAM('hssru','capn') + 500 ; 
 243  AdjSAM('hsnru','capn')    = SAM('hsnru','capn') + 250 ; 
 244    
 245  AdjSAM('hcurb','labunsk') = SAM('hcurb','labunsk') + SAM('hcurb','labself1 
      ') ; 
 246  AdjSAM('hfurb','labunsk') = SAM('hfurb','labunsk') + SAM('hfurb','labself2 
      ') ; 
 247  AdjSAM('hssub','labunsk') = SAM('hssub','labunsk') + SAM('hssub','labself3 
      ') ; 
 248  AdjSAM('hsnub','labunsk') = SAM('hsnub','labunsk') + SAM('hsnub','labself4 
      ') ; 
 249    
 250  AdjSAM('hcrur','labskll') = SAM('hcrur','labskll') + 350 ; 
 251  AdjSAM('hcrur','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hcrur','labunsk') - 350 ; 
 252    
 253  AdjSAM('hfurb','labskll') = SAM('hfurb','labskll') - 350 ; 
 254  AdjSAM('hfurb','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hfurb','labunsk') + 350 ; 
 255    
 256  AdjSAM('hfrur','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hfrur','labunsk') + 350 ; 
 257  AdjSAM('hfrur','labskll') = SAM('hfrur','labskll') - 350 ; 
 258    
 259  AdjSAM('hfurb','labunsk') = AdjSAM('hfurb','labunsk') - 350 ; 
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 260  AdjSAM('hfurb','labskll') = AdjSAM('hfurb','labskll') + 350 ; 
 261    
 262    
 263  SAM(HRUR2,FLAB)$AdjSAM(HRUR2,FLAB) = AdjSAM(HRUR2,FLAB) ; 
 264  SAM(HURB2,FLAB)$AdjSAM(HURB2,FLAB) = AdjSAM(HURB2,FLAB) ; 
 265    
 266  SAM(HRUR2,'capn')$AdjSAM(HRUR2,'capn') = AdjSAM(HRUR2,'capn') ; 
 267    
 268  SAM('hcurb','labself1') = 0 ; 
 269  SAM('hfurb','labself2') = 0 ; 
 270  SAM('hssub','labself3') = 0 ; 
 271  SAM('hsnub','labself4') = 0 ; 
 272    
 273    
 274    
 275  *Move exports to changes in inventories 
 276   SAM(REMEXP,'DSTK') = SAM(REMEXP,'DSTK') + SAM(REMEXP,'ROW'); 
 277   SAM('DSTK','S-I')  = SAM('DSTK','S-I') + SUM(REMEXP, SAM(REMEXP,'ROW')); 
 278   SAM('S-I','ROW')   = SAM('S-I','ROW') + SUM(REMEXP, SAM(REMEXP,'ROW')); 
 279   SAM(REMEXP,'ROW')  = 0; 
 280  *Move imports to changes in inventories 
 281   SAM('ROW',REMIMP) = SAM('ROW',REMIMP) + SAM('MTAX',REMIMP); 
 282   SAM('MTAX',REMIMP) = 0; 
 283   SAM(REMIMP,'DSTK') = SAM(REMIMP,'DSTK') - SAM('ROW',REMIMP); 
 284   SAM('DSTK','S-I')  = SAM('DSTK','S-I') - SUM(REMIMP, SAM('ROW',REMIMP)); 
 285   SAM('S-I','ROW')   = SAM('S-I','ROW') - SUM(REMIMP, SAM('ROW',REMIMP)); 
 286   SAM('ROW',REMIMP)  = 0; 
 287   SAM('GOV','MTAX')  = SUM(C, SAM('MTAX',C)); 
 288   SAM('ROW','GOV')   = 0; 
 289   SAM('ROW','GOV')   = SUM(ACNT, SAM(ACNT,'ROW')-SAM('ROW',ACNT)); 
 290  *Move trade transactions costs to domestic costs 
 291   SAM(CTD,REMEXP) = SAM(CTD,REMEXP) + SUM(CTE, SAM(CTE,REMEXP)); 
 292   SAM(CTD,REMIMP) = SAM(CTD,REMIMP) + SUM(CTM, SAM(CTM,REMIMP)); 
 293   SAM(CTE,REMEXP) = 0; 
 294   SAM(CTM,REMIMP) = 0; 
 295   SAM(C,CTM)$SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTM)) = SAM(C,CTM)/SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTM)) * 
SUM(A 
      CNT, SAM(CTM,ACNT)); 
 296   SAM(C,CTD)$SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTD)) = SAM(C,CTD)/SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTD)) * 
SUM(A 
      CNT, SAM(CTD,ACNT)); 
 297   SAM(C,CTE)$SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTE)) = SAM(C,CTE)/SUM(CP, SAM(CP,CTE)) * 
SUM(A 
      CNT, SAM(CTE,ACNT)); 
 298  *Move import tariffs to sales taxes 
 299   SAM('STAX',REMIMP) = SAM('STAX',REMIMP) + SAM('MTAX',REMIMP); 
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 300   SAM('MTAX',REMIMP) = 0; 
 301   SAM('GOV','STAX')    = SUM(ACNT, SAM('STAX',ACNT)); 
 302   SAM('GOV','DTAX')    = SUM(ACNT, SAM('DTAX',ACNT)); 
 303  *Remove any small imbalances that remain 
 304   SAM(C,'DSTK') = SUM(ACNT, SAM(ACNT,C) - SAM(C,ACNT)) + SAM(C,'DSTK'); 
 305   SAM('DSTK','S-I') = SUM(ACNT, SAM(ACNT,'DSTK')); 
 306   SAM('S-I','ROW') = SAM('S-I','ROW') + SUM(ACNT, SAM(ACNT,'S-I')-SAM('S-I' 
      ,ACNT)); 
 307    
 308    
 309  *If aggregate switch is chosen then group all households together into one 
       category (HHD) 
 310  IF (AGGREGATE EQ 1, 
 311  *Aggregate existing households into HHD 
 312   SAM('HHD',ACNT) = SUM(H$(NOT HAGG(H)), SAM(H,ACNT)); 
 313   SAM(ACNT,'HHD') = SUM(H$(NOT HAGG(H)), SAM(ACNT,H)); 
 314  *Clear existing household accounts H 
 315   SAM(H,AC)$(NOT HAGG(H)) = 0; 
 316   SAM(AC,H)$(NOT HAGG(H)) = 0; 
 317  ); 
 318    
 319  *Remove re-exports from SAM (eliminates exports by reducing imports) 
 320   SAM('ROW',REEXPORT) = SAM('ROW',REEXPORT) - SAM(REEXPORT,'ROW') + 
SUM(A,  
      SAM(A,REEXPORT)); 
 321   SAM(REEXPORT,'ROW') = SUM(A, SAM(A,REEXPORT)); 
 322    
 323  *Aggregate agriculture and non-agriculture capital 
 324  SAM('CAPN',ACNT) = SAM('CAPA',ACNT)+SAM('CAPN',ACNT); 
 325  SAM(ACNT,'CAPN') = SAM(ACNT,'CAPA')+SAM(ACNT,'CAPN'); 
 326  SAM('CAPA',ACNT) = 0; 
 327  SAM(ACNT,'CAPA') = 0; 
 328    
 329    
 330  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      331    
 332  *$INCLUDE 1SAMBAL.INC 
 333    
 334  *Account totals are recomputed. Check for SAM balance. 
 335    
 336   SAM('TOTAL',AC) = 0; 
 337   SAM(AC,'TOTAL') = 0; 
 338    
 339   SAM('TOTAL',AC) = SUM(ACNT, SAM(ACNT,AC)); 
 340   SAM(AC,'TOTAL') = SUM(ACNT, SAM(AC,ACNT)); 
 341    
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 342  PARAMETER 
 343   BALCHK(AC) column minus row total for SAM after running SAMBAL; 
 344    
 345   BALCHK(AC)      = SAM('TOTAL',AC) - SAM(AC,'TOTAL'); 
 346    
 347   DISPLAY "After running SAMBAL", BALCHK; 
 348   DISPLAY "After running SAMBAL", SAM; 
 349    
 350  *Billions of Ghanaian Cedis 
 351  PARAMETER 
 352   SCALE           SCALING PARAMETER FOR SAM / 1 /; 
 353    
 354   SAM(AC,ACP) =  SAM(AC,ACP) * SCALE; 
 355    
 356  *Defining CINV using SAM data with potential user input. 
 357    
 358  *All commodities receiving payments from S-I are included in the set CINV. 
 359  *Note: Negative payments are for stock changes and should be treated 
 360  *as such. 
 361   CINV(C)$SAM(C,'S-I') = YES; 
 362    
 363  *!!- User option to exclude selected commodities from the set CINV. Only 
 364  *relevant for SAMs without the account DSTK. 
 365  *Example: 
 366  *If the set C includes a commodity called CWHEAT and payments in the cell 
 367  *SAM('CWHEAT','S-I') are for stock changes, the user should include 
 368  *the following line in the program: 
 369  * CINV('CWHEAT')  = NO; 
 370    
 371  DISPLAY CINV; 
 372    
 373  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      374  *3. ELASTICITIES --------------------------------------------------------- 
       375  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
      !!- In this section, the user inputs elasticities for trade, production, 
      and household consumption. If the user does not supply all required 
      data, missing data will be generated in STDMOD.GMS using simple 
      assumptions. 
 
 384    
 385  *Trade elasticities ----------------------------------------- 
 386    
 387  *SIGMAQ is the elasticity of substitution between imports 
 388  *and domestic output in domestic demand. 
 389  *SIGMAT is the elasticity of transformation for domestic 
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 390  *marketed output between exports and domestic supplies. 
 391    
 392  SET 
 393   TRDELAS  trade elasticities 
 394   / 
 395   SIGMAQ  Armington elasticity 
 396   SIGMAT  CET elasticity 
 397   REGIMP  regional import substitution elasticity 
 398   REGEXP  regional export substitution elasticity 
 399   / 
 400    
 401   PRDELAS  production elasticities 
 402   / 
 403   PRODELAS 
 404   PRODELAS2 
 405   / 
 406  ; 
 407    
 408  PARAMETER 
 409   TRADELAS(AC,TRDELAS)  Armington and CET elasticities by commodity 
 410   PRODELAS(A)     Elas of substit bt. factors - bottom of technology nest 
 411   PRODELASTAB(A,PRDELAS) 
 412   PRODELAS2(A)    Elas of substit bt. agg fac & intermed - top of tech nest 
 413   PRODELAS3(F,A)  Elasticity of substitution for higher layer factors 
 414   ELASAC(C)       Output aggregation elasticity for commodity C 
 415  ; 
 416    
 417  *Load trade elasticities 
--- LOAD  TRADELAS = 41:TRADELAS 
--- LOAD  PRODELASTAB = 42:PRODELASTAB 
 419    
 420  *Top-level elasticities 
 421   PRODELAS(A)        = PRODELASTAB(A,'PRODELAS'); 
 422  *Overwrite factor substitution to ensure exogenous sector growth rates 
 423   PRODELAS2(A)       = PRODELASTAB(A,'PRODELAS2'); 
 424  *Nested layer elasticities 
 425   PRODELAS3(F,A)     = 1.2; 
 426   PRODELAS3(FAGG,A)  = 1.5; 
 427    
 428  SET CNTRADE(C)   commodities with less flexible regional substitutbility / 
 429    
 430  /; 
 431    
 432  *Output aggregation function elasticity 
 433   ELASAC(C)       = 8.0; 
 434   ELASAC(CNTRADE) = 0.5; 
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 435    
 436  *Nested factor demand mappings ------------------------------------------- 
437    
 438  *Calculate all direct and indirect nested factors beneath each aggregate factor 
 439   TREE(F,FAGG)$(SMAX(FP, NEST(F,FP)) GT SMAX(FP, NEST(FP,FAGG))) = 1; 
 440   TREE(F,FAGG)$(NEST(F,FAGG) EQ SMAX(FP, NEST(FP,FAGG))) = 1; 
 441    
 442  *Assign disaggregated factors to existing factors set 
 443   FDIS(F)$SAM(F,'TOTAL') = YES; 
 444    
 445   FNEST(F,FP)$NEST(FP,F) = YES; 
 446   FTREE(F,FP,FPP)$(FDIS(FPP) AND TREE(FPP,FP) AND FNEST(F,FP)) = YES; 
 447   FTREE(F,FP,FP)$(FDIS(FP) AND FNEST(F,FP)) = YES; 
 448    
 449  *set default to true if SAM is true 
 450   MFA1(F,A)$SAM(F,A) = YES; 
 451  *set all nested factors to false 
 452   MFA1(F,A)$SUM(FAGG, TREE(F,FAGG)) = NO; 
 453  *set active labor category for top layer 
 454   MFA1(FAGG,A)$(SMAX(F, NEST(F,FAGG)) EQ 1) = YES; 
 455    
 456  *1st lower VA level (from top) 
 457   MFA2(F,FP,A)$(FNEST(F,FP) AND SUM(FPP$(FTREE(F,FP,FPP) AND NOT 
FAGG(FPP)) 
      , SAM(FPP,A))) = YES; 
 458    
 459  *Prevent nested functions for non-active activities 
 460   MFA1(F,A)$(NOT SAM('TOTAL',A))    = NO; 
 461   MFA2(F,FP,A)$(NOT SAM('TOTAL',A)) = NO; 
 462   MFA1(FAGG,A)$(NOT SUM(FP, MFA2(FAGG,FP,A))) = NO; 
 463    
 464  DISPLAY MFA1, MFA2; 
 465    
 466  *Household population data ----------------------------------------- 
 467    
 468  *Note: population data are not needed to run the model. 
 469  *However, they may be useful for verification of household 
 470  *model parameters and for report parameters. 
 471    
 472  PARAMETER 
 473   POP(H)          Base-year population for household h (units) 
 474   POPTAB(AC,*) 
 475  ; 
 476    
--- LOAD  POPTAB = 50:POPTAB 
 478    
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 479  IF (AGGREGATE EQ 1, 
 480   POPTAB('HHD','SURVEY') = SUM(H, POPTAB(H,'SURVEY')); 
 481   POPTAB(H,'SURVEY')$(NOT H('HHD')) = 0; 
 482  ); 
 483    
 484   POP(H) =  POPTAB(H,'SURVEY'); 
 485    
 486  *Household consumption elasticities ------------------------------- 
 487  *Note: The Frisch parameter is included in this section. 
 488    
 489  PARAMETERS 
 490   LESELAS1(H,C)    LES demand elasticities 
 491   FRISCH(H)        Frisch parameter for household LES demand 
 492   LESELAS2(A,C,H)  Exp'e elasticity of home dem by com - act - hhd 
 493  ; 
 494    
--- LOAD  LESELAS1 = 43:LESELAS1 
 496    
 497  IF (AGGREGATE EQ 1, 
 498   LESELAS1('HHD',C) = 0.9; 
 499   LESELAS1(H,C)$(NOT H('HHD')) = 0; 
 500  ); 
 501    
 502  *If LES elasticity missing in data then assign default value 
 503   LESELAS1(H,C)$(NOT LESELAS1(H,C)) = 0.9; 
 504    
 505   LESELAS2(A,C,H) =  0.9; 
 506   FRISCH(H)       = -1; 
 507    
 508  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
 509  *4. PHYSICAL FACTOR QUANTITIES AND FACTOR MARKET STRUCTURES -----
--------- 
  510  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      511    
 512  PARAMETER 
 513  *initial employment numbers 
 514   SWITCH             if using wage (1) employment (2) or SAM data (3) / 1 / 
 515   SAMUNIT            SAM unit in relation to wage units               / 1000 / 
 516   WAGEINFLATE        inflate wages to base year (ratio to one)        / 1 / 
 517   QFBASE(F,A)        sectoral employment data 
 518   WFBASE(F,A)        sectoral wage data 
 519   QFINPUT(F,AAG)     sectoral employment data 
 520   WFINPUT(F,AAG)     sectoral wage data 
 521   QFSBASE(AC)        total employment data 
 522   CHKWAGE(F,A)       check for missing wage data 
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 523   CHKEMP(F,*)        compare employment approach to wage approach 
 524  *capital initialisation 
 525   GRSCAPINC          gross capital income 
 526   CAPSTK             total capital stock 
 527   ACOR(F)            average capital-output ratio 
 528  *factor adjustments and labor closures 
 529   LABDIFFSCALE(F)    labor unit adjustment factor (to ensure working deltava) 
 530   LABSCALE           labor unit                                       / 1 / 
 531   etals(F)           elasticity of labor supply 
 532   CONVERGE0(F)       wage convergence parameter 
 533   CONVERGE(F)        wage convergence parameter 
 534  ; 
 535    
 536  *While these adjustments must be removed when computing results from the model 
 537  *but the adjustments reduce the substantial differences in value-added shares 
 538  *between especially skilled and unskilled workers 
 539    
 540   LABDIFFSCALE(F)     = 1; 
 541    
--- LOAD  QFINPUT = 44:QFINPUT 
--- LOAD  WFINPUT = 45:WFINPUT 
 543    
 544   QFBASE(F,A) = SUM(AAG$MAPAAGA(AAG,A), QFINPUT(F,AAG)); 
 545   WFBASE(F,A) = SUM(AAG$MAPAAGA(AAG,A), 
WFINPUT(F,AAG))*WAGEINFLATE; 
 546    
 547  *Ghana: scale land units to 1000 ha 
 548   QFBASE(FLND,A) = SUM(AAG$MAPAAGA(AAG,A), QFINPUT(FLND,AAG)) / 
1000; 
 549    
 550  *Adjustment factors 
 551   QFBASE(F,A)$(NOT SAM(F,A)) = 0; 
 552   WFBASE(F,A)$(NOT SAM(F,A)) = 0; 
 553    
 554  *The following code uses the wage data to determine employment 
 555  IF (SWITCH EQ 1, 
 556   CHKWAGE(FLAB,A)$(SAM(FLAB,A) AND (NOT WFBASE(FLAB,A))) = 1/0; 
 557   CHKEMP(FLAB,'EMPLOY-APP') = SUM(A, QFBASE(FLAB,A)); 
 558   QFBASE(FLAB,A)$WFBASE(FLAB,A) = SAM(FLAB,A) * SAMUNIT / 
WFBASE(FLAB,A); 
 559   CHKEMP(FLAB,'WAGE-APP') = SUM(A, QFBASE(FLAB,A)); 
 560   DISPLAY CHKWAGE, WFBASE, CHKEMP; 
 561  ); 
 562    
 563  IF (SWITCH EQ 3, 
 564   QFBASE(FLAB,A) = 0; 
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 565  ); 
 566    
 567  *Factor supply equals sum of factor employment 
 568   QFBASE(FLAB,A) = QFBASE(FLAB,A) * LABSCALE * LABDIFFSCALE(FLAB); 
 569    
 570  *Capital/output ratio (actually capital/value-added ratio) = 2 in South Africa 
 571   ACOR(FCAP)          =  4.0; 
 572    
 573  *Capital initialization 
 574   GRSCAPINC(FCAP)                           = SAM(FCAP,'TOTAL'); 
 575   CAPSTK(FCAP)$SUM(A, QFBASE(FCAP,A))       = SUM(A, QFBASE(FCAP,A)); 
 576   CAPSTK(FCAP)$(NOT SUM(A, QFBASE(FCAP,A))) = 
ACOR(FCAP)*SAM(FCAP,'TOTAL'); 
 577    
 578   QFBASE(FCAP,A)$(NOT QFBASE(FCAP,A))       = 
CAPSTK(FCAP)*(SAM(FCAP,A)/GRS 
      CAPINC(FCAP)); 
 579   QFSBASE(F) = SUM(A, QFBASE(F,A)); 
 580    
 581    
 582    
 583  *Labor supply elasticities ----------------------------------------- 
 584  *Add factors with flexible labor supply to the set FLS 
 585  *Set factor supply elasticity 
 586  SET 
 587   FLS(F)          factors with flexible supply / 
 588    
 589   /; 
 590    
 591  *Upward sloping supply curve not allowed for aggregate factors (automatic) 
 592   FLS(F)$(NOT FLAB(F)) = NO; 
 593  DISPLAY FLS; 
 594  *Set factor supply elasticity 
 595   etals(F)      = 1.2; 
 596    
 597  *Fixed relative wages ---------------------------------------------- 
 598  SET 
 599   LREL(F)       factor groups with fixed relative wages / 
 600    
 601   / 
 602  *Flexible factors first, fixed factors in parentheses 
 603   MAPRELW(F,FP) mapping between flexible and fixed factors / 
 604    
 605   /; 
 606    
 607  *fixing relative wages is not allowed for aggregate factors 
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 608   LREL(FAGG)      = NO; 
 609   LREL(FLS)       = NO; 
 610  *fixing relative wages is not allowed for aggregate factors 
 611   MAPRELW(FAGG,F) = NO; 
 612   MAPRELW(F,FAGG) = NO; 
 613    
 614  *Set convergence rate between flexible and fixed factors' real wages 
 615  *e.g. 0.01 is an annual 1 percent convergence 
 616   CONVERGE0(F) = 0.00; 
 617   CONVERGE(F)  = CONVERGE0(F); 
 618    
 619  display lrel ; 
 620  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       621  *5. COMMODITY VALUE SHARES FOR HOME CONSUMPTION ------------------- 
       622  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      623    
 624  PARAMETER 
 625   shrhome(A,C,H) value share for comm'y c in home cons of hhd h from act a 
 626  ; 
 627    
 628   shrhome(A,C,H) = 0; 
 629    
 630    
 631  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
 632  *6. INITIALIZATION OF TAX DATA ------------------------------------------- 
       633  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
634    
 635  SET 
 636   TX  taxes in the model 
 637   / 
 638   INSTAX         direct taxes on domestic institutions 
 639   FACTAX         direct factor taxes 
 640   IMPTAX         import taxes 
 641   EXPTAX         export taxes 
 642   VATAX          value-added taxes 
 643   ACTTAX         taxes on activity revenue 
 644   COMTAX         taxes on commodity sales in domestic market 
 645   / 
 646  ; 
 647    
 648  PARAMETER 
 649   TAXPAR(TX,AC)   payment by account ac to tax account tx 
 650   ; 
 651    
 652  *direct taxes on domestic institutions 
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 653   TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSD)  = SAM('DTAX',INSD); 
 654  *direct factor taxes 
 655   TAXPAR('FACTAX',F)     = SAM('DTAX',F); 
 656  *import taxes 
 657  *TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)     = 0; 
 658   TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)     = SAM('MTAX',C); 
 659  *export taxes 
 660  *TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)     =0; 
 661  TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)     = SAM('ETAX',C); 
 662  *value-added taxes 
 663   TAXPAR('VATAX',A)      = 0; 
 664  *TAXPAR('VATAX',A)      = SAM('VATAX',A); 
 665  *taxes on activity revenue 
 666   TAXPAR('ACTTAX',A)     = SAM('ETAX',A); 
 667  *taxes on commodity sales in domestic market 
 668   TAXPAR('COMTAX',C)     = SAM('STAX',C); 
 669    
 670  PARAMETER 
 671   REGCUTOFF       minimum regional trade share                / 0.00 / 
 672   REGIMP(C,R)     regional imports values 
 673   REGTAR(C,R)     regional tariff values 
 674   REGEXP(C,R)     regional imports values 
 675   REGETX(C,R)     regional tariff values 
 676  ; 
 677    
--- LOAD  REGIMP = 46:REGIMP 
--- LOAD  REGTAR = 47:REGTAR 
--- LOAD  REGEXP = 48:REGEXP 
--- LOAD  REGETX = 49:REGETX 
 679    
 680  *Remove regioanl imports if no national imports in SAM 
 681   REGIMP(C,R)$(NOT SAM('ROW',C)) = 0; 
 682  *Remove small import shares 
 683   REGIMP(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGIMP(C,RP)) = REGIMP(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGIMP(C,RP)); 
 684   REGIMP(C,R)$(REGIMP(C,R) LT REGCUTOFF) = 0; 
 685  *Remove regional tariffs if no regional trade 
 686   REGTAR(C,R)$(NOT REGIMP(C,R))  = 0; 
 687  *If no regional trade data then assign to ROW 
 688   REGIMP(C,'ROW')$(NOT SUM(R, REGIMP(C,R))) = 100; 
 689   REGTAR(C,'ROW')$((NOT SUM(R, REGTAR(C,R))) AND SUM(R, REGIMP(C,R))) = 
100 ; 
 690  *Recalculate shares 
 691   REGIMP(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGIMP(C,RP)) = REGIMP(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGIMP(C,RP)); 
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 692   REGTAR(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGTAR(C,RP)) = REGTAR(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGTAR(C,RP)); 
 693    
 694  *Remove regioanl imports if no national imports in SAM 
 695   REGEXP(C,R)$(NOT SAM('ROW',C)) = 0; 
 696  *Remove small import shares 
 697   REGEXP(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGEXP(C,RP)) = REGEXP(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGEXP(C,RP)); 
 698   REGEXP(C,R)$(REGEXP(C,R) LT REGCUTOFF) = 0; 
 699  *Remove regional tariffs if no regional trade 
 700   REGETX(C,R)$(NOT REGEXP(C,R))  = 0; 
 701  *If no regional trade data then assign to ROW 
 702   REGEXP(C,'ROW')$(NOT SUM(R, REGEXP(C,R))) = 100; 
 703   REGETX(C,'ROW')$((NOT SUM(R, REGETX(C,R))) AND SUM(R, REGEXP(C,R))) = 
100 
      ; 
 704  *Recalculate shares 
 705   REGEXP(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGEXP(C,RP)) = REGEXP(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGEXP(C,RP)); 
 706   REGETX(C,R)$SUM(RP, REGETX(C,RP)) = REGETX(C,R) / SUM(RP, 
REGETX(C,RP)); 
 707    
 708  DISPLAY REGIMP, REGTAR, REGEXP, REGETX; 
 709    
 710  *SAM adjustments ---------------------------------------------------- 
 711    
 712  *In this section, some minor adjustments are made in the SAM (when 
 713  *needed) to fit the model structure. 
 714    
 715  *Adjustment for sectors with only exports and no domestic sales. 
 716  *If there is a very small value for domestic sales, add the discrepancy 
 717  *to exports. 
 718    
 719  *Netting transfers between domestic institutions and RoW. 
 720   SAM(INSD,'ROW')   = SAM(INSD,'ROW') - SAM('ROW',INSD); 
 721   SAM('ROW',INSD)   = 0; 
 722    
 723  *Netting transfers between factors and RoW. 
 724   SAM('ROW',F)  = SAM('ROW',F) - SAM(F,'ROW'); 
 725   SAM(F,'ROW')  = 0; 
 726    
 727  *Netting transfers between government and domestic non- 
 728  *government institutions. 
 729   SAM(INSDNG,'GOV') = SAM(INSDNG,'GOV') - SAM('GOV',INSDNG); 
 730   SAM('GOV',INSDNG) = 0; 
 731    
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 732  *Netting out re-exports of osrv 
 733   SAM('COSRV','ROW') = SAM('COSRV','ROW') - SAM('ROW','COSRV'); 
 734   SAM('ROW','COSRV') = 0 ; 
 735  *Eliminating payments of any account to itself. 
 736   SAM(ACNT,ACNT) = 0; 
 737    
 738  *Checking SAM balance ------------------------------------------------ 
 739    
 740  *Account totals are recomputed. Check for SAM balance. 
 741   SAM('TOTAL',ACNT) = SUM(ACNTP, SAM(ACNTP,ACNT)); 
 742   SAM(ACNT,'TOTAL') = SUM(ACNTP, SAM(ACNT,ACNTP)); 
 743    
 744   SAMBALCHK(AC)   = SAM('TOTAL',AC) - SAM(AC,'TOTAL'); 
 745    
 746   DISPLAY "SAM after final adjustments", SAMBALCHK; 
 747   DISPLAY "SAM after final adjustments", SAM; 
 748    
 749  *Additional set definitions based on country SAM --------------------- 
 750    
 751  *CD is the set for commodities with domestic sales of domestic output 
 752  *i.e., for which (value of sales at producer prices) 
 753  *              > (value of exports at producer prices) 
 754    
 755   CD(C)  = YES$(SUM(A, SAM(A,C)) GT (SAM(C,'ROW') - TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C) - 
SU 
      M(CTE, SAM(CTE,C)))); 
 756   CDN(C) = NOT CD(C); 
 757    
 758   CE(C)  = YES$(SAM(C,'ROW')); 
 759   CEN(C) = NOT CE(C); 
 760   CER(C,R)$(CE(C) AND REGEXP(C,R)) = YES; 
 761    
 762   CM(C)  = YES$(SAM('ROW',C)); 
 763   CMN(C) = NOT CM(C); 
 764   CMR(C,R)$(CM(C) AND REGIMP(C,R)) = YES; 
 765    
 766   CX(C) = YES$SUM(A, SAM(A,C)); 
 767    
 768   CT(C)$(SUM(CTD, SAM(C,CTD)) + SUM(CTE, SAM(C,CTE)) + SUM(CTM, 
SAM(C,CTM)) 
      )  = YES; 
 769    
 770  display cm, cmn; 
 771    
 772  *Ghana (sectors with residual exports instead of CET) 
 773  SET CERES(C) / 
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 774  * coexp 
 775  * conut 
 776  * cfrue 
 777  * cvege 
 778  * ccoco 
 779   cfore 
 780   cmine 
 781   /; 
 782    
 783    
 784  *If activity has no intermediate inputs, then Leontief function has to 
 785  *be used at the top of the technology nest 
 786    
 787   ACES(A)$(NOT SUM(C, SAM(C,A))) = NO; 
 788   ALEO(A)$(NOT ACES(A)) = YES; 
 789    
 790    
 791  DISPLAY 
 792   C, CAGR, CNAGR, R, CD, CDN, CE, CEN, CER, CM, CMN, CMR, CX, CT, ACES, 
ALE 
      O, FLS; 
 793    
 794    
 795  *Fine-tuning non-SAM data ------------------------------------------- 
 796    
 797  *Generating missing data for home consumption --- 
 798    
 799  *If SAM includes home consumption but NO data were provided for SHRHOME, 
 800  *data are generated assuming that the value shares for home consumption 
 801  *are identical to activity output value shares. 
 802    
 803  IF(SUM((A,H), SAM(A,H)) AND NOT SUM((A,C,H), SHRHOME(A,C,H)), 
 804    
 805   SHRHOME(A,C,H)$(SAM(A,H) AND SUM(CP, SAM(A,CP))) = SAM(A,C)/SUM(CP, 
SAM(A ,CP)); 
 806    
 807  DISPLAY 
 808   "Default data used for SHRHOME -- data missing" 
 809   SHRHOME 
 810   ; 
 811  *End IF statement 
 812   ); 
 813    
 814  *Eliminating superfluous elasticity data ------- 
 815    
 816   TRADELAS(C,'SIGMAT')$(CEN(C) OR (CE(C) AND CDN(C))) = 0; 
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 817   TRADELAS(C,'SIGMAQ')$(CMN(C) OR (CM(C) AND CDN(C))) = 0; 
 818    
 819   PRODELAS(A)$(NOT SAM('TOTAL',A))     = 0; 
 820    
 821   ELASAC(C)$(NOT SUM(A, SAM(A,C)))     = 0; 
 822    
 823   LESELAS1(H,C)$(NOT SAM(C,H))         = 0; 
 824   LESELAS2(A,C,H)$(NOT SHRHOME(A,C,H)) = 0; 
 825    
 826    
 827  *Diagnostics ------------------------------------ 
 828    
 829  *Include file that displays and generates information that may be 
 830  *useful when debugging data set. 
 831  *$INCLUDE 1DIAGNOSTICS.INC 
 832    
 833  *Physical factor quantities --------------------- 
 834    
 835  PARAMETER 
 836   QF2BASE(F,A)  qnty of fac f employed by act a (extracted data) 
 837   ; 
 838  *If there is a SAM payment from A to F and supply (but not 
 839  *demand) quantities have been defined in the country data file, 
 840  *then the supply values are used to compute demand quantities. 
 841   QF2BASE(F,A)$(SAM(F,A)$((NOT QFBASE(F,A))$QFSBASE(F))) 
 842     = QFSBASE(F)*SAM(F,A)/SUM(AP, SAM(F,AP)); 
 843    
 844  *If there is a SAM payment from A to F and neither supply nor 
 845  *demand quantities have been defined in the country data file, 
 846  *then SAM values are used as quantities 
 847   QF2BASE(F,A)$(SAM(F,A)$((QFBASE(F,A) EQ 0)$(QFSBASE(F) EQ 0))) 
 848                                                      = SAM(F,A); 
 849    
 850  *If there is a SAM payment from A to F and demand quantities have 
 851  *been defined in the country data file, then this information is used. 
 852   QF2BASE(F,A)$QFBASE(F,A) = QFBASE(F,A); 
 853    
 854  DISPLAY QF2BASE, QFBASE, QFSBASE; 
 855    
 856  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       857  *3. PARAMETER DECLARATIONS ----------------------------------------------- 
      858  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
859    
      This section is divided into the following subsections: 
      a. Parameters appearing in model equations 
      b. Parameters used for model calibration (to initialize variables and 
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         to define model parameters) 
      In each group, the parameters are declared in alphabetical order. 
 867    
 868  PARAMETERS 
 869    
 870  *a. Parameters appearing in model equations --------------- 
 871    
 872  *Parameters other than tax rates 
 873   alphaa(A)         shift parameter for top level CES function 
 874   alphaac(C)        shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation fn 
 875   alphae(C)         shift parameter for regional exports aggregation fn 
 876   alpham(C)         shift parameter for regional imports aggregation fn 
 877   alphaq(C)         shift parameter for Armington function 
 878   alphat(C)         shift parameter for CET function 
 879   alphava(A)        shift parameter for CES activity production function 
 880   alphava2(F,A)     Lower level factor nesting parameter 
 881   betah(A,C,H)      marg shr of hhd cons on home com c from act a 
 882   betam(C,H)        marg share of hhd cons on marketed commodity c 
 883   cwts(C)           consumer price index weights 
 884   deltaa(A)         share parameter for top level CES function 
 885   deltaac(A,C)      share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation fn 
 886   deltaq(C,R)       share parameter for Armington function 
 887   deltat(C,R)       share parameter for CET function 
 888   deltava(F,A)      share parameter for CES activity production function 
 889   deltava2(F,FP,A)  lower level factor nesting parameter 
 890   dwts(C)           domestic sales price weights 
 891   gammah(A,C,H)     per-cap subsist cons for hhd h on home com c fr act a 
 892   gammam(C,H)       per-cap subsist cons of marketed com c for hhd h 
 893   ica(C,A)          intermediate input c per unit of aggregate intermediate 
 894   inta(A)           aggregate intermediate input coefficient 
 895   iva(A)            aggregate value added coefficient 
 896   icd(C,CP)         trade input of c per unit of comm'y cp produced & sold  
      dom'ly 
 897   ice(C,CP)         trade input of c per unit of comm'y cp exported 
 898   icm(C,CP)         trade input of c per unit of comm'y cp imported 
 899   mps01(INS)        0-1 par for potential flexing of savings rates 
 900   mpsbar(INS)       marg prop to save for dom non-gov inst ins (exog part) 
 901   qdst(C)           inventory investment by sector of origin 
 902   qbarg(C,GOVF)     exogenous (unscaled) government demand by government fu 
      nction 
 903   qbarinv(C)        exogenous (unscaled) investment demand 
 904   rhoa(A)           CES top level function exponent 
 905   rhoac(C)          domestic commodity aggregation function exponent 
 906   rhoe(C)           regional export CES function exponent 
 907   rhom(C)           regional import CES function exponent 
 908   rhoq(C)           Armington function exponent 
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 909   rhot(C)           CET function exponent 
 910   rhova(A)          CES activity production function exponent 
 911   rhova2(F,A)       Lower level factor nesting parameter 
 912   shif(INS,F)       share of dom. inst'on i in income of factor f 
 913   shifN(INS,F)       share of dom. inst'on i in income of factor f 
 914   shii(INS,INSP)    share of inst'on i in post-tax post-sav income of inst  
      ip 
 915   supernum(H)       LES supernumerary income 
 916   theta(A,C)        yield of commodity C per unit of activity A 
 917   tins01(INS)       0-1 par for potential flexing of dir tax rates 
 918   trnsfr(INS,AC)    transfers fr. inst. or factor ac to institution ins 
 919   tq01(C)           0-1 par for potential fixing of commodity sales taxes 
 920   tqbar(c)          exogenous (unscaled) sales tax rate 
 921   INSTQ             index of institutional quality 
 922    
 923  *Tax rates (sales tax is endogenous) 
 924   ta(A)             rate of tax on producer gross output value 
 925   te(C,R)           rate of tax on exports 
 926   ter(C,R)          rate of tax on regional exports 
 927   tf(F)             rate of direct tax on factors (soc sec tax) 
 928   tinsbar(INS)      rate of (exog part of) direct tax on dom inst ins 
 929   tm(C,R)           rate of import tariff 
 930   tva(A)            rate of value-added tax 
 931    
 932   fprd0(F,A)        productivity of factor f in act a 
 933   fprd(F,A)         productivity of factor f in act a 
 934   ; 
 935    
 936  *b. Parameters used for model calibration ----------------- 
 937    
 
      For model calibration, one parameter is created for each model variable 
      with the suffix "0" added to the variable name. 0 is also added to the 
      names of parameters whose values are changed in experiments. 
 
 945    
 946  PARAMETERS 
 947  v 
 948  *Parameters for definition of model parameters 
 949   alphae0(C)        shift parameter for regional export aggregation fn 
 950   alpham0(C)        shift parameter for regional import aggregation fn 
 951   alphava0(A)       shift parameter for CES activity production function 
 952   qdst0(C)          stock change 
 953   qbarg0(C,GOVF)    exogenous (unscaled) government demand 
 954   gammah0(A,C,H)    per-cap subsist cons for hhd h on home com c fr act a 
 955   gammam0(C,H)      per-cap subsist cons of marketed com c for hhd h 
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 956   alphaq0(C)        shift parameter for Armington function 
 957   deltaq0(C,R)      share parameter for CET function 
 958   alphat0(C)        shift parameter for Armington function 
 959   deltat0(C,R)      share parameter for CET function 
 960    
 961   ta0(A)            rate of tax on producer gross output value 
 962   te0(C,R)          rate of tax on exports 
 963   tf0(F)            rate of direct tax on factors (soc sec tax) 
 964   tins0(INS)        rate of direct tax on domestic institutions ins 
 965   tm0(C,R)          rate of import tariff 
 966   tva0(A)           rate of value-added tax 
 967    
 968  *Check parameters 
 969    cwtschk          check that CPI weights sum to unity 
 970    dwtschk          check that PDIND weights sum to unity 
 971    shifchk          check that factor payment shares sum to unity 
 972    
 973  *Parameters for variable initialization 
 974    CPI0             consumer price index (PQ-based) 
 975    DPI0             index for domestic producer prices (PDS-based) 
 976    DMPS0            change in marginal propensity to save for selected inst 
 977    DTINS0           change in domestic institution tax share 
 978    DTQ0             change in sales tax rate 
 979    EG0              total current government expenditure 
 980    EH0(H)           household consumption expenditure 
 981    EXR0             exchange rate 
 982    FSAV0            foreign savings 
 983    GADJ0(GOVF)      government demand scaling factor by function 
 984    MGADJ0           government demand scaling factor 
 985    GOVSHR0(GOVF)    govt consumption share of absorption by function 
 986    MGOVSHR0         govt consumption share of absorption 
 987    GSAV0            government savings 
 988    GDEFGDP0         government deficit as a percentage of GDP 
 989    IADJ0            investment scaling factor (for fixed capital formation) 
 990    INVSHR0          investment share of absorption 
 991    MPS0(INS)        marginal propensity to save for dom non-gov inst ins 
 992    MPSADJ0          savings rate scaling factor 
 993    PA0(A)           output price of activity a 
 994    PDD0(C)          demand price for com'y c produced & sold domestically 
 995    PDS0(C)          supply price for com'y c produced & sold domestically 
 996    PE0(C,R)         price of exports 
 997    PINTA0(A)        price of intermediate aggregate 
 998    PM0(C,R)         price of imports 
 999    PQ0(C)           price of composite good c 
1000    PVA0(A)          value added price 
1001    PWE0(C,R)        world price of exports 
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1002    PWM0(C,R)        world price of imports 
1003    PX0(C)           average output price 
1004    PXAC0(A,C)       price of commodity c from activity a 
1005    QA0(A)           level of domestic activity 
1006    QD0(C)           quantity of domestic sales 
1007    QE0(C,R)         quantity of exports 
1008    QF0(F,A)         quantity demanded of factor f from activity a 
1009    QFS0(F)          quantity of factor supply 
1010    QG0(C,GOVF)      quantity of government consumption by government function 
1011    QH0(C,H)         quantity consumed of marketed commodity c by hhd h 
1012    QHA0(A,C,H)      quantity consumed of home commodity c fr act a by hhd h 
1013    QINT0(C,A)       quantity of intermediate demand for c from activity a 
1014    QINTA0(A)        quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
1015    QINV0(C)         quantity of fixed investment demand 
1016    QM0(C,R)         quantity of imports 
1017    QQ0(C)           quantity of composite goods supply 
1018    QT0(C)           quantity of trade and transport demand for commodity c 
1019    QVA0(A)          quantity of aggregate value added 
1020    QX0(C)           quantity of aggregate marketed commodity output 
1021    QXAC0(A,C)       quantity of ouput of commodity c from activity a 
1022    TABS0            total absorption 
1023    TINS0(INS)       rate of direct tax on domestic institutions ins 
1024    TINSADJ0         direct tax scaling factor 
1025    TQ0(C)           sales tax rate 
1026    TQADJ0           scaled sales tax adjustment factor 
1027    TRII0(INS,INSP)  transfers to dom. inst. insdng from insdngp 
1028    WALRAS0          savings-investment imbalance (should be zero) 
1029    WF0(F)           economy-wide wage (rent) for factor f 
1030    WFREAL0(F)       real wage (rent) for factor f 
1031    WFDIST0(F,A)     factor wage distortion variable 
1032    YF0(f)           factor income 
1033    YG0              total current government income 
1034    YIF0(INS,F)      income of institution ins from factor f 
1035    YI0(INS)         income of (domestic non-governmental) institution ins 
1036    
1037  *Capital stock updating parameters (only used in the simulation file) 
1038    DKAP(FCAP,A)     change in sectoral real capital stock 
1039    DKAPS(FCAP)      change in aggregate real capital stock 
1040    PKAP(FCAP)       price of aggregate capital good by sector of destination 
1041    CAPSHR1(FCAP)    shares of aggregate capital by type (sums to one) 
1042    CAPSHR2(FCAP,A)  sectoral shares of capital by type (rows sum to one) 
1043    CAPSHR1TOT       used to speed up capital accumulation calculations 
1044    CAPSHR2TOT(FCAP) used to speed up capital accumulation calculations 
1045    BMAT(C,FCAP)     shares of investment goods in aggregate capital by type 
1046    BMATTOT          used to speed up capital accumulation calculations 
1047    GFCF             gross fixed capital formation 
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1048    RKAP(FCAP,A)     annual rate of growth of sectoral capital stock by type 
1049    RKAPS(FCAP)      annual rate of growth of aggregate capital stock by type 
1050    WFK1AV           average rental on all capital (economywide) 
1051    WFK2AV(FCAP)     average rental on capital by type (across all activities) 
1052    WFDIST2(FCAP,A)  ratio of sectoral to average rental by capital type 
1053    INVSHR1(FCAP)    investment shares by type of capital 
1054    INVSHR2(FCAP,A)  investment shares by sector for each capital type 
1055    NGFCF            GFCF net of exogenous capital adjustments in fixed sectors 
1056    WFDISTADJ(F,A)   WFDIST adjusted to exclude fixed sectors 
1057    WFADJ(F)         WF adjusted to exclude fixed sectors 
1058    beta1            capital mobility parameter by type       / 2.00 / 
1059    beta2            capital mobility by sector                      / 2.00 / 
1060    INSTQ            index of institutional quality                /6.0  / 
1061  ; 
1062    
1063  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1064  *4. PARAMETER DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------ 
     1065  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1066    
1067    
1068  *All parameters are defined, divided into the same blocks as the 
1069  *equations. 
1070    
1071  *Price block ------------------------------------ 
1072    
      The prices PDS, PX, and PE  may be initialized at any desired price. 
      The user may prefer to initialize these prices at unity or, if 
      he/she is interested in tracking commodity flows in physical units, at 
      commodity-specific, observed prices (per physical unit). For any given 
      commodity, these three prices should be identical. Initialization at 
      observed prices may be attractive for disaggregated agricultural 
      commodities. If so, the corresponding quantity values reflect physical 
      units (given the initial price). 
 
      The remaining supply-side price, PXAC, and the non-commodity prices, EXR 
      and PA may be initialized at any desired level. In practice, it may be 
      preferable to initialize PXAC at the relevant supply-side price and EXR 
      and PA at unity. 
 
      If physical units are used, the user should select the unit (tons vs. 
      '000 tons) so that initial price and quantity variables are reasonably 
      scaled (for example between 1.0E-2 and 1.0E+3) -- bad scaling may cause 
      solver problems. Initialization at unity should cause no problem as long 
      as the initial SAM is reasonably scaled. 
1094    
1095  PARAMETER 
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1096  * PSUP(C)                 initial supply-side market price for commodity c 
1097  * PSUPA(AAG)              initial supply-side market price for commodity c 
1098   PRODUCTION(A,*)         production quantity information used to calibrate 
       initial activity prices 
1099  * prodshr(a) 
1100  ; 
1101    
1102  *$ONTEXT 
--- LOAD  PRODUCTION = 53:PRODUCTION 
1104    
1105   PA0(A)       = 1; 
1106   PA0(A)$PRODUCTION(A,'PROD') = SAM('TOTAL',A) / 
(PRODUCTION(A,'PROD')/1000 
      ); 
1107  * PA0(AAGR) = 2; 
1108    
1109  * prodshr(a)$SUM((AAG,AP)$(MAPAAGA(AAG,A) AND MAPAAGA(AAG,AP)), 
SAM('TOTAL 
      ',AP)) = SAM('TOTAL',A)/SUM((AAG,AP)$(MAPAAGA(AAG,A) AND 
MAPAAGA(AAG,AP)), 
       SAM('TOTAL',AP)); 
1110  * PSUPA(AAG) = SUM(A$MAPAAGA(AAG,A), PRODSHR(A)*PA0(A)); 
1111    
1112  * PSUP(C) = SUM((AAG,A)$(MAPAAGA(AAG,A) AND MAPA2C(AAG,C)), 
PRODSHR(A)*PA0 
      (A)); 
1113    
1114  * PSUP(C) = 1; 
1115  * PE0(C,R)$CER(C,R)   = PSUP(C); 
1116  * PX0(C)$CX(C)        = PSUP(C); 
1117  * PDS0(C)$CD(C)       = PSUP(C); 
1118  * PXAC0(A,C)$SAM(A,C) = PSUP(C); 
1119    
1120    
1121    
       PA0(A)              = 1; 
       PSUP(C)             = 1; 
       PE0(C,R)$CER(C,R)   = PSUP(C); 
       PX0(C)$CX(C)        = PSUP(C); 
       PDS0(C)$CD(C)       = PSUP(C); 
       PXAC0(A,C)$SAM(A,C) = PSUP(C); 
1130    
      The exchange rate may be initialized at unity, in which case all data are 
      in foreign currency units (FCU; e.g., dollars). Set the exchange rate at 
      another value to differentiate foreign exchange transactions, which will 
      be valued in FCU, and domestic transactions valued in local currency 
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      units (LCU). The SAM is assumed to be valued in LCU, and the exchange rate 
      is then used to calculate FCU values for transactions with the rest of the 
      world. 
1140    
1141   EXR0          = 9073 ; 
1142    
1143  *Activity quantity = payment to activity divided by activity price 
1144  *QA covers both on-farm consumption and marketed output 
1145  *output GROSS of tax 
1146   QA0(A)        =  SAM('TOTAL',A)/PA0(A) ; 
1147    
1148  *Output quantity = value received by producers divided by producer 
1149  *price 
1150  *QX covers only marketed output 
1151  * QX0(C)$SUM(A, SAM(A,C)) =  SUM(A, SAM(A,C)) / PX0(C); 
1152    
1153   QX0(C) =  SUM((AAG,A)$(MAPAAGA(AAG,A) AND MAPA2C(AAG,C)), QA0(A)); 
1154   PX0(C)$QX0(C) =  SUM(A, SAM(A,C)) / QX0(C); 
1155    
1156   PE0(C,R)$CER(C,R)   = PX0(C); 
1157   PDS0(C)$CD(C)       = PX0(C); 
1158   PXAC0(A,C)$SAM(A,C) = PX0(C); 
1159    
1160  *Unit value-added price = total value-added / activity quantity 
1161  *define pva gross of tax 
1162   QVA0(A)         =  (SUM(F, SAM(F,A))+ TAXPAR('VATAX',A)) ; 
1163   PVA0(A)$QVA0(A) =  (SUM(F, SAM(F,A))+ TAXPAR('VATAX',A))/QVA0(A); 
1164   iva(A)$QA0(A)   =  QVA0(A)/QA0(A) ; 
1165   QXAC0(A,C)$SAM(A,C) = SAM(A,C) / PXAC0(A,C); 
1166    
1167   QHA0(A,C,H)$SHRHOME(A,C,H) = SHRHOME(A,C,H)*SAM(A,H)/PXAC0(A,C); 
1168    
1169    
1170  *display PA0,  prodshr, PSUPA, PSUP; 
1171    
1172    
1173  *Export quantity = export revenue received by producers 
1174  *(ie. minus tax and transactions cost) divided by 
1175  *export price. 
1176  PARAMETER 
1177   TRESHR(C,R) 
1178  ; 
1179    
1180   TRESHR(C,R)$SUM(RP, 
SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,RP)+TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)*REGETX(C 
      ,RP)) 
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1181           = (SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,R)+TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)*REGETX(C,R)) / 
SUM 
      (RP, SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,RP)+TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)*REGETX(C,RP)); 
1182    
1183   QE0(C,R)$CER(C,R) = (SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,R) 
1184                    - TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)*REGETX(C,R) 
1185                    - SUM(CTE, SAM(CTE,C))*TRESHR(C,R) )/PE0(C,R); 
1186    
1187  * QE0(C)$SAM(C,'ROW') 
1188  *    =  (SAM(C,'ROW') - TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C) - SUM(CTE, SAM(CTE,C)))/PE0(C); 
1189    
1190  *RoW export price = RoW export payment (in for curr) / export qnty 
1191   PWE0(C,R)$CER(C,R)  = (SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,R)/EXR0) / QE0(C,R); 
1192    
1193   te0(C,R)$(SAM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,R)) = 
(TAXPAR('EXPTAX',C)*REGETX(C,R))/(S 
      AM(C,'ROW')*REGEXP(C,R)); 
1194   te(C,R)               = te0(C,R); 
1195  *te0(C,R)              =0; 
1196  *Quantity of output sold domestically = output quantity less quantity 
1197  *exported = value of domestic sales divided by domestic supply price 
1198  *QD0 covers only marketed output 
1199   QD0(C)$CD(C) =  QX0(C) - SUM(R, QE0(C,R)); 
1200    
1201  *Domestic demander price = demander payment divided by quantity bought 
1202   PDD0(C)$QD0(C)= (PDS0(C)*QD0(C) + SUM(CTD, SAM(CTD,C)))/QD0(C); 
1203    
1204  *Define import price to equal domestic price so that import and domestic 
1205  *units are the same to the purchaser. If no domestic good, set PM to 1. 
1206   PM0(C,R)$CMR(C,R) = PDD0(C) ; 
1207   PM0(C,R)$(QD0(C) EQ 0)  = 1 ; 
1208    
1209  *Import quantity = demander payment for imports (including tariffs 
1210  *and marketing cost) divided by demander price. 
1211  PARAMETER 
1212   TRMSHR(C,R) 
1213  ; 
1214    
1215   TRMSHR(C,R)$SUM(RP, 
SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,RP)+TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)*REGTAR(C 
      ,RP)) 
1216           = (SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,R)+TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)*REGTAR(C,R)) / 
SUM 
      (RP, SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,RP)+TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)*REGTAR(C,RP)); 
1217    
1218   QM0(C,R)$CMR(C,R) = (SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,R) 
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1219                    + TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)*REGTAR(C,R) 
1220                    + SUM(CTM, SAM(CTM,C))*TRMSHR(C,R) )/PM0(C,R); 
1221    
1222  *World price = import value (in foreign currency / import quantity) 
1223   PWM0(C,R)$CMR(C,R)                  = (SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,R)/EXR0) / Q 
      M0(C,R); 
1224   tm0(C,R)$(SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,R)) =  
(TAXPAR('IMPTAX',C)*REGTAR(C,R)) / 
       (SAM('ROW',C)*REGIMP(C,R)); 
1225   tm(C,R)                             = tm0(C,R); 
1226    
1227  *Composite supply is the sum of domestic market sales and imports 
1228  *(since they are initialized at the same price). 
1229   QQ0(C)$(CD(C) OR CM(C)) = QD0(C) + SUM(R, QM0(C,R)) ; 
1230   PQ0(C)$QQ0(C) = (SAM(C,'TOTAL') - SAM(C,'ROW'))/QQ0(C); 
1231   TQ0(C)$QQ0(C) = TAXPAR('COMTAX',C)/(PQ0(C)*QQ0(C)) ; 
1232   tqbar(C)      = TQ0(C) ; 
1233    
1234  *The following code works when for any number of sectors providing 
1235  *transactions services, as well as for the case when they are not 
1236  *in the SAM. 
1237    
1238  PARAMETERS 
1239   SHCTD(C)  share of comm'y ct in trans services for domestic sales 
1240   SHCTM(C)  share of comm'y ct in trans services for imports 
1241   SHCTE(C)  share of comm'y ct in trans services for exports 
1242    ; 
1243    
1244   SHCTD(CT) = SUM(CTD, SAM(CT,CTD)/SAM('TOTAL',CTD)) ; 
1245   SHCTM(CT) = SUM(CTM, SAM(CT,CTM)/SAM('TOTAL',CTM)) ; 
1246   SHCTE(CT) = SUM(CTE, SAM(CT,CTE)/SAM('TOTAL',CTE)) ; 
1247    
1248  *Transactions input coefficients 
1249   icd(CT,C)$QD0(c) = (shctd(ct)*SUM(CTD, SAM(CTD,C))/PQ0(ct)) / QD0(C); 
1250    
1251   icm(CT,C)$SUM(R, QM0(C,R)) = (shctm(ct)*SUM(CTM, SAM(CTM,C))/PQ0(ct)) / S 
      UM(R, QM0(C,R)); 
1252    
1253   ice(CT,C)$SUM(R, QE0(C,R)) = (shcte(ct)*SUM(CTE, SAM(CTE,C))/PQ0(ct)) / S 
      UM(R, QE0(C,R)); 
1254    
1255  *Indirect activity tax rate = tax payment / output value 
1256  *Tax is here applied to total output value (incl. on-farm cons.) 
1257   tva0(A)$(PVA0(A)*QVA0(A)) = TAXPAR('VATAX',A) / (PVA0(A)*QVA0(A)); 
1258   tva(A)        = tva0(A); 
1259    
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1260    
1261  *QA is GROSS of tax, so base for ta is as well 
1262   ta0(A)$SAM(A,'TOTAL') = TAXPAR('ACTTAX',A) / (SAM(A,'TOTAL')); 
1263   ta(A)         = ta0(A); 
1264    
1265  *Yield coefficient 
1266  * = quantity produced (including home-consumed output) 
1267  *   /activity quantity 
1268   theta(A,C)$PXAC0(A,C) 
1269    = ( (SAM(A,C) + SUM(H, SHRHOME(A,C,H)*SAM(A,H)) ) / PXAC0(A,C) ) / QA0(A 
      ); 
1270    
1271  * LEOAGGINT(A)$ALEO(A).. PINTA(A)*QINTA(A) =E= inta(A)*PA(A)*QA(A) ; 
1272  * INTDEM(C,A)$ica(C,A).. PQ(C)*QINT(C,A) =E= ica(C,A)*PINTA(A)*QINTA(A); 
1273    
1274  *OLD 
1275   QINT0(C,A)$PQ0(C) = SAM(C,A) / PQ0(C); 
1276   QINTA0(A) = SUM(C$PQ0(C), SAM(C,A)  / PQ0(C)) ; 
1277    
1278   inta(A)$QA0(A) = QINTA0(A) / QA0(A) ; 
1279    
1280   ica(C,A)$(QINTA0(A)$PQ0(C)) = SAM(C,A)/PQ0(C) / QINTA0(A) ; 
1281    
1282   pinta0(A)      = SUM(C, ica(C,A)*PQ0(C)) ; 
1283    
1284    
1285    
1286  DISPLAY QINT0, QINTA0, PINTA0, ICA, INTA; 
1287    
1288    
1289    
1290  *CPI weight by comm'y = hhd cons value for comm'y / total hhd cons value 
1291  *CPI does not consider on-farm consumption. 
1292   cwts(C)       = SUM(H, SAM(C,H)) / SUM((CP,H), SAM(CP,H)); 
1293    
1294  *Domestic sales price index weight = dom sales value for comm'y 
1295  */ total domestic salues value 
1296  *Domestic sales price index does not consider on-farm consumption. 
1297   dwts(C)       = (SUM(A, SAM(A,C)) - (SAM(C,'ROW') - 
1298                    SUM(cte, SAM(cte,C))))/ 
1299                    SUM(CP, SUM(A, SAM(A,CP)) - (SAM(CP,'ROW') - 
1300                    SUM(cte, SAM(cte,CP)))); 
1301    
1302   CWTSCHK       = SUM(C, cwts(C)); 
1303   DWTSCHK       = SUM(C, dwts(C)); 
1304    
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1305   CPI0          = SUM(C, cwts(C)*PQ0(C)) ; 
1306   DPI0          = SUM(CD, dwts(CD)*PDS0(CD)) ; 
1307    
1308  DISPLAY CWTSCHK, DWTSCHK; 
1309    
1310  *Production and trade block ------------------------- 
1311    
1312  *Compute exponents from elasticites 
1313   rhoq(C)$(CM(C) AND CD(C))  = (1/TRADELAS(C,'SIGMAQ')) - 1; 
1314    
1315   rhot(C)$(CE(C) AND CD(C))  = (1/TRADELAS(C,'SIGMAT')) + 1; 
1316   rhova(A)$PRODELAS(A)       = (1/PRODELAS(A)) - 1; 
1317   rhoa(A)$ACES(A)            = (1/PRODELAS2(A)) - 1; 
1318    
1319   rhova2(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A)) = (1/PRODELAS3(F,A)) - 1; 
1320    
1321  *Aggregation of domestic output from different activities 
1322    
1323   RHOAC(C)$ELASAC(C) = 1/ELASAC(C) - 1; 
1324    
1325   deltaac(A,C)$ (SAM(A,C)$ELASAC(C)) 
1326                 = (PXAC0(A,C)*QXAC0(A,C)**(1/ELASAC(C)))/ 
1327                   SUM(AP, PXAC0(AP,C)*QXAC0(AP,C)**(1/ELASAC(C))); 
1328    
1329   alphaac(C)$SUM(A,deltaac(A,C)) 
1330                 = QX0(C)/ 
1331                   (SUM(A$deltaac(A,C), deltaac(A,C) * QXAC0(A,C) 
1332                   **(-RHOAC(C))) )**(-1/RHOAC(C)); 
1333    
1334  PARAMETERS 
1335   WFA(F,A)          wage for factor f in activity a (used for calibration) 
1336   ; 
1337    
1338  *Demand computations ---- 
1339    
1340  SET 
1341   MFAGG(F,FP,A) directly or indirectly factor F is an agg of FP 
1342  *This mapping links aggregate factor F to ALL disaggregate factors 
1343  *that are below it in the nest (ie FP). 
1344   ; 
1345    
1346  * MFAGG(F,FDIS,A)$(MFA2(F,FDIS,A) + SUM(FAGG, 
MFA2(F,FAGG,A)*MFA2(FAGG,FDI 
      S,A))) = YES; 
1347  * MFAGG(F,FDIS,A)$MFA2(F,FDIS,A) = YES; 
1348  *The definition of MFAGG could be generalized further. 
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1349    
1350  * MFAGG(F,FLAB,A)$(SUM(FP, FTREE(F,FP,FLAB)) AND SAM(FLAB,A)) = YES; 
1351   MFAGG(F,FP,A)$((SUM(FPP, FTREE(F,FPP,FP)) AND SAM(FP,A)) AND FDIS(FP)) 
=  
      YES; 
1352    
1353  DISPLAY AC, FAGG, MFAGG, FDIS, FTREE, FNEST; 
1354    
1355  *Defining factor employment and supply. 
1356   QF0(F,A)  = QF2BASE(F,A); 
1357  *Defining employment for aggregate factors in factor nesting 
1358   QF0(FAGG,A) = SUM(FDIS$MFAGG(FAGG,FDIS,A), QF0(FDIS,A)); 
1359  *Total factor supply is sum of sectoral factor demand 
1360   QFS0(F)   = SUM(A, QF0(F,A)); 
1361    
1362  *Activity-specific wage is activity labor payment over employment 
1363   WFA(F,A)$SAM(F,A) = SAM(F,A)/QF0(F,A); 
1364  *Activity-specific wages for aggregate factors in factor nesting 
1365   WFA(FAGG,A)$QF0(FAGG, A) 
1366    = SUM(FDIS$MFAGG(FAGG,FDIS,A), SAM(FDIS,A))/QF0(FAGG,A); 
1367    
1368  *Economy-wide wage average is total factor income over employment 
1369   WF0(F)$SUM(A, SAM(F,A)) = SUM(A, SAM(F,A))/SUM(A, QF0(F,A)); 
1370    
1371   WF0(FAGG)$SUM(A, QF0(FAGG,A)) 
1372     = SUM((FDIS,A)$MFAGG(FAGG,FDIS,A), SAM(FDIS,A)) 
1373      /SUM(A, QF0(FAGG,A)); 
1374    
1375  *Economy-wide real wage average. Defined as equal to WF in base. 
1376   WFREAL0(F) = WF0(F); 
1377    
1378  *Factor-specific productivity adjustment parameter 
1379   fprd0(F,A)          = 1; 
1380   fprd(F,A)           = fprd0(F,A); 
1381    
1382  PARAMETER 
1383    QFS0T(F)       tempory storage for flexible labor supply equation 
1384    WF0T(F)        tempory storage for flexible labor supply equation 
1385  ; 
1386    
1387    QFS0t(F) = QFS0(F); 
1388    WF0t(F)  = WF0(F) ; 
1389    
1390  DISPLAY 
1391  "If the value of WF0 for any factor is very different from one (< 0.1" 
1392  "or >10) the user may consider rescaling the initial values for QFBASE" 
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1393  "or QFSBASE for this factor to get a value of WF0 such that" 
1394  "0.1 < WF0 < 10" 
1395   WF0 
1396   ; 
1397    
1398  *Wage distortion factor 
1399   wfdist0(F,A)$WF0(F) = WFA(F,A)/WF0(F); 
1400    
1401  *CES activity production function 
1402   deltava(F,A)$MFA1(F,A) 
1403              = (wfdist0(F,A) * WF0(F) 
1404                * (QF0(F,A))**(1+rhova(A)) ) 
1405                / SUM(FP$MFA1(FP,A), wfdist0(FP,A) * WF0(FP)*(QF0(FP,A))**(1 
      +rhova(A))); 
1406    
1407    alphava0(A)$rhova(A) = QVA0(A)/( SUM(F$MFA1(F,A), deltava(F,A)*QF0(F,A) 
1408                 **(-rhova(A))) )**(-1/rhova(A)); 
1409    
1410   alphava(A) = alphava0(A); 
1411    
1412  *Lower layer nested factor substitution parameters 
1413    
1414   deltava2(F,FP,A)$MFA2(F,FP,A) 
1415     = (wfdist0(FP,A) * WF0(FP) * (QF0(FP,A))**(1+rhova2(F,A)) ) 
1416       / SUM(FPP$MFA2(F,FPP,A), wfdist0(FPP,A) * WF0(FPP)*(QF0(FPP,A))**(1+r 
      hova2(F,A))); 
1417    
1418    alphava2(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A)) 
1419     = QF0(F,A)/( SUM(FP$MFA2(F,FP,A), deltava2(F,FP,A)*QF0(FP,A) 
1420                 **(-rhova2(F,A))) )**(-1/rhova2(F,A)); 
1421    
1422  DISPLAY deltava2, alphava2; 
1423    
1424  *CES top level production function 
1425  PARAMETER 
1426   predeltaa(A)  dummy used to define deltaa ; 
1427    
1428   predeltaa(A)  = 0 ; 
1429   predeltaa(A)$(ACES(A) AND QINTA0(A)) 
1430                  = (PVA0(A)/PINTA0(A))*(QVA0(A)/QINTA0(A))**(1+rhoa(A)) ; 
1431   deltaa(A)$ACES(A) = predeltaa(A)/(1 + predeltaa(A)) ; 
1432   alphaa(A)$deltaa(A) 
1433                  = QA0(A)/((deltaa(A)*QVA0(A)**(-rhoa(A)) 
1434                    +(1-deltaa(A))*QINTA0(A)**(-rhoa(A)))**(-1/rhoa(A))) ; 
1435    
1436  *Transactions demand 
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1437   QT0(CT) = ( SUM(CTD, SAM(CT,CTD)) + SUM(CTE, SAM(CT,CTE)) 
1438               + SUM(CTM, SAM(CT,CTM)) ) / PQ0(CT) ; 
1439    
1440  *CET transformation 
1441   deltat0(C,R)$CER(C,R) 
1442     = (PE0(C,R)*(QE0(C,R))**(1-rhot(C)))/( SUM(RP$CER(C,RP), PE0(C,RP)*QE0( 
      C,RP)**(1-rhot(C))) + (PDS0(C)*QD0(C)**(1-rhot(C))) ); 
1443   deltat(C,R) =  deltat0(C,R); 
1444    
1445   alphat0(C)$(CE(C) AND CD(C)) 
1446     = QX0(C)/(SUM(R$CER(C,R), deltat(C,R)*QE0(C,R)**rhot(C))  + ((1-SUM(R$C 
      ER(C,R), deltat(C,R)))*QD0(C)**( rhot(C))) )**(1/rhot(C)); 
1447   alphat(C) =  alphat0(C); 
1448    
1449  *Armington aggregation 
1450   deltaq0(C,R)$CMR(C,R) = (PM0(C,R)*(QM0(C,R))**(1+rhoq(C)))/( SUM(RP$CMR(C 
      ,RP), PM0(C,RP)*QM0(C,RP)**(1+rhoq(C))) + (PDD0(C)*QD0(C)**(1+rhoq(C))) ); 
1451   deltaq(C,R)        = deltaq0(C,R); 
1452    
1453   alphaq0(C)$(CM(C) AND CD(C)) 
1454     = QQ0(C)/(SUM(R$CMR(C,R), deltaq(C,R)*QM0(C,R)**(-rhoq(C))) + ((1-SUM(R 
      $CMR(C,R), deltaq(C,R)))*QD0(C)**(-rhoq(C))) )**(-1/rhoq(C)); 
1455   alphaq(C)          = alphaq0(C); 
1456    
1457    
1458  *Institution block ------------------------------ 
1459    
1460  *Institutional income 
1461   YI0(INSDNG) = SAM('TOTAL',INSDNG); 
1462    
1463  *Factor income by factor category 
1464   YF0(F) = SUM(A, SAM(F,A)); 
1465    
1466  *Institution income from factors 
1467   YIF0(INSD,F) = SAM(INSD,F); 
1468    
1469  *Transfers to RoW from factors 
1470   trnsfr('ROW',F) = SAM('ROW',F)/EXR0; 
1471    
1472  *Transfers from RoW to institutions 
1473   trnsfr(INSD,'ROW') = SAM(INSD,'ROW')/EXR0; 
1474    
1475  *Government transfers 
1476   trnsfr(INSD,'GOV') = SAM(INSD,'GOV')/CPI0; 
1477    
1478  *Factor taxes 
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1479   tf0(F)$SAM('TOTAL',F)        = TAXPAR('FACTAX',F)/SAM('TOTAL',F); 
1480   tf(F)         = tf0(F); 
1481    
1482  *Shares of domestic institutions in factor income (net of factor taxes 
1483  *and transfers to RoW). 
1484   shif(INSD,F)$SAM(F,'TOTAL')  = SAM(INSD,F)/(SAM(F,'TOTAL') - TAXPAR('FACT 
      AX',f) 
1485                   - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1486  *XD 2007Dec 
1487  parameter 
1488  QFSA0(INSD,F) 
1489  QFSN0(INSD,F) 
1490  QFST0(INSD,F) 
1491  ; 
1492    
1493  QFSA0('hcrur',F)  = sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone1')),SAM(F,A)) ; 
1494  QFSA0('hfrur',F)  = sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone2')),SAM(F,A)) ; 
1495  QFSA0('hssru',F)  = sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone3')),SAM(F,A)) ; 
1496  QFSA0('hsnru',F)  = sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone4')),SAM(F,A)) ; 
1497  QFST0(INSD,F) = SAM(INSD,F) ; 
1498  display shif, QFSA0, QFST0; 
1499    
1500   shifN(INSD,F) = 0 ; 
1501   shifN('hcrur',F)$(SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F,A)))  = 
1502                              (SAM('hcrur',F) - sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE( 
      A,'zone1')),SAM(F,A)))/ 
1503                                      (SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F, 
      A)) - TAXPAR('FACTAX',F) - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1504   shifN('hfrur',F)$(SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F,A)))  = 
1505                              (SAM('hfrur',F) - sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE( 
      A,'zone2')),SAM(F,A)))/ 
1506                                      (SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F, 
      A)) - TAXPAR('FACTAX',F) - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1507   shifN('hssru',F)$(SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F,A)))  = 
1508                              (SAM('hssru',F) - sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE( 
      A,'zone3')),SAM(F,A)))/ 
1509                                      (SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F, 
      A)) - TAXPAR('FACTAX',F) - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1510   shifN('hsnru',F)$(SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F,A)))  = 
1511                              (SAM('hsnru',F) - sum(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE( 
      A,'zone4')),SAM(F,A)))/ 
1512                                      (SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F, 
      A)) - TAXPAR('FACTAX',F) - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1513    
1514   shifN(H,F)$(HURB(H) and SAM(H,F)) = SAM(H,F)/ 
1515                  (SAM(F,'TOTAL') - sum(A$AAGR(A),SAM(F,A)) - TAXPAR('FACTAX 
 253 
      ',F) - SAM('ROW',F)); 
1516    
1517    
1518   SHIFCHK(F)    = SUM(INSD, shif(INSD,F)); 
1519   DISPLAY  SHIFCHK; 
1520    
1521   SHIFCHK(F)    = 0; 
1522   SHIFCHK(F)    = SUM(INSD, shifN(INSD,F)); 
1523   DISPLAY  shifn, shif, SHIFCHK; 
1524    
1525  *Inter-institution transfers 
1526   TRII0(INSDNG,INSDNGP) = SAM(INSDNG,INSDNGP); 
1527    
1528  *Share of dom non-gov institution in income of other dom non-gov 
1529  *institutions (net of direct taxes and savings). 
1530   shii(INSDNG,INSDNGP)$(SAM('TOTAL',INSDNGP) - 
TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSDNGP) - S 
      AM('S-I',INSDNGP)) 
1531    = SAM(INSDNG,INSDNGP) 
1532     /(SAM('TOTAL',INSDNGP) - TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSDNGP) - SAM('S-
I',INSDNGP)) 
      ; 
1533    
1534  *Scaling factors for savings, sales and direct tax shares 
1535   MPSADJ0      = 0; 
1536   TINSADJ0     = 0; 
1537   TQADJ0       = 0; 
1538    
1539    
1540  *Savings rates 
1541   MPS0(INSDNG)$(SAM('TOTAL',INSDNG) - TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSDNG)) 
1542    = SAM('S-I',INSDNG)/(SAM('TOTAL',INSDNG) - TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSDNG)); 
1543   mpsbar(INSDNG) = MPS0(INSDNG); 
1544    
1545  *Direct tax rates 
1546   TINS0(INSDNG)$SAM('TOTAL',INSDNG) 
1547    = TAXPAR('INSTAX',INSDNG) / SAM('TOTAL',INSDNG); 
1548   tinsbar(INSDNG) = TINS0(INSDNG); 
1549    
1550  *"Point" change in savings, sales and direct tax shares 
1551   DMPS0  = 0; 
1552   DTINS0 = 0; 
1553   DTQ0   = 0; 
1554    
1555  *Selecting institutions for potential "point" change in savings and tax ra 
      tes 
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1556    
1557  *If DMPS or MPSADJ is flexible, institutions with a value of 1 for mps01 
1558  *change their savings rates. 
1559   mps01(INSDNG)  = 1; 
1560    
1561  *If DTIMS is flexible, institutions with a value of 1 for tins01 change 
1562  *their savings rates. 
1563   tins01(INSDNG) = 1; 
1564    
1565  *If DTQ is flexible, commodities with a value of 1 for tq01 change 
1566  *their sales tax rates. 
1567   tq01(C) = 1; 
1568    
1569  *Household consumption spending and consumption quantities. 
1570   EH0(H)$SAM(H,'TOTAL')        = SUM(C, SAM(C,H)) + SUM(A, SAM(A,H)); 
1571   QH0(C,H)$PQ0(C) = SAM(C,H)/PQ0(C); 
1572    
1573  *Government indicators 
1574   YG0                = SAM('TOTAL','GOV'); 
1575   EG0                = SAM('TOTAL','GOV') - SAM('S-I','GOV'); 
1576   QG0(C,GOVF)$(PQ0(C) AND SUM(GOVFP, GOVFSHR(C,GOVFP))) = 
SAM(C,'GOV')/PQ0( 
      C) * (GOVFSHR(C,GOVF)/SUM(GOVFP, GOVFSHR(C,GOVFP))); 
1577    
1578   qbarg0(C,GOVF) = QG0(C,GOVF); 
1579   qbarg(C,GOVF)  = qbarg0(C,GOVF); 
1580   GADJ0(GOVF)    = 1; 
1581   MGADJ0         = 1; 
1582   GSAV0          = SAM('S-I','GOV'); 
1583    
1584  *LES calibration ------------------------------------------ 
1585    
1586  PARAMETERS 
1587   BUDSHRtot(H) 
1588   BUDSHR(C,H)    budget share for marketed commodity c and household h 
1589   BUDSHR2(A,C,H) budget share for home commodity c - act a - hhd h 
1590   BUDSHRCHKtot(H) 
1591   BUDSHRCHK(H)   check that budget shares some to unity 
1592   ELASCHK(H)     check that expenditure elasticities satisfy Engel aggr 
1593  *==== 
1594  *Xinshen 
1595   shgammam0(C,H) 
1596   shavggammam0(C) 
1597   avgQH0(C) 
1598   LESELAS1larg(H,C) 
1599   betamlarg(C,H) 
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1600    
1601   ; 
1602    
1603   BUDSHRtot(H)   = (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H))); 
1604   BUDSHR(C,H)$BUDSHRtot(H)    = SAM(C,H)/ BUDSHRtot(H); 
1605    
1606   BUDSHR2(A,C,H)$BUDSHRtot(H) = SAM(A,H)*SHRHOME(A,C,H) 
/BUDSHRtot(H); 
1607    
1608   BUDSHRCHK(H)   = SUM(C, BUDSHR(C,H)) + SUM((A,C), BUDSHR2(A,C,H)); 
1609    
1610   ELASCHK(H)     = SUM(C, BUDSHR(C,H)*LESELAS1(H,C)) 
1611                    + SUM((A,C), BUDSHR2(A,C,H)*LESELAS2(A,C,H)); 
1612    
1613  DISPLAY BUDSHR, BUDSHR2, BUDSHRCHK, LESELAS1, LESELAS2, ELASCHK; 
1614    
1615   LESELAS1(H,C)$ELASCHK(H)   = LESELAS1(H,C)/ELASCHK(H); 
1616   LESELAS2(A,C,H)$ELASCHK(H) = LESELAS2(A,C,H)/ELASCHK(H); 
1617    
1618   ELASCHK(H)      = SUM(C, BUDSHR(C,H)*LESELAS1(H,C)) 
1619                     + SUM((A,C), BUDSHR2(A,C,H)*LESELAS2(A,C,H)); 
1620    
1621  DISPLAY ELASCHK, LESELAS1, LESELAS2; 
1622    
1623    
1624   betam(C,H)   = BUDSHR(C,H)*LESELAS1(H,C); 
1625   betah(A,C,H) = BUDSHR2(A,C,H)*LESELAS2(A,C,H); 
1626    
1627  *=== 
1628  *Xinshen 
1629   LESELAS1larg(H,C)$( LESELAS1(H,C)gt 1) =  LESELAS1(H,C) ; 
1630   betamlarg(C,H)$(2*betam(C,H) gt BUDSHR(C,H)) = QH0(c,h) ; 
1631    
1632   parameter 
1633   FRISCHC(C,H) 
1634   ; 
1635    
1636  * FRISCH(H) = 1.5*FRISCH(H); 
1637   FRISCHC(C,H)$(BUDSHR(C,H) + betam(C,H)/FRISCH(H) lt 0) = 1.5*FRISCH(H); 
1638   FRISCH(H)$sum(c,FRISCHC(C,H)) = smin(c, FRISCHC(C,H)) ; 
1639    
1640   gammam0(C,H)$BUDSHR(C,H) 
1641       =  ( (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H))) / PQ0(C) ) 
1642                        * ( BUDSHR(C,H) + betam(C,H)/FRISCH(H)); 
1643    
1644   FRISCHC(C,H)$(BUDSHR(C,H) + betam(C,H)/FRISCH(H) lt 0) = 2.05*FRISCH(H); 
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1645   FRISCH(H)$sum(c,FRISCHC(C,H)) = smin(c, FRISCHC(C,H)) ; 
1646    
1647    
1648   gammam0(C,H)$BUDSHR(C,H) 
1649       =  ( (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H))) / PQ0(C) ) 
1650                        * ( BUDSHR(C,H) + betam(C,H)/FRISCH(H)); 
1651    
1652   gammah0(A,C,H)$BUDSHR2(A,C,H) 
1653       =  ( (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H))) / PXAC0(A,C) ) 
1654                        * ( BUDSHR2(A,C,H) + betah(A,C,H)/FRISCH(H)); 
1655    
1656   gammam(C,H)   =  gammam0(C,H); 
1657    
1658   gammah(A,C,H) =  gammah0(A,C,H); 
1659    
1660  *=== 
1661  *Xinshen 
1662  shavggammam0(C)$sum(H,QH0(C,H))  = 100*sum(H,gammam(C,H))/sum(H,QH0(C,H))  
      ; 
1663  shgammam0(C,H)$QH0(C,H)  = 100*gammam(C,H)/QH0(C,H) ; 
1664  avgQH0(C) = sum(H,QH0(C,H)) ; 
1665    
1666   display frisch, LESELAS1larg, betamlarg, avgQH0, shavggammam0, shgammam0; 
1667    
1668  *Checking LES parameters ---------------------------------- 
1669  PARAMETERS 
1670   SUBSIST(H)  subsistence spending 
1671   FRISCH2(H)  alt. defn of Frisch -- ratio of cons to supernumerary cons 
1672   LESCHK(H)   check on LES parameter definitions (error mssg if error) 
1673    
1674   LESELASP(H,*,C,*,CP) price elasticity bt c and cp for h (with c and cp la 
      beled by source) 
1675  *LESELASP defines cross-price elasticities when c is different from cp and 
1676  *own-price elasticities when c and cp refer to the same commodity. 
1677  *Source: Dervis, de Melo and Robinson. 1982. General Equilibrium Models 
1678  *for Development Policy. Cambridge University Press, p. 483 
1679   ; 
1680   SUPERNUM(H)  = SUM((A,C), gammah(A,C,H)*PXAC0(A,C)) 
1681                  + SUM(C, gammam(C,H)*PQ0(C)) ; 
1682   FRISCH2(H)$(EH0(H) - SUPERNUM(H))   = -EH0(H)/(EH0(H) - SUPERNUM(H)); 
1683   LESCHK(H)$((ABS(FRISCH(H) - FRISCH2(H)) GT 0.00000001) AND (SUM(A, 
SAM(A, 
      H))+SUM(C, SAM(C,H)))) = 1/0; 
1684    
1685  PARAMETER  SUPINCSHR(H); 
1686    
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1687  SUPINCSHR(H)$EH0(H) = SUPERNUM(H)/EH0(H)*100; 
1688    
1689  DISPLAY "Supernumerary expenditure as a percentage of total household expe 
      nditure", FRISCH2, SUPINCSHR, LESCHK; 
1690    
      *Cross-price elasticities : COMPUATATION IS TIME CONSUMING (BEST LEFT OUT  
      OF COMPILATION) 
 
       LESELASP(H,'MRK',C,'MRK',CP)$(ORD(C) NE ORD(CP)) 
         = -LESELAS1(H,C) 
           * PQ0(CP)*gammam(CP,H) / (SUM(CPP, SAM(CPP,H)) + SUM(APP, SAM(APP,H)) 
      ); 
 
       LESELASP(H,A,C,'MRK',CP)$(ORD(C) NE ORD(CP)) 
         = -LESELAS2(A,C,H) 
           * PQ0(CP)*gammam(CP,H) / (SUM(CPP, SAM(CPP,H)) + SUM(APP, SAM(APP,H)) 
      ); 
 
       LESELASP(H,'MRK',C,A,CP)$(ORD(C) NE ORD(CP)) 
         = -LESELAS1(H,C) 
           * PXAC0(A,CP)*gammah(A,CP,H) / (SUM(CPP, SAM(CPP,H)) + SUM(APP, SAM(A 
      PP,H))); 
 
      *Own-price elasticities 
 
       LESELASP(H,'MRK',C,'MRK',C) 
         = -LESELAS1(H,C) 
           *( PQ0(C)*gammam(C,H) / (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H))) 
                                                             - 1/FRISCH(H)); 
 
       LESELASP(H,A,C,A,C) 
         = -LESELAS2(A,C,H) 
           *( PXAC0(A,C)*gammah(A,C,H) / (SUM(CP, SAM(CP,H)) + SUM(AP, SAM(AP,H) 
      )) 
                                                             - 1/FRISCH(H)); 
 
      OPTION LESELASP:3:2:2; 
 
      DISPLAY 
       SUPERNUM, FRISCH, FRISCH2, LESCHK, LESELASP 
       ; 
 
1725    
1726  *System-constraint block ------------------------- 
1727  *Calibrate GDP growth for baseline 
1728  PARAMETER 
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1729   QINVK           quantity of new investment capital 
1730   PINV            price of new investment capital 
1731   alphainv        shift parameter for investment 
1732   iwts(C)         weights for investment price index 
1733   gdpgr           calibrated GDP growth rate for baseline scenario        / 
       0.045 / 
1734   depreciation    capital depreciation rate                               / 
       0.04 / 
1735    
1736   ; 
1737    
1738  *Fixed investment 
1739   qbarinv(c)$CINV(C) = SAM(C,'S-I')/PQ0(C); 
1740   QINV0(C)           = qbarinv(C); 
1741   IADJ0              = 1; 
1742    
1743  IF (KOPTION EQ 2, 
1744   QINVK           = (depreciation + gdpgr) * SUM(FCAP, CAPSTK(FCAP)); 
1745   PINV            = SUM(C, SAM(C,'S-I')) / QINVK; 
1746   iwts(C)         = qbarinv(c) / SUM(CP, qbarinv(cP)); 
1747   alphainv        = PINV / SUM(C, iwts(c)*PQ0(C)); 
1748   DISPLAY         QINVK, PINV, alphainv, gdpgr, depreciation, iwts, INSTQ; 
1749  ); 
1750    
1751  *Stock changes 
1752   qdst0(C)$PQ0(C) = (SAM(C,'S-I')$(NOT CINV(C)) + SAM(C,'DSTK'))/PQ0(C); 
1753   qdst(C)         = qdst0(C); 
1754    
1755   FSAV0         = SAM('S-I','ROW')/EXR0; 
1756    
1757   TABS0         = SUM((C,H), SAM(C,H)) + SUM((A,H), SAM(A,H)) 
1758                   + SUM(C, SAM(C,'GOV')) + SUM(C, SAM(C,'S-I')) 
1759                   + SUM(C, SAM(C,'DSTK')); 
1760    
1761   INVSHR0       = SAM('TOTAL','S-I')/TABS0; 
1762   MGOVSHR0      = SUM(C, SAM(C,'GOV'))/TABS0; 
1763   GOVSHR0(GOVF) = SUM(C, SAM(C,'GOV')*GOVFSHR(C,GOVF))/TABS0; 
1764    
1765   WALRAS0       = 0; 
1766    
1767  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1768  *5. VARIABLE DECLARATIONS ------------------------------------------------ 
      ------------------- 
1769  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
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1770  *This section only includes variables that appear in the model. 
1771  *The variables are declared in alphabetical order. 
1772    
1773  VARIABLES 
1774    ALPHAVAADJ(A)  productivity parameter 
1775    CPI            consumer price index (PQ-based) 
1776    DPI            index for domestic producer prices (PDS-based) 
1777    DMPS           change in marginal propensity to save for selected inst 
1778    DTINS          change in domestic institution tax share 
1779    DTQ            change in sales tax rate 
1780    EG             total current government expenditure 
1781    EH(H)          household consumption expenditure 
1782    EXR            exchange rate 
1783    FSAV           foreign savings 
1784    GADJ(GOVF)     government demand scaling factor 
1785    MGADJ          government demand scaling factor 
1786    GOVSHR(GOVF)   govt consumption share of absorption by function 
1787    MGOVSHR        govt consumption share of absorption 
1788    GSAV           government savings 
1789    GDEFGDP        government deficit as a percentage of GDP 
1790    IADJ           investment scaling factor (for fixed capital formation) 
1791    INVSHR         investment share of absorption 
1792    MPS(INS)       marginal propensity to save for dom non-gov inst ins 
1793    MPSADJ         savings rate scaling factor 
1794    PA(A)          output price of activity a 
1795    PDD(C)         demand price for com'y c produced & sold domestically 
1796    PDS(C)         supply price for com'y c produced & sold domestically 
1797    PE(C,R)        price of exports 
1798    PINTA(A)       price of intermediate aggregate 
1799    PM(C,R)        price of imports 
1800    PQ(C)          price of composite good c 
1801    PVA(A)         value added price 
1802    PWE(C,R)       world price of exports 
1803    PWM(C,R)       world price of imports 
1804    PX(C)          average output price 
1805    PXAC(A,C)      price of commodity c from activity a 
1806    QA(A)          level of domestic activity 
1807    QD(C)          quantity of domestic sales 
1808    QE(C,R)        quantity of exports 
1809    QF(F,A)        quantity demanded of factor f from activity a 
1810    QFS(F)         quantity of factor supply 
1811    QG(C,GOVF)     quantity of government consumption 
1812    QH(C,H)        quantity consumed of marketed commodity c by household h 
1813    QHA(A,C,H)     quantity consumed of home commodity c fr act a by hhd h 
1814    QINT(C,A)      quantity of intermediate demand for c from activity a 
1815    QINTA(A)       quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
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1816    QINV(C)        quantity of fixed investment demand 
1817    QM(C,R)        quantity of imports 
1818    QQ(C)          quantity of composite goods supply 
1819    QT(C)          quantity of trade and transport demand for commodity c 
1820    QVA(A)         quantity of aggregate value added 
1821    QVAADJ(A)      adjustment to aggregate value added (used for projections 
      ) 
1822    QX(C)          quantity of aggregate marketed commodity output 
1823    QXAC(A,C)      quantity of ouput of commodity c from activity a 
1824    TABS           total absorption 
1825    TINS(INS)      rate of direct tax on domestic institutions ins 
1826    TINSADJ        direct tax scaling factor 
1827    TQ(C)          sales tax rate 
1828    TQADJ          sales tax scaling factor 
1829    TRII(INS,INSP) transfers to dom. inst. insdng from insdngp 
1830    WALRAS         savings-investment imbalance (should be zero) 
1831    WALRASSQR      Walras squared 
1832    WF(F)          economy-wide wage (rent) for factor f 
1833    WFREAL(F)      real wage 
1834    WFDIST(F,A)    factor wage distortion variable 
1835    YF(F)          factor income 
1836    YG             total current government income 
1837    YIF(INS,F)     income of institution ins from factor f 
1838    YI(INS)        income of (domestic non-governmental) institution ins 
1839    ; 
1840    
1841  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1842  *6. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1843  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1844    
1845  *The initial levels of all model variables are defined in this file. 
INCLUDE    C:\Users\camara\Desktop\2011 Desktop\CAADP model3\1VARINIT.INC 
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GAMS Rev 228  x86/MS Windows                             
File for initializing variables. Standard CGE modeling system, Version 1.00 
Input file: 1dmodel.gms. IFPRI Extended standard recursive dynamic CGE modeling system, 
Version 2.00 
 
      Version 1.00 Release date: May 02, 2001 
      Last update: 
1852    
1853    ALPHAVAADJ.L(A) = 1; 
1854    CPI.L           = CPI0; 
1855    DMPS.L          = DMPS0; 
1856    DPI.L           = DPI0; 
1857    DTINS.L         = DTINS0; 
1858    DTQ.L           = DTQ0; 
1859    EG.L            = EG0; 
1860    EH.L(H)         = EH0(H); 
1861    EXR.L           = EXR0; 
1862    FSAV.L          = FSAV0; 
1863    GADJ.L(GOVF)    = GADJ0(GOVF); 
1864    GOVSHR.L(GOVF)  = GOVSHR0(GOVF); 
1865    MGADJ.L         = MGADJ0; 
1866    MGOVSHR.L       = MGOVSHR0; 
1867    GSAV.L          = GSAV0; 
1868    IADJ.L          = IADJ0; 
1869    INVSHR.L        = INVSHR0; 
1870    MPS.L(INSDNG)   = MPS0(INSDNG); 
1871    MPSADJ.L        = MPSADJ0; 
1872    PA.L(A)         = PA0(A); 
1873    PDD.L(C)        = PDD0(C); 
1874    PDS.L(C)        = PDS0(C); 
1875    PINTA.L(A)      = PINTA0(A) ; 
1876    PE.L(C,R)       = PE0(C,R); 
1877    PM.L(C,R)       = PM0(C,R); 
1878    PQ.L(C)         = PQ0(C); 
1879    PVA.L(A)        = PVA0(A); 
1880    PWE.L(C,R)      = PWE0(C,R); 
1881    PWM.L(C,R)      = PWM0(C,R); 
1882    PX.L(C)         = PX0(C); 
1883    PXAC.L(A,C)     = PXAC0(A,C); 
1884    QA.L(A)         = QA0(A); 
1885    QD.L(C)         = QD0(C); 
1886    QE.L(C,R)       = QE0(C,R); 
1887    QF.L(F,A)       = QF0(F,A); 
1888    QFS.L(F)        = QFS0(F); 
1889    QG.L(C,GOVF)    = QG0(C,GOVF); 
1890    QH.L(C,H)       = QH0(C,H); 
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1891    QHA.L(A,C,H)    = QHA0(A,C,H); 
1892    QINT.L(C,A)     = QINT0(C,A); 
1893    QINTA.L(A)      = QINTA0(A) ; 
1894    QINV.L(C)       = QINV0(C); 
1895    QM.L(C,R)       = QM0(C,R); 
1896    QQ.L(C)         = QQ0(C); 
1897    QT.L(C)         = QT0(C); 
1898    QVA.L(A)        = QVA0(A); 
1899    QVAADJ.L(A)     = 1; 
1900    QX.L(C)         = QX0(C); 
1901    QXAC.L(A,C)     = QXAC0(A,C); 
1902    TABS.L          = TABS0; 
1903    TRII.L(INSDNG,INSDNGP) = TRII0(INSDNG,INSDNGP); 
1904    TINS.L(INSDNG)  = TINS0(INSDNG); 
1905    TINSADJ.L       = TINSADJ0; 
1906    TQ.L(C)         = TQ0(C); 
1907    TQADJ.L         = TQADJ0; 
1908    WALRAS.L        = WALRAS0; 
1909    WALRASSQR.L     = 0 ; 
1910    WF.L(F)         = WF0(F); 
1911    WFREAL.L(F)       = WFREAL0(F); 
1912    WFDIST.L(F,A)   = WFDIST0(F,A); 
1913    YF.L(f)         = YF0(f); 
1914    YG.L            = YG0; 
1915    YI.L(INS)       = YI0(INS); 
1916    YIF.L(INS,F)    = YIF0(INS,F); 
1917    
1918  *Optional include file that imposes lower limits for selected variables 
1919  *The inclusion of this file may improve solver performance. 
1920  *$INCLUDE 1VARLOW.INC 
1921    
1922  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1923  *7. EQUATION DECLARATIONS ------------------------------------------------ 
      ------------------- 
1924  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ------------------- 
1925    
1926  EQUATIONS 
1927    
1928  *Price block ---------------------------------------------- 
1929   PMDEF(C,R)     domestic import price 
1930   PEDEF(C,R)     domestic export price 
1931   PDDDEF(C)      dem price for com'y c produced and sold domestically 
1932   PQDEF(C)       value of sales in domestic market 
1933   PXDEF(C)       value of marketed domestic output 
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1934   PADEF(A)       output price for activity a 
1935   PINTADEF(A)    price of aggregate intermediate input 
1936   PVADEF(A)      value-added price 
1937   CPIDEF         consumer price index 
1938   DPIDEF         domestic producer price index 
1939    
1940  *Production and trade block ------------------------------- 
1941   CESAGGPRD(A)    CES aggregate prod fn (if CES top nest) 
1942   CESAGGFOC(A)    CES aggregate first-order condition (if CES top nest) 
1943   LEOAGGINT(A)    Leontief aggreg intermed dem (if Leontief top nest) 
1944   LEOAGGVA(A)     Leontief aggreg value-added dem (if Leontief top nest) 
1945   CESVAPRD(A)     CES value-added production function 
1946   QVADEF(A)       sector growth projection or adjustment factor 
1947   CESVAFOC(F,A)   CES value-added first-order condition 
1948   CESVAPRD2(F,A)     lower level VA function producing aggregate factor f 
1949   CESVAFOC2(F,FP,A)  lower level VA first-order condition for producing f f 
      rom fp 
1950   INTDEM(C,A)     intermediate demand for commodity c from activity a 
1951   COMPRDFN(A,C)   production function for commodity c and activity a 
1952   OUTAGGFN(C)     output aggregation function 
1953   OUTAGGFOC(A,C)  first-order condition for output aggregation function 
1954   CET(C)          CET function 
1955   CET2(C)         domestic sales and exports for outputs without both 
1956   ESUPPLY(C,R)    export supply 
1957   ARMINGTON(C)    composite commodity aggregation function 
1958   COSTMIN(C,R)    first-order condition for composite commodity cost min 
1959   ARMINGTON2(C)   comp supply for com's without both dom. sales and imports 
1960   QTDEM(C)        demand for transactions (trade and transport) services 
1961   LBRSUPPLY(F)    labor supply function 
1962   WFREALEQ        real wage equation 
1963   WFDEF(F)        high level wage determination 
1964   RELWAGEQ(F)       wage convergence between skilled and highly-skilled 
1965    
1966  *Institution block ---------------------------------------- 
1967   YFDEF(F)        factor incomes 
1968   YIFDEF(INS,F)   factor incomes to domestic institutions 
1969  *XD 2007Dec 
1970   YI1FDEF(F)      factor incomes to domestic institutions 
1971   YI2FDEF(F)      factor incomes to domestic institutions 
1972   YI3FDEF(F)      factor incomes to domestic institutions 
1973   YI4FDEF(F)      factor incomes to domestic institutions 
1974    
1975   YIDEF(INS)      total incomes of domest non-gov't institutions 
1976   EHDEF(H)        household consumption expenditures 
1977   TRIIDEF(INS,INSP) transfers to inst'on ins from inst'on insp 
1978   HMDEM(C,H)      LES cons demand by hhd h for marketed commodity c 
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1979   HADEM(A,C,H)    LES cons demand by hhd h for home commodity c fr act a 
1980   INVDEM(C)       fixed investment demand 
1981   GOVDEM(C,GOVF)  government consumption demand 
1982   EGDEF           total government expenditures 
1983   YGDEF           total government income 
1984    
1985  *System constraint block ---------------------------------- 
1986   COMEQUIL(C)     composite commodity market equilibrium 
1987   FACEQUIL(F)     factor market equilibrium 
1988   CURACCBAL       current account balance (of RoW) 
1989   GOVBAL          government balance 
1990   TINSDEF(INS)    direct tax rate for inst ins 
1991   MPSDEF(INS)     marg prop to save for inst ins 
1992   TQDEF(C)        sales tax adjustment equation 
1993   SAVINVBAL       savings-investment balance 
1994   TABSEQ          total absorption 
1995   INVABEQ         investment share in absorption 
1996   GDABEQ(GOVF)    government consumption share in absorption by function 
1997   GDABEQ2         government consumption share in absorption 
1998   OBJEQ           Objective function 
1999    
2000   EXPRESID1(C) 
2001   EXPRESID2(C) 
2002   GDPEQ 
2003   INVGDP 
2004   GOVGDP 
2005   PXDEF2(C) 
2006   ICADEF(C,A) 
2007   ICA1DEF2(C,A) 
2008   ICA1DEF(C,A) 
2009   ICATOTDEF(A) 
2010  ; 
2011    
2012  PARAMETER 
2013   GDP0 
2014   INVGDPSHR0 
2015   GOVGDPSHR0 
2016  ; 
2017    
2018  VARIABLE 
2019   GDP 
2020   INVGDPSHR 
2021   GOVGDPSHR 
2022  ; 
2023    
2024   GDP0 = SUM(A, PVA0(A)*QVA0(A)); 
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2025    
2026   INVGDPSHR0 = (SUM(C, PQ0(C)*QINV0(C)) + SUM(C, PQ0(C)*qdst(C))) / GDP0; 
2027    
2028   GOVGDPSHR0 = SUM((GOVF,C), PQ0(C)*QG0(C,GOVF)) / GDP0; 
2029    
2030   GDP.L       = GDP0; 
2031   INVGDPSHR.L = INVGDPSHR0; 
2032   GOVGDPSHR.L = GOVGDPSHR0; 
2033    
2034  VARIABLE 
2035   ICAVA(C,A) 
2036   ICAVA1(C,A) 
2037   ICATOT(A) 
2038  ; 
2039    
2040   ICAVA.L(C,A) =  ica(C,A); 
2041   ICAVA1.L(C,A)=  ica(C,A); 
2042   ICATOT.L(A) = 1; 
2043    
2044  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      2045  *8. EQUATION DEFINITIONS ------------------------------------------------- 
     2046  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2047  *Notational convention inside equations: 
2048  *Parameters and "invariably" fixed variables are in lower case. 
2049  *"Variable" variables are in upper case. 
2050    
2051  *Price block ---------------------------------------------- 
2052    
2053   PMDEF(C,R)$CMR(C,R).. PM(C,R) =E= pwm(C,R)*(1 + tm(C,R))*EXR + SUM(CT, 
PQ 
      (CT)*icm(CT,C)); 
2054    
2055   PEDEF(C,R)$CER(C,R).. PE(C,R) =E= pwe(C,R)*(1 - te(C,R))*EXR - SUM(CT, PQ 
      (CT)*ice(CT,C)); 
2056    
2057   PDDDEF(C)$CD(C).. PDD(C) =E= PDS(C) + SUM(CT, PQ(CT)*icd(CT,C)); 
2058    
2059   PQDEF(C)$(CD(C) OR CM(C)).. PQ(C)*(1 - TQ(C))*QQ(C) =E= PDD(C)*QD(C) + SU 
      M(R, PM(C,R)*QM(C,R)); 
2060    
2061   PXDEF(C)$(CX(C) AND (NOT CERES(C))).. PX(C)*QX(C) =E= PDS(C)*QD(C) + 
SUM( 
      R, PE(C,R)*QE(C,R)); 
2062    
2063   PXDEF2(C)$CERES(C)..   PX(C) =E= PDS(C); 
2064    
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2065   PADEF(A)$PVA0(A).. PA(A) =E= SUM(C, PXAC(A,C)*theta(A,C)); 
2066    
2067  * PINTADEF(A)$PVA0(A).. PINTA(A) =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*ica(C,A)) ; 
2068   PINTADEF(A)$PVA0(A).. PINTA(A) =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*ICAVA(C,A)) ; 
2069  * PINTADEF(A)$PVA0(A).. PINTA(A)*QINTA(A) =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*QINT(C,A)); 
2070    
2071   PVADEF(A)$PVA0(A).. PA(A)*(1-ta(A))*QA(A) =E= PVA(A)*QVA(A) + 
PINTA(A)*QI 
      NTA(A) ; 
2072    
2073   CPIDEF..        CPI =E= SUM(C, cwts(C)*PQ(C)) ; 
2074    
2075  * DPIDEF..        DPI =E= SUM(CD$(NOT CERES(CD)), dwts(CD)*PDS(CD)) ; 
2076   DPIDEF..        DPI =E= SUM(CD, dwts(CD)*PDS(CD)) ; 
2077    
2078  *Production and trade block ------------------------------- 
2079    
2080  *CESAGGPRD and CESAGGFOC apply to activities with CES function at 
2081  *top of technology nest. 
2082    
2083   CESAGGPRD(A)$ACES(A).. QA(A) =E= alphaa(A)*(deltaa(A)*QVA(A)**(-rhoa(A))  
      + (1-deltaa(A))*QINTA(A)**(-rhoa(A)))**(-1/rhoa(A)) ; 
2084    
2085   CESAGGFOC(A)$ACES(A).. QVA(A) =E= 
QINTA(A)*((PINTA(A)/PVA(A))*(deltaa(A)/ 
       (1 - deltaa(A))))**(1/(1+rhoa(A))) ; 
2086    
2087  *LEOAGGINT and LEOAGGVA apply to activities with Leontief function at 
2088  *top of technology nest. 
2089   LEOAGGINT(A)$ALEO(A).. QINTA(A) =E= inta(A)*QA(A) ; 
2090  * LEOAGGINT(A)$ALEO(A).. PINTA(A)*QINTA(A) =E= inta(A)*PA(A)*QA(A) ; 
2091    
2092   LEOAGGVA(A)$ALEO(A).. QVA(A) =E= iva(A)*QA(A) ; 
2093    
2094  *CESVAPRD, CESVAFOC, INTDEM apply at the bottom of the technology nest 
2095  *(for all activities). 
2096   CESVAPRD(A)$QVA0(A).. QVA(A) =E= 
alphava(A)*ALPHAVAADJ(A)*(SUM(F$MFA1(F,A 
      ), deltava(F,A)*(fprd(F,A)*QF(F,A))**(-rhova(A))))**(-1/rhova(A)) ; 
2097    
2098  *Adjustment factor to QVA (used in fixing sector growth) 
2099   QVADEF(A)$QVA0(A).. QVA(A) =E= QVAADJ(A) * QVA0(A); 
2100    
2101   CESVAFOC(F,A)$MFA1(F,A).. 
2102                   WF(F)*wfdist(F,A) =E= 
2103                   PVA(A)*(1-tva(A)) * QVA(A)*SUM(FP, deltava(FP,A)*(fprd(FP 
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      ,A)*QF(FP,A))**(-rhova(A)))**(-1) *deltava(F,A)*fprd(F,A)**(-rhova(A))*QF( 
      F,A)**(-rhova(A) - 1); 
2104    
2105   CESVAPRD2(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A)).. 
2106                   QF(F,A) =E= alphava2(F,A)*(SUM(FP$MFA2(F,FP,A), deltava2( 
      F,FP,A)*QF(FP,A)**(-rhova2(F,A))))**(-1/rhova2(F,A)) ; 
2107    
2108   CESVAFOC2(F,FP,A)$MFA2(F,FP,A).. 
2109                   WF(FP)*wfdist(FP,A) =E= 
2110                   WF(F)*wfdist(F,A) * QF(F,A) * SUM(FPP$MFA2(F,FPP,A), delt 
      ava2(F,FPP,A)*QF(FPP,A)**(-rhova2(F,A)))**(-1)*deltava2(F,FP,A)*QF(FP,A)** 
      (-rhova2(F,A)-1); 
2111    
2112  * INTDEM(C,A)$ica(C,A).. QINT(C,A) =E= ica(C,A)*QINTA(A); 
2113   INTDEM(C,A)$ica(C,A).. QINT(C,A) =E= ICAVA(C,A)*QINTA(A); 
2114    
2115   ICA1DEF(C,A)$(QA0(A) AND PQ0(C) AND CSER(C))..           ICAVA1(C,A) =E=  
      ica(C,A) * PQ0(C)/PQ(C); 
2116   ICA1DEF2(C,A)$(QA0(A) AND (NOT CSER(C)))..    ICAVA1(C,A) =E= ica(C,A); 
2117    
2118    
2119   ICATOTDEF(A)$(QA0(A))..               ICATOT(A) =E= SUM(C, ICAVA1(C,A)); 
2120   ICADEF(C,A)$(QA0(A) AND PQ0(C))..     ICAVA(C,A) =E= ICAVA1(C,A) / ICATOT 
      (A); 
2121    
2122    
2123   COMPRDFN(A,C)$theta(A,C).. QXAC(A,C) + SUM(H, QHA(A,C,H)) =E= theta(A,C)* 
      QA(A) ; 
2124    
2125   OUTAGGFN(C)$CX(C).. QX(C) =E= alphaac(C)*SUM(A, eltaac(A,C)*QXAC(A,C)**( 
      -rhoac(C)))**(-1/rhoac(C)); 
2126    
2127   OUTAGGFOC(A,C)$deltaac(A,C).. 
2128                   PXAC(A,C) =E= PX(C)*QX(C) * SUM(AP, deltaac(AP,C)*QXAC(AP 
      ,C)**(-rhoac(C)) )**(-1)*deltaac(A,C)*QXAC(A,C)**(-rhoac(C)-1); 
2129    
2130  *Ghana (sectors with residual exports instead of CET) 
2131   CET(C)$(CE(C) AND CD(C) AND (NOT CERES(C))).. 
2132                   QX(C) =E= alphat(C)*(SUM(R, deltat(C,R)*QE(C,R)**rhot(C)) 
       + (1 - SUM(R, deltat(C,R)))*QD(C)**rhot(C))**(1/rhot(C)) ; 
2133    
2134  *Ghana (sectors with residual exports instead of CET) 
2135   ESUPPLY(C,R)$(CER(C,R) AND CD(C) AND (NOT CERES(C))).. 
2136                   QE(C,R) =E=  QD(C)*((PE(C,R)/PDS(C))*((1 - SUM(RP, deltat 
      (C,RP)))/deltat(C,R)))**(1/(rhot(C)-1)) ; 
2137    
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2138  *Ghana (sectors with residual exports instead of CET) 
2139   EXPRESID1(C)$CERES(C).. QE(C,'ROW')  =E= QX(C) - QD(C); 
2140    
2141   EXPRESID2(C)$CERES(C).. PDD(C) =E= PE(C,'ROW'); 
2142    
2143   CET2(C)$((CD(C) AND CEN(C)) OR (CE(C) AND CDN(C))).. QX(C) =E= QD(C) + 
SU 
      M(R, QE(C,R)); 
2144    
2145   ARMINGTON(C)$(CM(C) AND CD(C)).. 
2146                   QQ(C) =E= alphaq(C)*(SUM(R, deltaq(C,R)*QM(C,R)**(-rhoq(C 
      ))) + (1-SUM(R, deltaq(C,R)))*QD(C)**(-rhoq(C)))**(-1/rhoq(C)); 
2147    
2148   COSTMIN(C,R)$(CD(C) AND CMR(C,R)).. 
2149                   QM(C,R)/QD(C) =E= (PDD(C)/PM(C,R)*deltaq(C,R)/(1-SUM(RP,  
      deltaq(C,RP))))**(1/(1+rhoq(C))); 
2150    
2151   ARMINGTON2(C)$( (CD(C) AND CMN(C)) OR (CM(C) AND CDN(C)) ).. QQ(C) 
=E= QD 
      (C) + SUM(R, QM(C,R)); 
2152    
2153   QTDEM(C)$CT(C).. QT(C) =E= SUM(CP, icd(C,CP)*QD(CP)) + SUM((CP,R), icm(C, 
      CP)*QM(CP,R)) + SUM((CP,R), ice(C,CP)*QE(CP,R)); 
2154    
2155   LBRSUPPLY(F)$(FLS(F) AND FDIS(F)).. 
2156                   QFS(F) =E= QFS0(F)*[ ([SUM(A, WF(F)*WFDIST(F,A)*QF(F,A))/ 
      QFS(F)]/CPI) / (WF0(F)/CPI0)]**(etals(F)); 
2157    
2158   WFREALEQ(F)$WFREAL0(F).. WFREAL(F) =E= SUM(A, 
WF(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A))/ 
      ((CPI/CPI0)*SUM(A, QF(F,A))) ; 
2159    
2160   WFDEF(F)$SUM((FP,A), MFA2(F,FP,A)).. WF(F) =E= SUM((FP,A)$MFA2(F,FP,A), 
W 
      FDIST(FP,A)*WF(FP)*QF(FP,A) ) / SUM((FP,A)$MFA2(F,FP,A), QF(FP,A) ); 
2161    
2162   RELWAGEQ(F)$LREL(F).. WFREAL(F)/SUM(FP$MAPRELW(FP,F), WFREAL(FP)) 
=E= WFR 
      EAL0(F)/SUM(FP$MAPRELW(FP,F), WFREAL0(FP)) + CONVERGE(F); 
2163    
2164  *Institution block ---------------------------------------- 
2165    
2166   YFDEF(F)$FDIS(F).. YF(F) =E= SUM(A, WF(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)); 
2167    
2168  *XD 2007Dec 
2169   YI1FDEF(F).. 
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2170              YIF('hcrur',F) =E= SUM(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone1')), WF 
      (F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) 
2171                       + shifN('hcrur',F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - SUM(A$AAGR(A),  
      WF(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) - trnsfr('ROW',F)*EXR) ; 
2172    
2173   YI2FDEF(F).. 
2174              YIF('hfrur',F) =E= SUM(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone2')), WF 
      (F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) 
2175                       + shifN('hfrur',F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - SUM(A$AAGR(A),  
      WF(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) - trnsfr('ROW',F)*EXR) ; 
2176    
2177   YI3FDEF(F).. 
2178              YIF('hssru',F) =E= SUM(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone3')), WF 
      (F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) 
2179                      + shifN('hssru',F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - SUM(A$AAGR(A), W 
      F(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) - trnsfr('ROW',F)*EXR) ; 
2180    
2181   YI4FDEF(F).. 
2182              YIF('hsnru',F) =E= SUM(A$(AAGR(A) and MAPAZONE(A,'zone4')), WF 
      (F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) 
2183                      + shifN('hsnru',F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - SUM(A$AAGR(A), W 
      F(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) - trnsfr('ROW',F)*EXR) ; 
2184    
2185  * YIFDEF(INSD,F)$shif(INSD,F).. 
2186  *                 YIF(INSD,F) =E= shif(INSDE,F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - trnsfr( 
      'ROW',F)*EXR); 
2187    
2188   YIFDEF(H,F)$HURB(H).. 
2189                   YIF(H,F) =E= shifN(H,F)*((1-tf(f))*YF(F) - SUM(A$AAGR(A), 
       WF(F)*wfdist(F,A)*QF(F,A)) - trnsfr('ROW',F)*EXR); 
2190    
2191   YIDEF(INSDNG)$YI0(INSDNG).. 
2192                   YI(INSDNG) =E= 
2193                   SUM(F, YIF(INSDNG,F))  + SUM(INSDNGP, TRII(INSDNG,INSDNGP 
      )) + trnsfr(INSDNG,'GOV')*CPI + trnsfr(INSDNG,'ROW')*EXR; 
2194    
2195   TRIIDEF(INSDNG,INSDNGP)$(shii(INSDNG,INSDNGP)).. 
2196                   TRII(INSDNG,INSDNGP) =E= shii(INSDNG,INSDNGP) * (1 - MPS( 
      INSDNGP)) * (1 - TINS(INSDNGP))* YI(INSDNGP); 
2197    
2198   EHDEF(H)..      EH(H) =E= (1 - SUM(INSDNG, shii(INSDNG,H))) * (1 - MPS(H) 
      ) * (1 - TINS(H)) * YI(H); 
2199    
2200   HMDEM(C,H)$betam(C,H).. 
2201                   PQ(C)*QH(C,H) =E= 
2202                   PQ(C)*gammam(C,H) + betam(C,H)*( EH(H) - SUM(CP, PQ(CP)*g 
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      ammam(CP,H)) - SUM((A,CP), PXAC(A,CP)*gammah(A,CP,H))) ; 
2203    
2204   HADEM(A,C,H)$betah(A,C,H).. 
2205                   PXAC(A,C)*QHA(A,C,H) =E= 
2206                   PXAC(A,C)*gammah(A,C,H) + betah(A,C,H)*(EH(H) - SUM(CP, P 
      Q(CP)*gammam(CP,H)) - SUM((AP,CP), PXAC(AP,CP)*gammah(AP,CP,H))) ; 
2207    
2208   INVDEM(C)$CINV(C).. QINV(C) =E= IADJ*qbarinv(C); 
2209    
2210   GOVDEM(C,GOVF).. QG(C,GOVF) =E= MGADJ*GADJ(GOVF)*qbarg(C,GOVF); 
2211    
2212   YGDEF..         YG =E= SUM(INSDNG, TINS(INSDNG)*YI(INSDNG)) 
2213                   + SUM(f, tf(F)*YF(F)) 
2214                   + SUM(A, tva(A)*PVA(A)*QVA(A)) 
2215                   + SUM(A, ta(A)*PA(A)*QA(A)) 
2216                   + SUM((CM,R), tm(CM,R)*pwm(CM,R)*QM(CM,R))*EXR 
2217                   + SUM((CE,R), te(CE,R)*pwe(CE,R)*QE(CE,R))*EXR 
2218                   + SUM(C, TQ(C)*PQ(C)*QQ(C)) 
2219                   + SUM(F, YIF('GOV',F)) 
2220                   + trnsfr('GOV','ROW')*EXR; 
2221    
2222   EGDEF..         EG =E= SUM((C,GOVF), PQ(C)*QG(C,GOVF)) + SUM(INSDNG, trns 
      fr(INSDNG,'GOV'))*CPI; 
2223    
2224    
2225  *System constraint block ---------------------------------- 
2226    
2227   FACEQUIL(F)..   SUM(A, QF(F,A)) =E= QFS(F); 
2228    
2229   COMEQUIL(C)..   QQ(C) =E= SUM(A, QINT(C,A)) + SUM(H, QH(C,H)) + 
SUM(GOVF, 
       QG(C,GOVF)) + QINV(C) + qdst(C) + QT(C); 
2230    
2231   CURACCBAL..     SUM((CM,R), pwm(CM,R)*QM(CM,R)) + SUM(F, trnsfr('ROW',F)) 
       =E= SUM((CE,R), pwe(CE,R)*QE(CE,R)) + SUM(INSD, trnsfr(INSD,'ROW')) + FSA 
      V; 
2232    
2233   GOVBAL..        YG =E= EG + GSAV; 
2234    
2235   TINSDEF(INSDNG).. TINS(INSDNG) =E= tinsbar(INSDNG)*(1 + TINSADJ*tins01(IN 
      SDNG)) + DTINS*tins01(INSDNG); 
2236    
2237   MPSDEF(INSDNG)..  MPS(INSDNG)  =E= mpsbar(INSDNG)*(1 + 
MPSADJ*mps01(INSDN 
      G)) + DMPS*mps01(INSDNG); 
2238    
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2239   TQDEF(C)..      TQ(C) =E= tqbar(C)*(1 + TQADJ*tq01(C)) + DTQ*tq01(C); 
2240    
2241   SAVINVBAL..     SUM(INSDNG, MPS(INSDNG) * (1 - TINS(INSDNG)) * 
YI(INSDNG) 
      ) + GSAV + FSAV*EXR =E= 
2242                   SUM(C, PQ(C)*QINV(C)) + SUM(C, PQ(C)*qdst(C)) + WALRAS; 
2243    
2244   TABSEQ..        TABS =E= SUM((C,H), PQ(C)*QH(C,H)) + SUM((A,C,H), PXAC(A, 
      C)*QHA(A,C,H)) 
2245                   + SUM((C,GOVF), PQ(C)*QG(C,GOVF)) + SUM(C, PQ(C)*QINV(C)) 
       + SUM(C, PQ(C)*qdst(C)); 
2246    
2247   INVABEQ..       INVSHR*TABS =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*QINV(C)) + SUM(C, PQ(C)*qdst 
      (C)); 
2248    
2249   GDABEQ(GOVF)..  GOVSHR(GOVF)*TABS =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*QG(C,GOVF)); 
2250    
2251   GDABEQ2..       MGOVSHR*TABS =E= SUM((C,GOVF), PQ(C)*QG(C,GOVF)); 
2252    
2253   GDPEQ..         GDP =E= SUM(A, PVA(A)*QVA(A)); 
2254    
2255   INVGDP..        INVGDPSHR*GDP =E= SUM(C, PQ(C)*QINV(C)) + SUM(C, 
PQ(C)*qd 
      st(C)); 
2256    
2257   GOVGDP..        GOVGDPSHR*GDP =E= SUM((GOVF,C), PQ(C)*QG(C,GOVF)); 
2258    
2259   OBJEQ..         WALRASSQR   =E= WALRAS*WALRAS ; 
2260    
2261  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2262  *9. MODEL DEFINITION ----------------------------------------------------- 
2263  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      2264    
2265  MODEL STANDCGE  standard CGE model / 
2266  *Price block (10) 
2267   PMDEF.PM 
2268   PEDEF.PE 
2269   PQDEF.PQ 
2270   PXDEF.PX 
2271   PDDDEF.PDD 
2272   PXDEF2 
2273   PADEF.PA 
2274   PINTADEF.PINTA 
2275   PVADEF.PVA 
2276   CPIDEF 
2277   DPIDEF 
 272 
2278  *Production and trade block (17) 
2279   CESAGGPRD 
2280   CESAGGFOC 
2281   LEOAGGINT.QINTA 
2282   LEOAGGVA 
2283   CESVAPRD.QVA 
2284   QVADEF.QVAADJ 
2285   CESVAFOC 
2286   CESVAPRD2 
2287   CESVAFOC2 
2288   INTDEM.QINT 
2289   COMPRDFN.PXAC 
2290   OUTAGGFN.QX 
2291   OUTAGGFOC.QXAC 
2292   CET 
2293   CET2 
2294   ESUPPLY.QE 
2295   ARMINGTON 
2296   COSTMIN 
2297   ARMINGTON2 
2298   QTDEM.QT 
2299   LBRSUPPLY 
2300   WFREALEQ.WFREAL 
2301   WFDEF.WF 
2302   RELWAGEQ 
2303  *Institution block (12) 
2304   YFDEF.YF 
2305   YIFDEF.YIF 
2306   YI1FDEF 
2307   YI2FDEF 
2308   YI3FDEF 
2309   YI4FDEF 
2310   YIDEF.YI 
2311   EHDEF.EH 
2312   TRIIDEF.TRII 
2313   HMDEM.QH 
2314   HADEM.QHA 
2315   EGDEF.EG 
2316   YGDEF.YG 
2317   GOVDEM.QG 
2318   GOVBAL 
2319   INVDEM.QINV 
2320  *System-constraint block (9) 
2321   FACEQUIL 
2322   COMEQUIL 
2323   CURACCBAL 
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2324   TINSDEF.TINS 
2325   MPSDEF.MPS 
2326   TQDEF.TQ 
2327   SAVINVBAL.WALRAS 
2328   TABSEQ.TABS 
2329   INVABEQ 
2330   GDABEQ 
2331   GDABEQ2 
2332  *Ghana (sectors with residual exports instead of CET) 
2333   EXPRESID1 
2334   EXPRESID2 
2335   GDPEQ 
2336   INVGDP 
2337   GOVGDP 
2338   ICADEF 
2339   ICA1DEF2 
2340   ICA1DEF.ICAVA1 
2341   ICATOTDEF.ICATOT 
2342   / 
2343   ; 
2344    
2345  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2346  *10. FIXING VARIABLES NOT IN MODEL AT ZERO ------------------------------- 
2347  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2348    
2349    ALPHAVAADJ.FX(A) = 1; 
2350    PDD.FX(C)$(NOT CD(C)) = 0; 
2351    PDS.FX(C)$(NOT CD(C)) = 0; 
2352    PE.FX(C,R)$(NOT CER(C,R)) = 0; 
2353    PM.FX(C,R)$(NOT CMR(C,R)) = 0; 
2354    PX.FX(C)$(NOT CX(C)) = 0; 
2355    PXAC.FX(A,C)$(NOT SAM(A,C)) = 0; 
2356    PVA.FX(A)$(NOT PVA0(A)) = 0; 
2357    QD.FX(C)$(NOT CD(C)) = 0; 
2358    QE.FX(C,R)$(NOT CER(C,R)) = 0; 
2359    QF.FX(F,A)$(NOT (MFA1(F,A) + SUM(FP, MFA2(FP,F,A)))) = 0; 
2360    QG.FX(C,GOVF)$(NOT SAM(C,'GOV')) = 0; 
2361    QH.FX(C,H)$(NOT SAM(C,H)) = 0; 
2362    QHA.FX(A,C,H)$(NOT BETAH(A,C,H)) = 0; 
2363    QINT.FX(C,A)$(NOT SAM(C,A)) = 0; 
2364    QINV.FX(C)$(NOT CINV(C)) = 0; 
2365    QM.FX(C,R)$(NOT CMR(C,R)) = 0; 
2366    QQ.FX(C)$(NOT (CD(C) OR CM(C))) = 0; 
2367    QT.FX(C)$(NOT CT(C)) = 0; 
2368    QVA.FX(A)$(NOT QVA0(A)) = 0; 
2369    QX.FX(C)$(NOT CX(C)) = 0; 
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2370    QXAC.FX(A,C)$(NOT SAM(A,C)) = 0; 
2371    TRII.FX(INSDNG,INSDNGP)$(NOT SAM(INSDNG,INSDNGP)) = 0; 
2372    WFREAL.FX(F)$(NOT WFREAL0(F)) = 0; 
2373    YI.FX(INS)$(NOT INSD(INS)) = 0; 
2374    YIF.FX(INS,F)$((NOT INSD(INS)) OR (NOT SAM(INS,F))) = 0; 
2375    YI.FX(INS)$(NOT YI0(INS)) = 0; 
2376    
2377  *  PINTA.FX(A)$(NOT QINTA0(A)) = 0; 
2378  *  QINTA.FX(A)$(NOT QA0(A)) = 0; 
2379    
2380    
2381    
2382  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      2383  *11. MODEL CLOSURE ------------------------------------------------------- 
      2384  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2385    
      In the simulation file, SIM.GMS, the user chooses between 
      alternative closures. Those choices take precedence over the choices 
      made in this file. 
 
      In the following segment, closures is selected for the base model 
      solution in this file. The clearing variables for micro and macro 
      constraints are as follows: 
 
      FACEQUIL - WF: for each factor, the economywide wage is the 
      market-clearing variable in a setting with perfect factor mobility across 
      activities. 
 
      CURACCBAL - EXR: a flexible exchange rate clears the current account of 
      the RoW. 
 
      GOVBAL - GSAV: flexible government savings clears the government 
      account. 
 
      SAVINVBAL - SADJ: the savings rates of domestic institutions are scaled 
      to generate enough savings to finance exogenous investment quantities 
      (investment-driven savings). 
 
      The CPI is the model numeraire. 
2411    
2412  *Factor markets ---------------- 
2413    
2414  *Disaggregate factors: 
2415   QFS.FX(FDIS)$(NOT LREL(FDIS))  = QFS0(FDIS); 
2416   QFS.LO(F)$(FLS(F) AND FDIS(F)) = -INF; 
2417   QFS.UP(F)$(FLS(F) AND FDIS(F)) = +INF; 
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2418   WF.LO(FDIS)        = -inf; 
2419   WF.UP(FDIS)        = +inf; 
2420   WFDIST.FX(FDIS,A)  = WFDIST0(FDIS,A); 
2421    
2422  parameter 
2423  chkQFS0(F) 
2424  ; 
2425  chkQFS0(FDIS)$(NOT LREL(FDIS))  = QFS0(FDIS); 
2426    
2427  display chkQFS0; 
2428    
2429  *Aggregate factors: 
2430   WF.LO(F)$SUM((FP,A), MFA2(F,FP,A))    = -inf; 
2431   WF.UP(F)$SUM((FP,A), MFA2(F,FP,A))    = +inf; 
2432   QFS.LO(F)$SUM((FP,A), MFA2(F,FP,A)) = -INF; 
2433   QFS.UP(F)$SUM((FP,A), MFA2(F,FP,A)) = +INF; 
2434   WFDIST.LO(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A))  = -INF; 
2435   WFDIST.UP(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A))  = +INF; 
2436   QF.LO(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A))  = -INF; 
2437   QF.UP(F,A)$SUM(FP, MFA2(F,FP,A))  = +INF; 
2438    
2439  *Current account of RoW ---------- 
2440    
2441  * EXR.FX       = EXR0; 
2442   FSAV.FX      = FSAV0; 
2443    
2444  *Import and export prices (in FCU) are fixed. A change in model 
2445  *specification is required if these prices are to be endogenous. 
2446   PWM.FX(C,R)  = PWM0(C,R) ; 
2447   PWE.FX(C,R)  = PWE0(C,R) ; 
2448    
2449  *Current government balance ------ 
2450    
2451   GSAV.FX     = GSAV0 ; 
2452   TINSADJ.FX  = TINSADJ0; 
2453    
2454   DTINS.FX    = DTINS0; 
2455   DTQ.FX      = DTQ0; 
2456   TQADJ.FX    = TQADJ0; 
2457   GADJ.FX(GOVF) = GADJ0(GOVF); 
2458  * MGADJ.FX    = MGADJ0; 
2459  * GOVSHR.FX(GOVF)   = GOVSHR0(GOVF) ; 
2460  * MGOVSHR.FX  = MGOVSHR0; 
2461    
2462  *Savings-investment balance ------ 
2463    
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2464   MPSADJ.FX = MPSADJ0; 
2465   DMPS.FX   = DMPS0; 
2466  * IADJ.FX   = IADJ0; 
2467  * INVSHR.FX = INVSHR0 ; 
2468    
2469  *Numeraire price index ----------- 
2470    
2471   CPI.FX        = CPI0; 
2472  * DPI.FX        = DPI0; 
2473    
2474    
2475  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2476  *12. DISPLAY OF MODEL PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES ------------------------
--- 
  2477  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2478    
2479  DISPLAY 
2480  *All parameters in this file and include files are displayed in 
2481  *alphabetical order. 
2482    
2483  ALPHAA   , ALPHAVA0  , ALPHAAC  , ALPHAQ    , ALPHAT    , ALPHAVA 
2484  BETAH    , BETAM     , BUDSHR   , BUDSHR2   , BUDSHRCHK , CPI0 
2485  CWTS     , CWTSCHK   , DELTAA   , DELTAAC   , DELTAQ 
2486  DELTAT   , DELTAVA   , DPI0     , DMPS0     , DTINS0    , DWTS 
2487  DWTSCHK  , EG0       , EH0      , ELASAC    , ELASCHK   , EXR0 
2488  FRISCH   , FSAV0     , GADJ0    , MGADJ0    , GAMMAH   , GAMMAM    , GOVSH 
      R0   , MGOVSHR0 
2489  GSAV0    , IADJ0     , ICA      , ICD       , ICE       , ICM 
2490  INTA     , INVSHR0   , IVA      , LESELAS1  , LESELAS2  , MPS0 
2491  MPSADJ0  , MPSBAR    , PA0      , PDD0      , PDS0      , PE0 
2492  PINTA0   , PM0       , POP      , PQ0       , PRODELAS  , PRODELAS2 
2493  PVA0     , PWE0      , PWM0     , PX0       , PXAC0     , QA0 
2494  QBARG    , QBARG0    , QBARINV  , QD0       , QDST      , QDST0 
2495  QE0      , QF0       , QF2BASE  , QFBASE    , QFS0      , QFSBASE 
2496  QG0      , QH0       , QHA0     , QINT0     , QINTA0    , QINV0 
2497  QM0      , QQ0       , QT0      , QVA0      , QX0       , QXAC0 
2498  RHOA     , RHOAC     , RHOQ     , RHOT      , RHOVA     , SAM 
2499  SAMBALCHK, SHCTD     , SHCTE    , SHCTM     , SHIF      , SHIFCHK 
2500  SHII     , SHRHOME   , SUPERNUM , TA        , TA0 
2501  TABS0    , TAXPAR    , TE       , TE0       , TF        , TF0 
2502  THETA    , TINS0     , TINSADJ0 , TINSBAR   , TM        , TM0 
2503  TQ0      , TQ0       , TRADELAS , TRII0     , TRNSFR    , TVA 
2504  TVA0     , WALRAS0   , WF0      , WFREAL0   , WFA       , WFDIST0   , YF0 
2505  YG0      , YI0       , YIF0 
2506  ; 
2507    
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2508  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2509  *13. SOLUTION STATEMENT -------------------------------------------------- 
2510  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2511    
2512  OPTIONS ITERLIM = 1000, LIMROW = 1500, LIMCOL = 1500, SOLPRINT=ON, 
2513          MCP=PATH, NLP=CONOPT2 ; 
2514    
      These options are useful for debugging. When checking whether the 
      initial data represent a solution, set LIMROW to a value greater than 
      the number of equations and search for three asterisks in the listing 
      file. SOLPRINT=ON provides a complete listing file. The program also 
      has a number of display statements, so when running experiments it is 
      usually not necessary to provide a solution print as well. 
2523    
2524   STANDCGE.HOLDFIXED   = 1 ; 
2525   STANDCGE.TOLINFREP   = .0001 ; 
2526    
      The HOLDFIXED option converts all variables which are fixed (.FX) into 
      parameters. They are then not solved as part of the model. 
      The TOLINFREP parameter sets the tolerance for determinining whether 
      initial values of variables represent a solution of the model 
      equations. Whether these initial equation values are printed is 
      determimed by the LIMROW option. Equations which are not satsfied to 
      the degree TOLINFREP are printed with three asterisks next to their 
      listing. 
2537    
2538   SOLVE STANDCGE USING MCP ; 
2539    
2540  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2541  *14. OPTIONAL NLP MODEL DEFINITION AND SOLUTION STATEMENT ------
---------- 
     2542  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2543    
      Define a model that can be solved using a nonlinear programming (NLP) 
      solver. The model includes the equation OBJEQ which defines the 
      variable WALRASSQR, which is the square of the Walras' Law variable, 
      which must be zero in equilibrium. 
2550    
2551  MODEL NLPCGE  standard CGE model for NLP solver / 
2552  *Price block (10) 
2553   PMDEF 
2554   PEDEF 
2555   PQDEF 
2556   PXDEF 
2557   PDDDEF 
2558   PADEF 
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2559   PINTADEF 
2560   PVADEF 
2561   CPIDEF 
2562   DPIDEF 
2563  *Production and trade block (17) 
2564   CESAGGPRD 
2565   CESAGGFOC 
2566   LEOAGGINT 
2567   LEOAGGVA 
2568   CESVAPRD 
2569   CESVAFOC 
2570   INTDEM 
2571   COMPRDFN 
2572   OUTAGGFN 
2573   OUTAGGFOC 
2574   CET 
2575   CET2 
2576   ESUPPLY 
2577   ARMINGTON 
2578   COSTMIN 
2579   ARMINGTON2 
2580   QTDEM 
2581   LBRSUPPLY 
2582   WFREALEQ 
2583  *Institution block (12) 
2584   YFDEF 
2585   YIFDEF 
2586   YIDEF 
2587   EHDEF 
2588   TRIIDEF 
2589   HMDEM 
2590   HADEM 
2591   EGDEF 
2592   YGDEF 
2593   GOVDEM 
2594   GOVBAL 
2595   INVDEM 
2596  *System-constraint block (9) 
2597   FACEQUIL 
2598   COMEQUIL 
2599   CURACCBAL 
2600   TINSDEF 
2601   MPSDEF 
2602   SAVINVBAL 
2603   TABSEQ 
2604   INVABEQ 
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2605   GDABEQ 
2606   GDABEQ2 
2607   OBJEQ 
2608   GDPEQ 
2609   INVGDP 
2610   GOVGDP 
2611   / 
2612   ; 
2613    
2614   NLPCGE.HOLDFIXED   = 1 ; 
2615   NLPCGE.TOLINFREP   = .0001 ; 
2616    
2617  * SOLVE NLPCGE MINIMIZING WALRASSQR USING NLP ; 
2618    
2619  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     2620  *15. SOLUTION REPORTS ---------------------------------------------------- 
2621  *------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2622    
2623  *Optional include file defining report parameters summarizing economic 
2624  *data for the base year. 
2625    
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